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THE MORAL DUALISM OF MACHIAVELLI

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ABSTRACT

The Moral Dualism of Machiavelli.—The life and times of Machiavelli are reflected in his writings. He was a true product of the age. Two radically different points of view are presented by his critics; the one is characterized by vehement denunciation and censure, the other by ardent appreciation and praise. The explanation of this enigma of contradiction is found in his twofold philosophy of life. His *moral idealism* presented in *Thoughts of a Statesman* represents his concept of what men should do in a perfect society. But society is not perfect, and his *ethical opportunism*, disclosed in portions of *The Prince*, is based on a description of what men do *under the circumstances*—an interpretation of Florence in the sixteenth century. He describes dispassionately and without equivocation the age-long conflict between the dictates of *idealism* and of *practical necessity*.

Nicholo Machiavelli was born in the midst of the most turbulent period of Italian history, grew to manhood in the Florence of Lorenzo the Magnificent, entered the public service at the age of twenty-nine, served his country efficiently and without reproach for fourteen years, lost his office with the advent of the Medici, was falsely accused of complicity in revolutionary activities, was tortured and imprisoned, and, although released for want of evidence, was banished from Florence and retired at the age of forty to his small family estate at San Casciano a crushed and dispirited man, there to brood over the malignity of fortune to which he had been subjected and to write, as an outlet for his pent-up intellectual and emotional energies. It was here, and under these conditions, that he wrote *The Prince*—a book which has affected profoundly the thinking of men for four centuries.

Morley makes an admirable summary of the adverse criticisms:

In the long and fierce struggle from the fifteenth century onwards, among rival faiths, between contending forces in civil government, Machiavelli was hated and attacked from every side. In the great rising up of new types of life in the Church, and of life in the State, his name stood for something that partisans of old and new alike professed to abhor. The Church first tolerated, if it did not patronize, his writings; but soon under the double stress of the

Reformation in Germany on one hand and the Pagan Renaissance in Italy on the other, it placed him in that index of forbidden books which now first, 1557, in dread of the new art of printing, crept into formal existence. He speedily came to be denounced as schismatical, heretical, perverse, the impious foe of faith and truth. He was burned in effigy. His book was denounced as written with the very fingers of Satan himself. The vituperation of the sixteenth century had never been surpassed either among learned or unlearned men and the dead Machiavelli came in for his full share of unmeasured words. As Voltaire has said of Dante that his fame is secure because nobody reads him, so in an inverse sense, the bad name of Machiavelli grew worse because men reproached, confuted and cursed but never read. Catholics attacked him as the enemy of the Holy See, and Protestants attacked him because he looked to a restoration of the spirit of Ancient Rome, instead of a restoration of the faith and discipline of the primitive Church. While both of them railed at him, Catholic and Protestant each reviled the other as Machiavellist. In France National prejudice against the famous Italian Queen-mother hit Machiavelli too, for his book was declared to be the oracle of Catherine de Medici, to whose father it was dedicated; it was held responsible for the Bartholomew massacre and the Huguenot wars. In Spain opposite ground was taken, and he who elsewhere was blamed as the advocate of persecution was abominated here as the enemy of wars of religion, and the advocate of that monstrous thing, civil toleration. In England, Royalists called him an atheist, and roundheads called him a Jesuit. A recent German writer has noted 395 references to him in our Elizabethan literature, all fixing him with the craft, malice and hypocrisy of the Evil One. Everybody knows how Hudibras finds in his Christian name the origin of our domestic title for the devil though scholars have long taught us to refer it to Nyke, the water-goblin of Norse Mythology. . . . Whenever a bad name floated into currency it was flung at Machiavelli and his own was counted the worst that could be flung at a bad man.¹

The reaction against this odium and hate has carried favorable criticism to equally exaggerated extremes. Macaulay says: "It may seem ridiculous to say that we are acquainted with few writings which exhibit so much elevation of sentiment, so pure and warm a zeal for the public good, or so just a view of the duties and rights of citizens as those of Machiavelli. Yet so it is."² Morley tells us that "Thomas Cromwell, the powerful Minister of Henry VIII told Cardinal Pole that he had better fling aside dreamers like Plato, and read a new book by an ingenious Italian which treated the arts of government practically." He speaks

¹ *The Romanes Lectures, Machiavelli*, pp. 6-8.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 195.

further of Bacon who was "profoundly attracted by the genius of Machiavelli" and who said: "We are much beholden to Machiavelli and others that wrote what men do, and not what they ought to do."¹ Morley gives his own estimate as follows:

He has the highest of all the virtues that prose writing can possess—he is simple, unaffected, direct, vivid and rational. He possesses the truest of all forms of irony, which consists in literal statement, and of which you are not sure whether it is irony or naïveté. He disentangles his thought from the fact so skillfully and cleanly that it looks almost obvious. Nobody has ever surpassed him of throwing pregnant vigor into a single concentrated word—of some pages it has been well said that they are written with the point of a stiletto. He uses few of our loud easy words of praise and blame; he is not often sorry or glad; he does not smile and he does not scold; he is seldom indignant and he is never surprised. He has not even the mastering human infirmity of trying to persuade. His business is that of the clinical lecturer, explaining the nature of the malady, the proper treatment, the chances of recovery. He strips away the flowing garments of convention and commonplace; closes his will against sympathy and feeling; ignores pity as an irrelevance just as the operating surgeon does.²

Machiavelli's dust now reposes in Florence beside that of Michael Angelo and Galileo in the Church of Sante Croce. A medallion on the monument erected to commemorate his worth is inscribed with the words: "So great a name no praise can match." The Italian government, recognizing his great merit, has placed his bust in the Pincio Gardens in Rome, and in 1869 placed upon the modest house in which he lived and died in the Via Guicciardini a tablet bearing the inscription:

To Nicholas Machiavelli
The intrepid and prophetic precursor of National Unity
The first Institutor and Master of Her Own
In place of Adventitious Arms
United and Armed Italy placed this tablet
On his fourth centenary 3rd May 1869

In view of the wide disparity between these diatribes and encomiums upon the character and work of Machiavelli, it would appear, since we cannot impugn the motives nor deny the sincerity of either faction, that the discrepancy lies in one or the other of

¹ Morley, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21.

two alternatives. Either his interpreters hold to such widely divergent standards of ethics that they appraise the same things differently, or holding to a common standard of judgment they are evaluating different things.

The former alternative seems to us to lack any reasonable degree of probability, for although men differ in details and hold what we call "shades of opinion" upon public policies history furnishes no example of diametrically opposite view upon fundamental problems of public morality. The latter possesses the characteristics of reasonableness, provided it can be shown, as we think it can, that Machiavelli possessed two distinct standards of ethical judgment, and this it is the purpose of this paper to establish.

MACHIAVELLI'S ETHICAL IDEALISM

Throughout the entire range of his political writings, but especially in the *Discourses on Livy* and in *The Prince*, are to be found declarations of an exalted ethical idealism unsurpassed by those of any of the world's great moral leaders.

As early as 1771 an eminent Italian jurist and man of letters extracted and classified these maxims from the writings of Machiavelli and published them with full sanction of the papal censors under the title of *Thoughts of a Statesman* for the purpose of showing the injustice of the popular concept resulting from unfair prejudice and imperfect understanding of his sentiments.

On the subject of religion where often he has been denounced as an atheist and a blasphemer he says:

"All enterprises to be undertaken should be for the honor of God and the general good of the country."

"The fear of God facilitates every enterprise undertaken by governments."

"As the observance of Divine worship is the cause of the greatness of states, so the disregard of Divine worship is the cause of their ruin."

"If in all the governments of the Christian Republics religion were maintained as it was instituted by the Divine Founder, the state and the Christian Republics would be much more united and happy than they are now."

On peace and war he says:

"A good and wise prince should love peace and avoid war."

"Arms should be reserved for the last extremity, when all other means prove insufficient."

"A prince who has any feelings of humanity cannot altogether rejoice at a victory that spreads sorrow amongst all his subjects."

Of laws he declares:

"Whoever is not restrained by the laws commits the same error as an unrestrained mob."

"In a well constituted government the laws are made for the public good, and not to satisfy the ambitions of a few."

"That government alone is durable which rests upon the free will of the governed."

"No law should ever stain the pledged faith of public engagements."

Of the ideal prince he says:

"To be humane, affable, show no sign of cruelty, pride, sensuality, nor any other vice that taints men's lives, will bring a prince honors, victories and renown."

"Everyone knows how laudable it is in a prince to keep his pledges, to live with integrity and not with craft and deceit."

"The public faith pledged by a prince to his subjects should be inviolably preserved."

On almost every page of *The Prince* he repudiates the maxims of expediency, which men may be forced by circumstances to adopt, as violations of the higher moral law.

"Wicked and nefarious means may enable a man to achieve empire but not glory."

A prince should possess all the virtues which are esteemed good. He should be liberal, merciful, and not cruel, keep faith and fulfil his pledges, and above all he should be religious and upright. Six chapters (xix—xxv) are devoted to the problem of how a prince may avoid the hard necessity of lowering his ethical standards and of employing unscrupulous means of accomplishing what he must, in the preservation of the state.

These statements contain the ideal and subjective elements of Machiavelli's moral philosophy and of his political faith. They

represent in his mind what men ought to do and to be. They are the goals toward which all men should strive. These ideas and ideals possess the same authority and constitute as much a part of his writings as any other. They may be ignored only by the prejudiced interpreter who selects, in order to establish his thesis, only such sentiments as suit his purpose without regard to truth or justice.

MACHIAVELLI'S PHILOSOPHY OF EXPEDIENCY

But, in common with men in general, Machiavelli possessed a philosophy of expediency and of crisis—that the end justifies the means—a doctrine in theory always repudiated but in practice always followed. Mankind has always a weakness, if it is a weakness, of making virtue of necessity. We are no less familiar than was Machiavelli with the fact that inexorable conditions, not theories, shape individual and public policies.

Machiavelli's fault was that he accepted this doctrine without apology; that he described it without equivocation. Unhampered by conventional standards of dissimulation and basing his considerations upon observation and experience he constructed a psychology of human behavior which for fearlessness and integrity of thinking, acuteness of penetration, and accuracy of description, remains unsurpassed in the literature of moral and social philosophy.

What then were the conditions which compelled him to compromise his idealism? What were the ends to be sought which justified the resort to "wicked and nefarious" means as the only method of their accomplishment? The sad plight of his beloved Italy and the hope of her redemption, is Machiavelli's answer.

All historians of the time agree that the intellectual renaissance in Italy was accompanied by inexplicable moral contradictions. Villari says: "Everywhere liberty was disappearing, tyrants were springing up; family ties grew weaker and weaker; the domestic hearth was profaned; no man trusted any longer the good faith of the Italians."¹

Rogers remarks:

A civilization sprang up which, as opposed to the Religious civilization of the Middle Ages, was thoroughly pagan in its spirit—pagan not only in its

¹ *Nicholo Machiavelli and His Times*, I, 5.

love of beauty and literature, and its delight in living, but also—as a reaction against the asceticism of the Church—in its vices, and its frank sensualism and egoism. The whole scale of values was shifted.¹

Cust paints a still more sinister picture. He says:

At the beginning of the sixteenth century Italy was rotten to the core. In the close competition of great wickedness the Vicar of Christ easily carried off the palm, and the court of Alexander VI was probably the wickedest meeting place of men that has ever existed upon earth. No virtue, Christian or Pagan, was there to be found; little art that was not sensuous or sensual. It seemed as if Bacchus and Venus and Priapus had come to their own again, and yet Rome had not ceased to call herself Christian.²

Conditions in Florence which furnished Machiavelli with his immediate social outlook should not be overlooked. Florence was easily the most democratic, cultured, and corrupt of the Italian Republics. It presented a confused chaos of events, which even the brilliance of Machiavelli could scarcely disentangle.³

For a time the burning eloquence of the Dominican monk, Savonarola, was sufficient to check the profligacy of the city and he became the dominating figure in the formation of the Republic. His ascendancy, however, was short-lived. Reforms could not sink deeply and violent reaction followed quickly. In 1498 Franciscan jealousies and popular clamor were supplemented by the bitter hostility of the unscrupulous pope, Alexander VI, and Savonarola was arrested, convicted as a heretic, executed, and his body burned in the public square. The Republic continued a turbulent existence for eighteen years. In 1512 the Medici were again restored to control and the liberty of Florence came to an end. Political intrigues and assassinations continued until Florence was reduced to the position of a grand duchy of Tuscany.

It was a time when politics was divorced from morals but so was religion. Conspiracy, treachery, deceit, characterized public and private action. Perhaps Machiavelli's perspective was distorted, but as he saw it, the hope of Italy's redemption lay, not in the advocacy of the ethics of ultimate peace, but in the immediate efficacy

¹ *A Student's History of Philosophy*, p. 244.

² *Introduction to Machiavelli* in Rudor Translation, edited by Henley, I, 17.

³ See Machiavelli's *History of Florence*.

of a political genius who could bring order out of chaos, repel the foreign invader, and restore to Italy her lost liberties. This, for moral reasons, was the supreme enterprise of the hour.

This, then, was that "last extremity" for which arms should be "reserved." For this reason he counsels the prince to "have no other thought or object so much at heart and make no other thing so much his personal study as the art of war and the organization and discipline of his army."¹

It may be superfluous to observe by way of comment that Machiavelli's philosophy of "preparedness," a product of Italy's national emergency of his day, was never more ably nor forcibly stated by our own renowned Roosevelt in the stormy days of international crisis immediately preceding our entrance into the world-war.

The subject of the personal character of the successful prince, our author approaches with the same candor and sang-froid exhibited in his preliminary discussions. Nothing matters but the salvation of Florence. Patriotism is a passion. "Reasons of state" are his justification for the conduct of the prince. Nor is he unaware of the risk incurred in departing from the customary treatment of the subject. He explains:

But, as my aim is to write something that may be useful to him for whom it is intended, it seemed to me proper to pursue the real truth of the matter rather than to indulge in mere speculation on the same; for many have imagined republics and principalities such as have never been known to exist in reality. For the manner in which men live is so different from the way in which they ought to live that he who leaves the common course for that which he ought to follow will find that it leads him to ruin rather than to safety. For a man who, in all respects, will carry out only his professions of good, will be apt to be ruined among so many who are evil. A prince therefore who desires to maintain himself must learn to be not always good, but to be so or not as necessity may require.²

After enumerating a long list of virtues and their alternate vices he continues:

I am well aware that it would be most praiseworthy for a prince to possess all of the above named qualities that are esteemed good; but as he cannot have them all, nor entirely observe them . . . he should at least be prudent enough

¹ *The Prince*, chap. xiv.

² *Ibid.*, chap. xv.

to know how to avoid the infamy of those vices which rob him of his state; . . . for all things considered, it will be found that some things that seem like virtue will lead you to ruin if you follow them; whilst others, that apparently are vices, will, if followed, result in your safety and well being.¹

Four illustrations are given in support of this thesis:

First: "It is well for a prince to be deemed liberal," nevertheless it is a virtue that must be indulged with great prudence if it is not to react disastrously. This is a very familiar maxim in modern politics. For even if that liberality should concern the expenditure of public revenues in the interest of municipal government, if it involves the tax-rate, it is likely to incur the charge of extravagance and not infrequently leads to downfall of the administration. Hence a reputation for prudence and economy is safer political expediency.²

Second: "Every prince ought to desire the reputation of being merciful, and not cruel; at the same time he should be careful not to misuse that mercy. . . . A prince, therefore, should not mind the ill repute of cruelty, when he can thereby keep his subjects united and loyal, for a few displays of severity will be more merciful than to allow, by an excess of clemency, disorders to occur, which are apt to result in rapine and murder; for these injure a whole community whilst the executions ordered by a prince fall only upon a few individuals."³ This is a sad concession, but in the absence of effective means of crime prevention, it is the only philosophy Chicago, Philadelphia, or San Francisco knows how to employ in their efforts to reduce their crime waves, or suppress the violence of mobs.

Third: This calls forth the further question, whether it is better for the prince to be loved than feared. "It will naturally be answered," he replies, "that it would be desirable to be both." But suppose you have to choose between the two. Suppose children disobey their parents; suppose a criminal assault is made with intent to kill; suppose Germany attempts to invade Belgium; and you have for the time being to choose between love and fear. Machiavelli answers, "It is safer to be feared than loved." Here we have stated in naked honesty the traditional doctrine of force

¹ *Ibid.*

² Cf. *ibid.*, chap. xvi.

³ *Ibid.*, chap. xvii.

as a means of social control; in the discipline of children by punishment, intimidation as a means of criminal repression, the imprisonment of conscientious objectors in the interest of public morale, and the resort to war.

Fourth: "It must be evident to everyone that it is more praiseworthy for a prince always to maintain good faith and practice integrity rather than craft and deceit. And yet the experience of our own times has shown that those princes have achieved great things who made small account of good faith and who understood by cunning to circumvent the intelligence of others; and that in the end they got the better of those whose actions were dictated by loyalty and good faith.

"A sagacious prince then cannot and should not fulfil his pledges when their observance is contrary to his interest, and when the causes that induced him to pledge his faith no longer exist. If men were all good, then, indeed, this precept would be bad, but as men are naturally bad, and will not observe their faith toward you, you must in the same way not observe yours to them, and no prince ever yet lacked legitimate reasons with which to color his want of good faith. A prince should seem to be merciful, faithful, humane, religious, and upright, and should even be so in reality, but he should have a versatile mind, capable of changing readily, according as the winds and changes of fortune bid him; and as has been said above, not to swerve from the good if possible, but to know how to resort to evil if necessity demands it.

"A prince then should look mainly to the successful maintenance of his state. The means which he employs for this will always be accounted honorable and he will be praised by everybody."

It is upon this chapter, more than any other portion of his writings, that Machiavelli's sinister reputation depends. And yet Morley may be correct when he observes that "we are shocked by his maxims in proportion to our forgetfulness of history."² Three times in this chapter he repudiates the practice of deception as a general principle of political morality—it is simply a bad method which reason of state may require under existing conditions. The

¹*The Prince*, chap. xviii.

²*Romanes Lectures, Machiavelli*, p. 38.

history of treaties and of international diplomacy among modern nations can hardly be cited in refutation of the accuracy of his description.

Nothing in literature so completely shocks us into the realization that our political and social theories are hypothetical and idealistic. Despite our denial that it is ever right to do evil that good may come, it would require volumes to record instances in which individual and public morality has justified exceptions to the rule. The surgeon inflicts pain, and puts the life of the patient in jeopardy, in the interest of future health. We sanction homicide in self-defense. Capital punishment is still defended by many as justifiable in the interest of public safety. War suspends the Decalogue, reverses the Christian attitude toward enemies, plunges society into moral chaos and condemns millions of men to cruel death, and yet it is justified "to save the union," "to make the world safe for democracy," or "to end war."

To charge the great Italian with the invention of the philosophy of opportunism; to coin out of his name a synonym for treachery and deception; to impugn his motives because he sought to get behind fancy pictures to the truth of things, seems rather a concession to popular prejudice based upon ignorance of his real purpose and motive than a sincere desire to render a balanced judgment.

It was his misfortune that he lived in Italy in the sixteenth century and that his genius was applied to the interpretation of an unattractive epoch of social history. But this should not blind us to the merit of accurate description. It is a habit of the untutored mind to identify interpretation with defense. Had Machiavelli ever intended that *The Prince* should be regarded as presenting an ideal picture of public morality, then it would have merited all the censure it has evoked. But such was not his intention. There is no evidence that he rejected moral force as the ultimate element of government. Furthermore it is beneath the dignity of the critics to assume that he intended to practice upon Lorenzo a malicious fraud by recommending a course that would lead him to destruction, or that *The Prince* was merely a piece of grave irony intended to warn nations against the arts of ambitious men.¹

¹ Macaulay, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

In conclusion, therefore, we reaffirm that an unbiased study of the writings of Machiavelli justifies the thesis that he possessed a dual standard of ethics, and that this assumption explains the enigma which is presented in the divergent views of his critics.

His idealistic philosophy reflects the ethical idealism of the moral leaders of the ages. It merits unstinted praise. It is the goal toward which evolving civilization moves.

His philosophy of expediency, no less true to history and experience, still richly deserves the censure it receives. It is the survival of a disappearing phase of the struggle from savagery to civilization which the race is undergoing; from a society based on natural impulses to one which ultimately shall rest upon genuinely ethical foundations.

His moral idealism is the philosophy of a society for ethical culture; his ethical opportunism is that of a committee of public safety.

NEURO-PSYCHIC TECHNIQUE IN SOCIAL EVOLUTION—AN ABSTRACT*

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Mental development in man and in the lower animals may be described as the evolution of neuro-psychic technique by which the organism has improved its adjustment to its external environments. This evolution of neuro-psychic technique may be considered under two general aspects.

1. The evolution of the control of action by means of neuro-psychic technique. The stages are those of (a) chemotropism, (b) instinct, (c) overt habit, (d) language (gesture and speech), (e) internal habit (thought), and (f) external storage of internal habit symbols.

2. The conscious evaluation of conduct for the control of conduct. This aspect also evolves through six stages as follows: (a) primitive sensory orientation, (b) affective or feeling orientation or valuation, (c) primitive emotional orientation and valuation, (d) perceptual orientation and valuation, (e) conceptual orientation and valuation, and (f) external or statistical (mathematical) measurement and valuation.

The former of these two evolutionary series consists of a constant growth of acquired neuro-psychic technique by means of which control by environment evolves from the static to the flexible, until in the long run man has created his own psycho-social environment, which forms the character of the new members of society as they enter the social world and develop in it. But even in the earliest stages, where adjustment is mediated directly by inherited mechanisms, a relatively static environment selects the mechanisms. In the latter series there is an evolution from mere sensory

* This paper was read as the opening paper of the first session but is printed here only in abstract owing to limitation of space. This paper will appear entire in the September or the November issue of the *Psychological Review*, 1923.

orientation and emotional valuation of adjustment conduct up to a highly rational or acquired intellectual control which measures and values conduct patterns in quantitative terms, as well as creates the patterns by intellectual processes or thinking.

The two series are supplementary and the neuro-psychic technique of the one functions in the valuations and orientations of the other. The process of development is, in each case, from subjective control of adjustment to environment over to an objective control which, although phylogenetically a product of individual adjustment processes, has come to be mainly external to any one individual and now dominates both the immediate adjustment situation and the character or adjusting apparatus of the individual. In this way environment in its higher, and especially in its psychosocial, forms comes to dominate man directly, but intelligently, instead of, as in lower animal life, merely indirectly through the selection of inheritance and therefore blindly and unintelligently.

COMTE AND PSYCHOLOGY

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ABSTRACT

Comte and Psychology.—Comte's proper place in the development of sociology is not yet settled. This is illustrated by the variant criticisms of his psychology, some going so far as to insist he had no psychology at all. But Comte's denunciation of psychology applied only to a certain type of psychology characterized by two outstanding defects: (1) its introspective method and (2) its overemphasis of the intellect. As against that kind of a psychology Comte insisted that only two possible methods could be used, namely, a study of the physiology and structure of the brain and the other organs, and a study of the products of the mind which are found in the culture and history of a people. He attempted to use both, but was primarily interested in the latter. As against the over-intellectualism of the psychologists Comte thought the "passions" or impulses should be stressed if one is to find the explanation of human conduct.

INTRODUCTION

The place of Auguste Comte in the development of sociology is still one of dispute, although sufficient time has elapsed for the suggestion to be made that the year 1922 be observed as a Comtean centenary.¹ Though Comte is more often referred to, perhaps, than any other single writer as the founder of sociology, most of us are still confused as to what Comte actually thought, and much less agreed as to whether he had any real influence or made any contribution to sociology in the United States. The habit of dismissing Comte with the assumption that he was the founder of the science of sociology must be questioned until further research has been made. From the standpoint of the history of sociology there is still some opportunity for the solution and restatement of this very interesting problem, viz., the place of Comte's philosophy in the origin and development of sociology.

CRITICISMS OF COMTE'S PSYCHOLOGY

In order to illustrate the variety of opinions held by different writers with reference to Comte's psychology, it may be well to refer to a few such opinions selected at random. Merz, in his *History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, says,

¹ *American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1922, p. 510.

"This system, the philosophy of Auguste Comte, did not seek an extension of scientific research in the direction of psychology, which it discouraged in a very peremptory fashion."¹ McDougall, in his *Introduction to Social Psychology*, speaking of the claim of psychology to recognition as the foundation of all the social sciences, makes this statement, "of the workers in these sciences [social sciences] some, like Comte, . . . repudiate the claim of psychology to such recognition."² Professor Mead, in an article entitled "Social Psychology as a Counterpart to Physiological Psychology,"³ remarks: "The modern sociologists neither abjure psychology with Comte, nor determine what the value of the social character of human consciousness is for the psychology which they attempt to use." Approaching the matter from a little different angle, that of the validity of the introspective method, Woodworth, after pointing out the difficulties in the way of that method, continues thus: "Comte went so far as to assert that it made psychology impossible. The subject and the object of an observation cannot be the same, he said."⁴

On the other hand certain writers credit Comte with a great deal of psychological insight. Professor Ellwood quotes with approval Comte's statement that "Mental science must needs form far the largest part of sociology"⁵ and that "sociology is essentially reducible to true mental science."⁶

Frederic Harrison, after indicating Comte's rejection of a futile psychology, concludes that "Psychology, meaning the laws of mind and will, was not only an indispensable basis of Comte's system, but its rational, systematic foundation dates from Comte's suggestions."⁷ In a similar vein Lévy-Bruhl credits Comte with considerable influence in developing both physiological psychology and social psychology.⁷

One phase of the criticism of Comte calls attention to his acceptance of phrenology. The basis for such criticism is found, perhaps,

¹ III, 43. ² Pp. 1-2. ³ *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. VI (December 15, 1909).

⁴ Lecture on "Psychology," *Columbia University Lectures on Science, Philosophy, and Art*, p. 6.

⁵ *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, p. 60.

⁶ Introduction to Lévy-Bruhl's *Philosophy of Auguste Comte*, p. xii.

⁷ *Philosophy of Auguste Comte*, p. 208.

in his use of the term in his first large work, and the very important place he gives Gall in building up his own theories. With reference to the first point, his use of the term phrenology, two things may be said: first, that in *Positive Polity* Comte deplores the fact that such a term was ever used,¹ and secondly, that he makes no use of that phase of Gall's or Spurzheim's doctrines which had to do with skull formations and their assumed relations to the brain faculties. In other words, we use the term phrenology in a different sense from the one given it by Comte. A second basis of this criticism implies that Comte must have espoused the vagaries of phrenology because he was an avowed debtor to Gall and Spurzheim. As is well known, these two writers are sometimes referred to as the founders of phrenology. It is also well known that Comte looked upon Gall, especially, as the man who had done more to lay the foundations of his own theories than any other man in that field. We shall have more to say of this later. Just now it need only be pointed out that Comte got from Gall two main contributions, namely (1) the conception of the brain as a union of organs, each of which has its appropriate location in the brain; and (2) the dependence of all mental functions on such organs. In other words, Comte utilized the conception of brain physiology or cerebral functions without the vagaries of Gall and his followers. He had no use for the followers who had misinterpreted and degraded the real doctrines of their leader. "As is but too often the case, Gall's disciples resembled him in nothing but his errors."² With this we may dismiss the criticisms that have been made of Comte and allow the discussion of his actual theories to furnish the answer to many of the points suggested.

CRITICISM OF PSYCHOLOGY OF HIS DAY

Comte's attitude of hostility toward the psychology of his day falls under two headings: first, a criticism of its method; secondly, an attack on some of its doctrines. Comte's attack on psychology,

¹ "They invented, what he had always carefully avoided, their most unfortunate title of Phrenology, and endeavored to form their cerebral notions into a body of truth wholly dissociated from general physiology; and thus it fell into the hands of special adepts who were often destitute of the smallest scientific training, even in Biology," *Positive Polity*, I, 545.

² *Positive Polity*, I, 545.

as shown in these two phases, may in part explain the common impression that he had no use for psychology or did away with it altogether. It will become clear, I believe, that he had a very definite type of psychology in mind when he excoriated the method and doctrines of psychology. Let us see what his objections to the methods of psychology were.

Comte's denunciation of the method of psychology is, to my mind, the most interesting part of his whole discussion. It is especially so in view of the present-day attempts of some of the behaviorist psychologists to escape from the same difficulties by first denying the value of the same method, introspection, and then setting up another which, as will be suggested later, is not so far different from part of Comte's substitute method.

Now the essence of Comte's criticism of the psychology of his day was that it was still outside the realm of science. It was still, to use his terms, in the metaphysical or theological stages of development. What he thought he was struggling for was the bringing of it into the realm of positivity. He does not, however, claim to be original in his effort to make the study of mental phenomena positive or scientific. Gall, Spurzheim, Broussais, and Cabanis were all pioneers in introducing physiological psychology and thus laying the foundation for a scientific or positive psychology. Comte acknowledged that he was merely building on their foundations. In order to get this background of Comte's thought clearly before us it will be well to introduce some of his statements concerning this point. In an article written in 1828, reviewing a work by Broussais, Comte comes to the conclusion that the positive method is completely successful for all "who regard the study of the intellectual and moral functions as inseparably connected with that of all the other physiological phenomena, and as properly investigated by the same methods and in the same spirit."^{*} Now, according to Comte, the metaphysical psychologists were still outside the scientific fold. As he phrases it, "However, some, misconceiving in this respect the actual and unalterable direction of the human mind, have endeavored during the last ten years to transplant among us German metaphysics and to found under the name of

^{*} *Positive Polity*, Appendix, Part 6, p. 646.

psychology a pretended science completely independent of physiology, superior to it, and exclusively embracing the study of the phenomena termed *moral*.”¹ It was the task of Broussais, as Comte sees it, to turn aside from his own important work long enough to “demonstrate the emptiness and nullity of psychology.”² Broussais, Comte says, has made clear the “worthlessness of that illusory science of personified abstractions.”³ The work of Broussais, says Comte, “dissipates forever the mystical spirit, so flattering to pretentious ignorance, which inspires an instinctive repugnance towards every special and positive study, by presenting empty abstractions as superior to all real knowledge, and replunges us into the state of infancy by re-establishing, in a new form, the empire of theological conceptions.” We have here the basis of an explanation of Comte’s attitude toward what he called “psychology.”

Comte, however, thinks that the psychologists were not entirely unaffected by the historic trend to positivism. They have made efforts to make their subject scientific and thus fall into line with the tendency developing since Bacon and Descartes. They have sought to make use of the principle of observation. In searching about for the objects which they are to observe they lay claim to a field of phenomena which they call “internal” phenomena. In that way they attempt to distinguish their science from other sciences which observe external phenomena. Thus they think they have become scientific and their science as valid as any other, distinguished only by the locus of the phenomena. They thus cease, in their own opinion, to be either theological or metaphysical.

Such an apology for their so-called science, however, will not satisfy Comte; and for the very simple reason that their method will not work. The fundamental method of the various metaphysical schools, according to Comte, is that of interior observation and he proceeds to explain why it is defective and sterile. Let us see what his objections to the method are. In the first place, he insists it is *inherently* defective. By that he means that the mind cannot observe itself; it cannot become both observer and observed.

¹ *Ibid.*, IV, 646; Appendix, Part 6.

² *Ibid.*, p. 646.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 649.

Comte puts his case against the introspective method very clearly. He says:

Man can observe what is external to him and also certain functions of his organs, other than the thinking organ. To a certain extent he can even observe himself as regards the passions he feels, because the cerebral organs on which these depend are distinct from the observing organ properly so called. It is, however, evidently impossible for him to observe his own intellectual acts, for the organ observed and the observing organ being in this case identical, by whom could the observation be made? To render this possible the individual would have to divide himself into two persons, one thinking, the other observing the thoughts. Thus man cannot *directly* observe his intellectual operations; he can only observe his organs and their results. . . . There is therefore no place for psychology, or the direct study of the soul independently of any *external considerations*.¹

Some of the statements in this quotation merit a little further attention. Comte excludes the method of internal observation only from intellectual acts, not from other functions, although in another place he contends that it is not without great difficulty and discount in the latter. The kind of psychology he condemns is, as he says, that which directly observes the intellectual observations without reference either to the organs involved or to the acts. It is such statements as the above from Comte that have given an apparent basis for the criticism that Comte condemned all psychology; for, say the critics, how can there be any psychology in a system which excludes all purely mental phenomena?

Comte seems to think that a statement of what he considers the inherent impossibility of introspection amounts to a demonstration of its fallaciousness, but he goes on to give other indications of its shortcomings. The futility of the method, he asserts, is proved by the fact that two thousand years of its use have brought its followers to no agreement even as to the fundamental elements of their supposed science. The various schools agree only in one point, namely, the use of a defective method. Furthermore, the investigations of Gall and Broussais, in the field of physiology, have effectually demolished the method. Comte approves the words of Broussais when the latter says:

Let us now examine what physiologists can find in their consciousness by adopting this sort of research. They are sure to meet with sensations pro-

¹ *Positive Polity*, p. 647; Appendix, Part 6. Italics mine.

ceeding from viscera which invariably correspond with the brain, not only hunger, [but also?] amorous desires, cold, heat, specific pains or pleasures, localized in any part of the body. They will further remark a crowd of vague undetermined sensations, disposing sometimes to sorrow, sometimes to joy, at one time to action, at another to repose, one day to hope, the next to despair and even to horror of existence. They will find all these without suspecting whence they come, for the physiologists are the only persons who can inform them about this. If they take all these internal sensations for revelations of the divinity which they name consciousness, they can increase their treasures by taking, in Oriental fashion, a certain dose of opium combined with aromatics.¹

The implication here, of course, is that physiology, not internal observation as understood by the psychologists, is the way to the study of the mental processes.

Comte, however, has still further objections to the method. Not only is it inherently defective and sterile, but it also imposes serious limitations on the study of the mind. He points out that it excludes the study of three important types of phenomena: first, pathological cases among adults, for here internal observations are relatively worthless because the observer is untrustworthy; secondly, the mental processes of children, since children cannot introspect at all or only very inaccurately; third, it excludes animals, because they cannot make any internal observations at all. Comte, as we know, attached a great deal of importance to the study of these three types of behavior, especially the study of pathological cases and of animal psychology. To him, therefore, any method or science which necessarily excluded them from its purview was bad. A valid science or method must bring them all in.

COMTE'S SUBSTITUTES FOR THE INVALID METHOD

On all points, then, Comte is led to reject the method of the psychology of his day, as he conceived it.² What does he propose to substitute for the discarded method of internal observation? To this he has a ready reply. A given function can be studied in two ways only, either in "relation to the organ which fulfils it" or to

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 647; Appendix, Part 6.

² In all this discussion of the psychology of his day we are allowing Comte to define it as he will. What Comte thought it was is all that we are interested in. Whether his interpretation is true or not is not of our concern.

the "phenomena of its fulfilment." That is, by a study of the organ, or by observation of the function, i.e., the products. Applying this principle to the "intellectual and moral functions," Comte finds that two ways of approach to mental phenomena are open. First, we may proceed to study and determine the various organic conditions on which they depend, that is, physiological psychology. This, according to Comte, was the chief object of those who, like Gall, were attempting to build up a physiology of the brain. This is why Comte placed psychology under biology. It is interesting to note how nearly some contemporary psychologists proceed along the line suggested by Comte. This phase of a proper method was so important in Comte's mind that he devoted a great deal of time and effort in following and remodeling Gall's cerebral physiology. In the second place, on the other hand, we may take the other method of study, i.e., observe the products of the mental organs, and thus also arrive at scientific knowledge. We may also utilize *both* methods and combine them, as he attempted to do in his works; but to discard them both means disaster. "But when," says he, "by the pretended psychological method, the consideration of both the agent and the act is discarded altogether, what material can remain but an unintelligible conflict of words, in which merely nominal entities are substituted for real phenomena? The most difficult study of all is thus set up in a state of isolation, without any one point of support in the most simple and perfect of sciences over which it is yet proposed to give it majestic sovereignty; and in this all psychologists agree, however extreme may be their differences on other points."¹

CRITICISM OF THE DOCTRINES

Turning now to Comte's objections to some of the *doctrines* of the psychology of his day, we may group them around the central defect, the exaggeration of the rôle of the intellect, and the consequent neglect of what he calls the affective side of man's mental life. The psychologists, he thinks, have all made the intellect the point of departure for their studies, while the affections have been almost wholly neglected. This intellectualistic bias is con-

¹ *Positive Philosophy*, I (1854), 462.

trary, he argues, to the true state of facts both in the case of animals and in the case of man.

For daily experience shows that the affections, the propensities, the passions, are the great springs of human life; and that, so far from resulting from intelligence, their spontaneous and independent impulse is indispensable to the first awakening and continuous development of the various intellectual faculties. . . . The whole of human nature is thus very unfaithfully represented by these futile systems, which, if noticing the affective faculties at all, have vaguely connected them with one single principle, sympathy, and, above all self-consciousness, always supposed to be directed by the intellect. Thus it is that, contrary to evidence, man has been represented as essentially a reasoning being, continually carrying on, unconsciously, a multitude of imperceptible calculations, with scarcely any spontaneity of action, from infancy upwards.¹

It is interesting to observe, by the way, that a great many of our contemporary sociologists, as well as psychologists, have sought to get away from what they, too, deemed a similar intellectualistic bias, on the part of some of the social scientists and psychologists of a much later date.

Comte thought the intellectualism of the psychologists was due to two causes; first, there was the original theological notion which made it necessary to separate man from the animals. It was a relic of the tendency to invest man with a soul and preserve an impassable gulf between him and other forms of life. In the second place, though the metaphysicians were free from this older theological view, yet they had erected a new entity that must be preserved, namely, the ego, or the "I."² For Comte, the explanation of the unity of the ego was quite simple. Gall, he thinks, had conclusively "dissipated the nebulous mental unity of psychologists and ideologists, by demonstrating the plurality of the intellectual and moral organs."³ While Gall had thus destroyed the imaginary problem of the unity of the ego, he had, on the other hand, laid the foundations in physiology for the correct notion that the organism, though composed of different organs, is a fundamental unity, as a result of the harmony between its chief functions. It is only here, says Comte, that we can find "the sound theory of the *Ego*, so absurdly perverted at present by the vain dreams of the metaphysicians; for the general sense of the I is certainly determined

¹ *Ibid.*, I, 463.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Positive Polity*, I, 541.

by the equilibrium of the faculties, the disturbance of which impairs that consciousness so profoundly in many diseases."¹

COMTE'S TABLE OF CEREBRAL FUNCTIONS

We come now to Comte's table of the internal functions of the brain, in which he attempts to map out the intellectual and moral functions, each of which has its appropriate location in the brain. In building up this table Comte acknowledges that he is but remodeling Gall's scheme, but he is also careful to point out the defects of the latter. Comte devoted a great deal of time to his table and considered it fundamental for his system. To us it is interesting only as an obsolete exhibit and we must pass over its details. In his table Comte sets forth eighteen items which he calls the "internal functions of the brain."² Ten of the eighteen are classed as affective, five as intellectual, and three as practical functions. The ten affective functions are the propensities or motors of activity. They not only outnumber the others severally and combined, but are also the basic instincts. Comte uses the term instinct in this connection in much the same way in which it is used by some contemporary writers. As he states it, an instinct is "any spontaneous impulse in a determinate direction, independently of any foreign substance."³ The organ or seat of each of these functions is assigned to a definite part of the brain. The affective organs occupy the back or lower, the practical the central, and the intellectual the forepart of the brain, in accordance with his principle that the later developed and less aggressive part of the brain lies farthest from the spinal cord. This is in keeping with his oft-repeated statement that the affections, not the intellect, constitute the dominant element in the make-up of mind.

We have time for but three observations on Comte's table. In the first place, Comte's conception of the brain as capable of division into areas, each of which has a distinguishable function, has been vindicated by subsequent experimentation. In the second place, though no one, so far as I know, at least among sociologists in the United States, has attached any importance to Comte's table, still

¹ *Positive Philosophy*, I, 457 (1854).

² *Positive Polity*, I, facing last page.

³ *Positive Philosophy*, I, 464.

its fate is not much different from some more modern classifications of instincts. The speculative nature of all such schemes of classification is indicated by the disagreements among the writers who use them, and by a skeptical attitude in some quarters toward the concept "instinct" altogether. In the third place, on the other hand, it may be worth while to call attention to the agreement between Comte and a great many sociologists in America, who feel that some sort of classification of instincts or innate social forces is essential as a foundation of their sociology. Such a method of procedure has peculiar interest just now, when there is evidence from several quarters that it is to be vigorously challenged, if not abandoned, among sociologists.¹ It is not within the scope of this paper to do more than to refer to this point and to suggest that Comte's table was of primary importance to him in building his system.

SECOND PART OF COMTE'S METHOD: OBSERVATION OF MIND'S PRODUCTS

Up to this point we have not considered the second alternative of the true method suggested by Comte, namely, the observation of the products, the results, of mental process or the mind. Heretofore we have been considering the first part of his method, namely, the study of the brain and its organs. Lévy-Bruhl, in his work on *The Philosophy of Comte*, contends that Comte passed from one method to the other as he developed in his thinking. That is, that whereas Comte, at the time he wrote his early essays and the *Positive Philosophy*, was largely under the spell of Gall's *physiological* psychology, yet, by the time he came to write his *Positive Polity*, he came to emphasize and to stress the method of studying the *products* of the mind, that is a *social* psychology. The question raised is one that is entirely too large for our consideration here. It must be said, however, that one of the chief reasons why Comte felt he had to remodel Gall's work was that the latter's system was

¹ As examples of this tendency in some of its phases: Faris, "Are Instincts Data or Hypotheses," *American Journal of Sociology* (September, 1922); Josey, *The Social Philosophy of Instinct*; Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*; Kantor, "An Essay toward an Institutional Conception of Social Psychology," *American Journal of Sociology* (March and May, 1922).

a failure because it was constructed without a sociology.¹ The principle upon which Comte worked in reconstructing Gall's works was, as he expresses it, "sociological suggestion checked by zoölogical verification."²

Comte attached great importance, perhaps increasing importance, to the method of observing the products of the mind. These products are to be found in the history, thought, knowledge, science, and institutions of a people; in a word, in the life of the Great Being. These are the primary interests of sociology, and though their study is the most difficult of all phenomena, yet it is the most essential of all for a complete science.

One may not agree with Lévy-Bruhl in crediting Comte with a very important part in stimulating the rise and development of two modern sciences of commanding importance, namely, physiological psychology and social psychology. Just what Comte's influence upon either of those subjects was, if any, we do not attempt to state; but certainly his discussion contains rather surprising suggestions of both, and fundamentally his argument admits of both. Laying aside all questions of Comte's influence on subsequent thought, it is still a striking fact that in the study of the social problem today, physiological psychology and social psychology occupy a dominant position.

¹ *Positive Polity*, I, 541, 573, 589.

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE FOR SOCIAL THEORY

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ABSTRACT

Individual Differences and Their Significance for Social Theory.—The form of distribution of observed individual differences is that of the curve of error. This may reasonably also be assumed as regards innate differences. A much greater equalization of opportunity would not alter the general form of distribution. Great importance, therefore, attaches (1) to the average value, (2) to the proportions of distribution, and (3) to the variability of a group trait. These must be the criteria for the determination of inferiority or superiority of groups, such as races or social classes, which show differences of degree rather than of kind. A survey of data relating to white and negro show significant differences. Though it is legitimate, therefore, to speak of inferior races or classes, the individual must be considered on his merits.

During the past few decades there has been a great increase in our knowledge of the form and extent of variation in the human species. Statisticians, anthropologists, biometricians, and psychometricians have collaborated to give precision to our conceptions of human inequality. Much remains yet to be done, especially in the determination of the respective rôles of heredity and environment in producing differences of individual capacity. Nevertheless, it is now possible to draw certain conclusions which are not always drawn by social theorists. Certain it is that the time has arrived when one can no longer discuss the problems here involved in the vague terms of a purely ideological approach, but must use the more exact phraseology of statistical science. The primary object of this paper is to contribute to a proper understanding of the significance of individual differences for our theories of racial differences, immigration, cultural evolution, and democracy. But before taking up these problems it seems necessary to call attention to certain facts and criteria which determine the point of view with respect to them. An accurate conception of the form of the distribution of the individual differences of the members of a social group is quite fundamental to all intelligent reasoning about them.

Of great significance also are differences in the average values of a given trait in two compared groups, and the respective variabilities of the two groups.

I. In the first place, what is the form of distribution of individual differences? Only nine years ago it was possible for the veteran sociologist, Lester F. Ward, to reiterate with great vigor the claims of his *Applied Sociology* that the form of distribution of the natural abilities of a population is that of an exact parallelogram, except for one-tenth of one per cent of genius above and one-half of one per cent of mental deficiency below.¹ This was a statement by a noted philosopher in the twentieth century of the most extreme claims ever made for human equality. But it ignored well established facts in anthropometry and biometry. What are some of these facts and what conclusions do they enforce?

Since the work of the Belgian astronomer, statistician and anthropometrist, Quetelet, it has been clear that the physical traits of a homogeneous group of men are distributed about their average or type in the form of the bell-shaped curve representing the distribution of the chances of error in measurement. There is a central tendency about which the frequencies are distributed in a more or less symmetrical form.

Quetelet was convinced that also the mental and moral traits of a group of men are distributed in similar manner but he did not advance very far with the demonstration. Much advance has been made, however, by the most illustrious worker in this field, Sir Francis Galton, and by those who have followed him. There can no longer be any doubt that mental ability is distributed in the population in a manner closely resembling that of the distribution of physical traits. One would infer this on a priori grounds because of variations in the size and weight of the brain, in which the higher mental powers are centered. It may not be true that variations in brain size, weight, or morphology are *perfectly* correlated with variations in brain functioning, but there is no ground whatever for supposing that none of these variations in physical properties has any relation to mental capacity. In any case, the direct obser-

¹ "Eugenics, Euthenics, Eudemics," *American Journal of Sociology*, XVII (May, 1912), 737-54.

variations of biometricians, psychologists, educators, psychiatrists, criminologists, and neurologists all converge to demonstrate a variation in natural abilities from the idiot, imbecile, and moron to the genius, with a greater frequency of cases at the average values and lesser frequencies on either side. On this point the studies of Thorndike, Terman, Starch, and many others in psychology and education have combined with those of Pearson, Woods, Davenport, and others in biometry and eugenics, and with those of Goddard, Goring, Ellis, Lombroso, and a host of others in the fields of criminology and mental deficiency to substantiate the surmises of Quetelet and the pioneer hypotheses of Galton.

A much greater equalization of opportunity than now exists might serve to narrow the range of distribution in actual life and to alter its proportions somewhat, though even this seems doubtful; but it would not change its general form. Several considerations bear especially on this point. In the first place, all measurements of ability have tended to take the same general form. Secondly, when tests have been specially designed to reduce to a minimum the value of experience this form of results still obtains. Thirdly, when external environmental factors are made as nearly equal as possible, as in the equalization of school and home conditions, the variations persist in much the same manner. Then, it should be noted that training, instead of equalizing attainment has the effect of widening the differences. Those with superior capacity improve most. Finally, attention may be called to the fact that from every social level individuals move to every other social level. From the same general environmental conditions and opportunities varied individuals arise to follow very different life-careers. Each individual to a greater or less degree selects his own environment. This is truer of the more able than of the less able. As Dr. Bernard Glueck says: "It is not commonly recognized to what extent and in what a variety of ways man's instinctive disposition determines the kind of experiences he is likely to expose himself to, and this, indirectly at least, determines the nature of his acquired equipment."¹ The human organism is impressionable, of course, but there is abundant evidence to show that it is also active and dynamic and seeks out, within the varied

¹ *Survey* (October 15, 1922), p. 106.

opportunities of its environment, those activities and experiences which accord best with its inherent predispositions and propensities.

II. If, then, it be admitted that inherent mental powers are distributed in the population after the manner of the bell-shaped curve, several consequences follow. One of these is the significance attaching to the average mental capacity. A high average is obviously necessary for the efficient working of democratic institutions resting on the force of public opinion. A high average is most important as indicative of the probable fecundity of a group in those superior personalities who constitute the creators and innovators.

There seem to be those who think it possible to dispense with a high average of natural ability provided sufficient emphasis be given to education. But it now takes half a lifetime for the more able 20 per cent [is a rough guess] of the population to acquire a more or less superficial understanding of our present civilization; and culture promises to become more rather than less complex—unless Mr. Stoddard's dire predictions come true. Moreover, we are already apparently trying to force a considerable portion of the community to take more education than they are willing to profit by. One may, of course, lay the blame on present pedagogy; and, no doubt there is much room for improvement. But even good pedagogy is no substitute for the lack of ability to learn. It would probably give some much-abused pedagogues great delight to observe Professor John Dewey engaged in a vigorous effort to arouse the creative powers of a class of morons. It may be asserted, however, that a high average of native mental power is a very effective compensation for poor pedagogy.

Another closely related consequence is the significance of the greater variability of one group over another, especially in the upper reaches of the distribution. This latter indicates directly the relative fecundity of different groups in those higher ranges of mental powers which constitute the gifts of genius.

Now these two characteristics of the distribution of a trait in two groups constitute the basis for determining their relative inferiority or superiority. I wish to call especial attention to this point. In comparing two groups of human beings we are comparing

two groups that are in most respects homogeneous and hence we have as a rule no criteria of absolute differences whereby we may be able to say that one excels the other. All men are human and are possessed, therefore, of human attributes. Their differences are differences of degree rather than differences of kind. With respect to nearly every trait on which we compare two human groups we shall find a large amount of overlapping in the statistical distribution. We must conclude then that the group which has the higher average value for the given trait, or shows the greater frequency in the upper reaches of the distribution, is superior to the other with regard to the trait studied. We shall see that this logic has an important bearing on ideas of race and class superiority.

III. An additional preliminary consideration must be made clear. It is often assumed in certain theories of the cultural determinists that the quality of a large group of human beings remains so nearly the same from generation to generation and century to century that the biological or racial factor may be eliminated as a factor in cultural evolution. This assumption seems more facile than true. There are several counter-considerations of first-rate importance. In the first place, it cannot be denied that different elements of the population produce superior and inferior individuals at different rates of frequency. Mendelians, psychiatrists, and social workers have joined in discovering whole tribes of degraded stocks; Galton showed that distinction runs in families to such an extent as cannot be explained by environmental opportunities; Professor Woods has traced the potency of heredity through the royal families of Europe as also through the distinguished families in this country; the educational psychologists have shown that low mentality, school retardation, and school elimination not only go together but run in families, as do also high ability, school acceleration, and excellence in a variety of studies.

But not only does native ability tend strongly to be inherited but the different social classes and types do not contribute in equal proportions to the next generation. Galton made a computation of the relative contributions to the next generation made by marriages at age twenty-two and at age thirty-three. Pearson applied to this the term "genetic" or "reproductive selection"; also the

term "selective birth-rate." He was able to show for several countries that a very small proportion (12.5 per cent) of those born in this generation become the progenitors of a very large proportion (50 per cent) of the next generation. In view of the decided tendency toward reversed natural selection in modern society due to the release of population pressure by colonization and the industrial revolution, the preservative effects of medical science and philanthropy, and the relative sterility of the successful families, it seems reasonable to hold that under the conditions now prevailing in advanced countries the average quality of the inheritable capacities of a nation, or at least the proportions of their statistical distribution, may undergo a sensible alteration in one or two generations. This would involve a change in the proportional distributions of natural capacities in the upper ranges of the curve; there would be a lessened frequency with which superior individuals occur. A profound change in the biological basis of group life may thus occur without any mutational or evolutionary change whatever.

We now come to an application of these preliminary considerations to certain assumptions or conclusions of sociological reasoning. In the first place, consider the question of racial equality. The view held by a very considerable and respectable body of American anthropological and sociological opinion is substantially that racial differences are negligible in considering the development of culture. It is argued that all branches of mankind are human: that there are no differences of kind in their traits while there is a great deal of overlapping in their distribution. This view admits that different branches of the human stock have undergone different types of development from which have resulted differences in degree and form of specialization; but it argues that these differences have been divergent rather than rectilinear as regards relationship to lower animal forms. It thus admits hereditary differences of a specialized sort as regards physical traits but rather inconsistently refuses to admit any characteristic or specialized mental differences. In consequence it explains the differences in cultural development of the different races as due to differences of opportunity for cultural diffusion.

Such a view is sound in many respects and represents a great contribution to sociological and ethnological theory; but it is easily distorted. In supplementing it one need not reiterate the extravagant claims of De Gobineau, Vacher de Lapouge, Madison Grant, and other racial determinists. But, on the other hand, there is no scientific gain in flying from one form of race mysticism to another. The ascription of a wonder-working prepotency to the Nordics who have played a great rôle in history for many centuries, is, in fact, less reprehensible than the ascription of a mysterious potentiality to races that have never risen above anonymity. One can maintain an open mind as to the potentialities of various racial stocks without the necessity of assuming that the races that have shown least cultural achievement are merely sufferers from lack of opportunity.

In a recent article Dr. E. A. Goldenweiser¹ points out that some negro brains are smaller than any found among whites, and that some white brains are larger than any found among negroes. He admits that in general in the animal scale mental capacity increases with brain size; he admits that in man the higher mental processes "are, of course, focused in the brain"; but he concludes that because the brain also carries on a variety of lower activities "it is only natural that the correlation between brain size and weight and intellectual capacity, should at best be highly intricate and illusive." Like Professor Boas² he admits there is correlation between brain size and weight and mental capacity but he emphasizes its indirectness. Then he goes on to argue that, in any case, if one overlook those relatively few brains of negroes that are smaller than any found among whites and those relatively few white brains that are larger than any found among negroes, then "within these very wide limits the range of brain size and weight of the races was found to be identical."³

The quotation would seem to mean merely that for those brain sizes found in both races the range of sizes of brains is identical. This is obvious, but it contains a delusion and a snare. In the first place, it ignores that small percentage of super-brains which the white race produces and which are of transcendent importance

¹ "Concerning Racial Differences," *Menorah Journal*, VIII (October, 1922), 309-16.

² *The Mind of Primitive Man*, p. 24.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 311.

in the production of super-individuals. This does not mean that all geniuses have large brains but rather that the correlation between genius and large brains is high. More important, however, is the illusion contained in the statement that throughout the range of equal size the brains are identical. If we are comparing one individual with another this is so, but if we are comparing one race or group with another it may be false. In the latter case the answer depends on the *relative proportions* of brains of the different sizes.

Thus the very data presented in an argument for the ignoring of racial differences is sufficient to warrant one in concluding that as regards brain size and weight the white is superior to the negro.

The logic of this criticism of an accepted anthropological view is simply this: it is not enough to say that all men are human, that all are possessed of similar cerebral and neurological equipment, and are, therefore, for all practical purposes equal. Such a conclusion greatly exceeds the premises. As already stated, in comparing groups of homogeneous objects the tests of superiority must be found and can only be found in a comparison of average values and of relative proportions at different points in the scale of distribution. Take an illustration in the realm of physical traits. All men have stature, because all have legs, back-bones, necks, and heads, but all races of men are not equal in stature. Most South Italians are as tall as some Scotchmen; in fact, most of them are taller than some Scotchmen. But in the distribution of the heights of the two groups some Italians are found to be shorter than any Scots; and some Scots taller than any Italians; the Scotch have a greater average height and a greater proportionate frequency throughout the upper ranges of height. As a class, therefore, they are taller than the Italians.

In other words, in comparing groups of humans the adjective indicating inferiority or superiority calls attention to average values and the extent and proportions of variations. In this sense it is clearly proper to speak of inferior and superior races and classes. Inferiority and superiority as here used are primarily statistical concepts; they could be applied to two compared samples of the same racial stock. They do not, therefore, necessarily imply hereditary differences of a specific or specialized sort; but they

do imply, as regards hereditary traits, a *tendency* on the part of one group to manifest the measured trait in a form of distribution characteristically different from the other. Thus, there is a hereditary tendency for the Scotch to produce tall individuals more frequently than the Italians. This is a characteristic racial difference of a hereditary sort. Likewise it seems to be demonstrated that native white Americans produce persons gifted mentally more frequently than native colored Americans. This is also a hereditary tendency of the groups as wholes and capable of determination only by exact statistical methods and expressible only in statistical terminology.

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that superiority or inferiority as here applied to a race cannot without special inquiry be inferred of a particular individual of that race. A group found inferior as regards some trait may well produce very superior individuals as regards that same trait. Science, democratic faith, and humanitarian sentiment join in not condemning a man on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

Let us carry a step farther the inquiry as to the equality of the races in mental abilities. Galton's early attempt to measure the comparative worth of different races was a suggestive but inconclusive one. Quite properly he assumed that the fecundity of a group in men of genius was a practical and objective measure of its racial qualities, but he had no means of equalizing environmental stimulation. Moreover, his method involved a large amount of somewhat arbitrary assessment of individual merit and the impossibility of verification by a repetition of the test for the same groups.

Before the advent of present methods of mental testing there had been a number of notable attempts to measure the abilities of different racial stocks by approved psychometric methods. In 1910 Professor Woodworth summarized the previous work, notably that of Professor Rivers with the Torres Straits natives, and added the results of his own experiments with several groups of primitive peoples at the St. Louis Fair.¹ It should be emphasized that practi-

¹ R. S. Woodworth, "Racial Differences in Mental Traits," *Science* (New Series), XVII (1910), 171-86; see also his "Comparative Psychology of Races," *Psychological Bulletin*, XIII (1916).

cally all these earlier studies had to do with the sensory-motor powers and gave little attention to the higher mental processes. Woodworth thought some differences in the average power of various senses not improbable, especially if one compare racial groups that "are small, isolated and much inbred"; but he was more inclined to emphasize the overlapping than the differences and drew the general conclusion that "on the whole, the keenness of the senses seems to be about on a par in the various races of mankind."¹ As regards the higher powers he had only one slight bit of evidence. In the form-board and similar tests he found a striking difference between the Pygmies, Igorotes, and Negritoes on the one hand, and the Filipinos, Ainu, Eskimos, Indians, and whites on the other. Moreover, these latter ranked in an order of excellence corresponding to their respective cranial dimensions. This last was the only crumb of evidence the testing psychologist had then to offer on this vexing question.

Since then there have been a number of studies of considerable significance. But before giving them a brief summary, another important point in the logic of the matter should be mentioned. It is obvious that easy tests will not serve to bring about a complete discrimination between lower and higher grades of ability. All men are human, and hence, just as all have some stature so all have some mental ability. If racial groups are tested on levels that all readily meet then they all appear alike. If all are asked to jump hurdles that are passable for all then all appear to be equal in power to hurdle. Here has been precisely the weakness of the early tests of racial mental differences. Tests dealing with the sensory-motor powers were not sufficiently discriminative as regards the reach of the higher mental capacities. Thus, in the measurement of the powers of persons of low as contrasted with those of high intelligence, a much greater difference between them is found as regards the higher mental processes than in tests of the senses.

With this in mind let us note the results of some of the numerous tests of white and negro in this country. In Phillips' investigations

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 177.

he found first by school records¹ and then by Binet Tests² that, for the same chronological age and similar home conditions, there was much greater retardation among the colored and much less acceleration than among the whites, even in schools composed almost entirely of foreigners.

Mayo,³ in a comparative study of 150 white and 150 colored pupils in New York high schools found that the latter averaged seven months older, stayed in school longer, and in grade records showed a sensible inferiority. This latter result is of special pertinence here for it illustrates the main points of this paper. In the first place the range of grades for all subjects was very similar; that is, there was overlapping throughout nearly the whole distribution. *But the proportions were different.* Only 17 per cent of the whites were below the median for the colored; the median for the whites corresponded with the upper quartile for the colored; only 12 per cent of the colored attained the level reached by the upper 25 per cent of the whites. In other words in the upper reaches of the distribution of scholastic ability the whites were twice as frequent as the colored. This is characteristic of many investigations.

Results quite like the foregoing were secured by Rowe⁴ and by Pyle.⁵ More significant but exactly similar in result were the studies of G. O. Ferguson.⁶ He found the colored pupils when classified to rank in the order of the proportion of white blood. He noted less difference in the sensory and motor capacities than in the higher mental processes, and concluded that "such neural differences as may be found will probably be mainly in the constitution of the cortical neurones, rather than elsewhere in the nervous system."⁷

¹ B. A. Phillips, "Retardation in the Elementary Schools of Philadelphia," *Psych. Clinic*, VI (1912), 79-90.

² "Binet Tests Applied to Colored Children," *ibid.*, VIII (1914), 190-96.

³ M. H. Mayo, "The Mental Capacity of the Negro," *Archiv. of Psych.*, IV (1913).

⁴ E. C. Rowe, "Five Hundred Forty-Seven White and Two Hundred Sixty-Eight Indian Children Tested by the Binet-Simon Tests," *Ped. Sem.*, XXI (1914), 454-68.

⁵ W. H. Pyle, "The Mind of the Negro Child," *School and Society*, I, 357-60.

⁶ "The Psychology of the Negro," *Archiv. of Psych.* (No. 36, 1916).

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

Other investigations of similar tenor include that of Pressey and Teter¹ in which colored children averaged below the white in all tests but showed a greater inferiority in tests of the more complex abilities. Derrick's study of college students showed again that the median value for the whites corresponded to the upper quartile for the colored and that only 12 per cent of the colored reached the level attained by the upper 25 per cent of the whites. The examinations of the army² showed differences of one or two classes in the A,B,C,D,E classification, between white and colored.

Now, of course, it cannot be contended that these tests have any of them measured inherent intellectual capacity directly. The results attained are the composite effects of the original inherent ability affected by experience and training. But there are several considerations which make it highly probable that the results do reflect certain differences in original endowment. In the first place the tests themselves were as a rule designed to reduce to a minimum the effects of experience, though their complete success in this respect is far from established. Where special effort was made to secure similarity of social conditions, as in the studies by Phillips and Mayo, the relation of the races was not altered. In the test for ability to learn, by Pyle,³ the negro children showed a definitely smaller capacity. Phillips commented on the slower reactions of the colored children, that it took longer to test them and that they were less animated.⁴ This becomes significant when it is recalled that repeated investigations of learning ability have shown that the brighter individuals not only learn faster but improve more than the dull ones. But the most striking consideration is the remarkable uniformity of the results obtained by many investigators working with different tests and in different localities. It must not be overlooked that inherent mental capacities can never

¹ "A Comparison of Colored and White Children by Means of a Group Scale of Intelligence," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, III (1919), 277-82.

² "Psychological Examining in the U.S. Army," *Memoirs of the National Academy of Science*, Vol. XV, chap. viii.

³ W. H. Pyle, "The Learning of Negro Children," *Psychological Bulletin*, XIII (1916), 82-83.

⁴ *Psychological Bulletin* (1914).

be measured directly; they can only be measured indirectly by their manifestations and the achievements of their possessors. When these considerations are all taken into account, it seems well-nigh certain that the negro, viewed as a race, falls below most of the white stocks with which he has been compared in this country, both as regards his average attainment and as regards the frequency with which he produces individuals of superior powers.

There is no intention that these remarks shall seem to fasten any special stigma upon the negro; he already has plenty of troubles of his own and causes the sociologist sufficient anxiety as to his future in this country. The aim has been to emphasize a reaction against the point of view which has been assiduously cultivated by numerous American students of these questions who contend that there can be no question of racial inferiority or superiority because the races overlap in the distribution of their traits and because their differences are differences of degree and not of kind. But as we have repeatedly affirmed the question of equality is purely one of statistical distribution to be decided by averages and quantitative proportions of the trait studied. The social significance of this is obvious. It is not the frequency of mediocrity that makes a nation great; it is not the average and less than average mental powers that make inventions or do the creative work in art, literature, or science. It is exactly the greater frequency of superior types, the greater variability in the upper portions of the scale of intelligence that marks one group of humans as superior to another. As Professor Thorndike has well said, "The ability of a hundred of its most gifted representatives often accounts more for a nation's or a race's welfare than the ability of a million of its mediocrities."¹

¹ *Educational Psychology*, III, 210.

PRESENTATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

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ABSTRACT

Presentation of the Doctrine of Evolution in the Social Sciences.—An evolutionary background is fundamental in sociology as in other sciences dealing with organisms and their environment. It seems most effective, where prejudice is involved, to begin with facts and interpretations that are remote from human concern and widely accepted. Such for example are the concepts of cosmic and of geologic evolution. Organic evolution can be approached in a similar manner, making the evolution of man the final conclusion that follows from the universal evidence that has been presented. As to the formulation of each particular line of evidence, inductive presentation is necessary, if the learner is to distinguish the unquestionable facts from the overwhelmingly reasonable inferences in terms of evolution, instead of merely accepted conclusions on the strength of authority. The line of least resistance is from the impersonal to the personal, and from unquestionable facts to unavoidable conclusions.

As your program committee allowed me wide latitude, I have chosen to speak upon the *presentation* of a biological subject rather than upon its significance as a factor in the social sciences. I do this on the principle that in meetings of this nature one should deal with matters wherein he claims competence, submitting the results of investigation and reflection rather than matter "gotten up" for the occasion. As the technical investigations in which I am interested have but general social values, it seemed best to offer the results of my experience in presenting the doctrine of evolution, the methodology of which I have pursued in the spirit of an investigator for many years.

I take it for granted that an evolutionary background is fundamental in sociology as in other sciences that deal with organisms and their environment. In biology it is possible to consider many problems, for example, those of human physiology, without constant recourse to the evolutionary point of view. But in the comprehensive pursuit of any biological investigation its evolutionary aspects cannot be disregarded. As you well know, the doctrine of evolution and the cell doctrine are the two cardinal generalizations of modern biological science.

Viewing sociology as an outsider, although it may be claimed that every thinking man is some manner of sociologist in spite of himself, it seems to the biologist that without the background of evolved and evolving institutions many social problems must lack perspective. Behind such an evolutionary interpretation of social institutions lies the fact that man is an animal; and for the zoölogist, at least, sociology may be regarded as a study of animal behavior. Just as the sociologist depends upon many applications of biological knowledge in medicine and sanitation, so, I believe, he eventually depends upon the facts of evolution for historical perspective.

The necessity under which the sociologist thus labors is, therefore, my justification for the discussion of educational technology that follows. I confess myself uncertain as to the value of such discussions, for, with all respect to our colleagues in education, presentation remains so largely a matter of personality that one doubts the importance of technique as compared with knowledge of fact. Nevertheless, it should be possible to *generalize from experience* and this is what I propose to do with reference to the presentation of evolution.

How then can one best present in brief compass the doctrine of evolution? It is necessary to do so in elementary courses in biology and in preparation for study of the social sciences; and, since the subject has taken so little root in the popular mind, it now appears that we educators must foster understanding of evolution even among seemingly educated men and women.

As to the general method of attack, I would submit for your consideration an *inductive approach through the more remote and impersonal fields*. This is a method that may be used successfully in both classroom and popular discussion. It has the advantage of avoiding prejudice at the outset and of carrying the individual from what he already accepts to what must be acknowledged as a logical consequence. For example, suppose one begins an outline of the arguments for evolution with the generally accepted idea of a *changing universe*. That nothing persists indefinitely in its present form is likely to be admitted even by those suspicious of inoculation with the virus of evolutionism. Along with the ideas

of modern astronomy concerning the present organization of our solar system and the universe, goes the concept of a material world whose extent is infinite in both time and space. Whatever the philosophical difficulties of the concept of infinity, it is an idea that is familiar to the popular mind. Men *think* they apprehend the fact, if not its explanation, and few will gainsay it. It seems innocuous and of no particular importance. Here then is a good point of departure.

The case for a *changing* cosmos may be developed somewhat as follows: Cosmic development includes all other forms, for by the cosmos we mean the entire visible universe from our very bodies to the farthest star. But in practice, one thinks of the cosmos as more remote. And what we have in mind is the changes postulated by the science of astronomy. It is believed by astronomers that our solar system with its central sun, its planets, and lesser bodies has not always possessed its present form, although it has been in existence from a remote period in time. Apparently our earth was once molten and before that perhaps gaseous. Although the famous nebular hypothesis of La Place has been in part replaced by other theories, the belief of modern astronomy is that our solar system, and perhaps countless others, have arisen by a process of change. Few intelligent men will combat the concepts of astronomy regarding the present nature of our sun and its planets. When some of us were children the idea of cosmic origins, as set forth by the nebular hypothesis, was taught in school geographies. The point is not whether the nebular hypothesis, the planetesimal hypothesis, or the like is correct, but that the astronomer regards the heavenly bodies as having reached their present state by a *process of change*, continuous through an unfathomable past and presumably to be continued into a limitless future. There is no longer talk among intelligent or educated men—or there should not be—of “heaven and earth, center and circumference, created all together, in the same instant, and clouds full of water, on October 23, in the year 4004 B.C., at nine o'clock in the morning,” as was determined by the chronology of Dr. John Lightfoot in the seventeenth century.

When we investigate the facts upon which such astronomical theories are based, they are of course limited. The element of imagination involved is evident upon critical examination.¹

There seems little certainty in the details of any particular theory. What is significant is that *astronomy postulates a changing universe in the past, present, and future*; and because it is remote from human concern this idea seems matter-of-fact to the man in the street.

If we pursue the case farther, turning now to geological change, the idea of a changing earth overlaps with that of a changing universe, since the geologist takes the problem of our planet where the astronomer leaves it. There is no such indefiniteness to the data regarding the earth's surface as exists regarding the origin of the solar system. In place of a hypothetical nebula there is the ground beneath our feet. The evidence, as commonly interpreted, shows that the planet was once molten and has since become cooler. The "countenance" of the earth, how the land and sea lie at the present day, how rocks and soil are being produced, and what these facts imply, is acceptable as plain matter of fact by all who attain even an elementary knowledge of the phenomena. The geological evidence for *change* is indelibly written in the crust of our planet. Acceptance of the geologist's assumption regarding a *vast lapse of time* is inevitable and not alarming. Even Mr. Bryan recognizes the facts of geology by implication for, if correctly quoted by the press, he declares that this "*Age of the Rocks* is of no importance as compared with the *Rock of Ages*."

In geology, therefore, the evidence for *inorganic* evolution is patent to all who examine the facts. Moreover, geology offers wonderful opportunities for the practice of simple inductive inference, even by those untrained in the science. Vast changes like the formation of the Grand Canyon may be observed in miniature in the wash of a pasture. The weathering of rock into soil, erosion with its transportation of the products of weathering, deposition of the material in oceans or in large bodies of fresh water, uplift

¹ Cf. Barrell *et al.*, "The Origin of the Earth," chap. i, *The Evolution of the Earth*. Yale University Press, 1917.

of the ocean's floor and its hardening into rock may all be seen in slow but certain progress in various parts of the world at the present day, and their occurrence in the past is recorded in the rocks.

Geology occupies a pivotal position in the presentation we have in mind, because it is so obviously matter of fact and so impersonal in its nature. Moreover, it articulates both with the evolution postulated by astronomy and with organic evolution; it is also susceptible of an inductive presentation based upon a maximum of direct observation even by the uninitiated.

In passing, it may be remarked that some idea of the historical development of evolutionary concepts may well be introduced wherever the facts are sufficiently striking. The modern formulation of evolution in contrast to creation antedates Darwin's *Origin of Species* by more than a century; and it is sometimes impressive to have this fact stated as evidence that the anti-evolutionist is not merely fifty years behind the times but well-nigh two hundred. As an example in geology, one might cite the ideas of Leonardo da Vinci in the fifteenth century and those of Hutton in the closing decades of the eighteenth; and more particularly, the work of Lyell, the subtitle of whose famous book, *The Principles of Geology* (1830), runs as follows: "An attempt to explain the Former Changes of the Earth's Surface by Reference to Causes now in Operation." Lyell established the idea of *change* as the only reasonable interpretation of geologic facts and his elaborations of Hutton's doctrines still constitute the basic principles of geology. Today, geology without an earth changed from a molten mass to its present form in the course of millions of years, would be on a par with a science of geography postulating a flat earth. Hence, the conclusions of astronomy and geology, alike, point to an evolutionary process involving many millions of years and still in progress—to an earth hoary with age and still growing old.

This approach through geology seems highly effective wherever it is necessary to combat prejudice, because the facts are so unquestionable and so impersonal. The lapse of time involved is clear; and, even if one accepts the lowest estimate, it staggers imagination. As a lesser item, the fact that geologists have accepted the idea of change, that is, *evolution*, since the days of Hutton and

Lyell, is useful in enforcing the fact that evolution is an idea of long standing and respectability in scientific circles.

Astronomy and geology despite their practical importance seem remote from human concern, in so far as their concepts of a changing universe are concerned. Cosmic change and geologic change, with their implications regarding the time element, are readily accepted by the laity on the authority of science, because such teachings do not seem to interfere with doctrines that are deemed vital. From the standpoint of *following through* one can reach this point without serious difficulty.

Here it can be explained that the *change* which has been postulated is *evolution*. The *inorganic* world we now behold appears to have clearly arisen by a process of evolutionary modification. But it is impossible to ignore the question of the history of plant and animal life, *because of the fossils in the rocks*. We thus find our introduction to the field of organic evolution.

Let me not weary you with even the briefest summary of the evidence for organic evolution, save as this is necessary in showing the methods of presentation that are proposed. Here again, we proceed from the impersonal and remote, in so far as the evolution of man is concerned. Organic evolution resembles the cosmic and geologic evolution above described, since it concludes that the living bodies, which are the objects of its investigation, have not always existed as they are today, but have undergone a process of change. As with the evidence for geologic change, it may be emphasized that the evidence for an evolution of animals and plants rests upon facts that are immediately before us; for example, the structure and development of animals, their distribution over the earth, the fossils in the rocks.

The following tabulation of the lines of evidence is suggested:

A. Circumstantial or Indirect Evidence

1. Evidence from Structure is derived from:
 - Comparative Anatomy
 - Comparative Embryology
 - Classification
2. Evidence from Distribution, past and present, is derived from:
 - Paleontology
 - Zoögeography

3. Evidence from Physiology is derived from:
Fundamental Resemblances in Vital Processes
Specific Chemical Resemblances of Closely Related Forms; e.g., Blood Tests

B. Direct Evidence

1. Evidence from Experimentation rests upon:
Unconscious Experimentation upon Animals and Plants since Their Domestication
2. Conscious Experimentation of Breeders and of Scientific Investigators

As a matter of scientific candor, it should be freely acknowledged that the greater body of the evidence is indirect or circumstantial. The facts are *as they should be*, if evolution has occurred. The strength of circumstantial evidence lies in its volume and diversity. In the present instance these are very great. It is a truism to say that the concept of organic evolution *makes more facts hang together* than any other generalization of biology, unless it be the cell doctrine.

The *direct* evidence is of necessity limited in the amount of change that it sets forth; but to many this evidence is the more conclusive, because it is experimental and before our eyes in its completeness. Applying to biology the geological tenet that past changes are explicable in terms of what occurs at the present day, we have in this direct evidence of today's modifications in the bodies of animals and plants the clues to the past.

Some special cases of presentation may now be indicated.¹ The evidence from anatomy and embryology is best treated as a unit. The structure of an adult organism is but the final stage of its development. Comparisons may be made between corresponding developmental stages in exactly the same manner as between adults. The argument from anatomy is that we find in a given group a similar plan of structure, despite all superficial differences. The evolutionary explanation of the facts is that the members of the group came by their resemblances *honestly*, that is naturally, and not by being created according to some ideal plan variously modified. The forelimb of a man resembles the flipper of a whale,

¹ Space does not permit an elaboration of each item of the tabulation. The method in cases not cited is indicated in an address recently delivered before the Missouri State Teachers' Association, to which the reader is referred. Cf. W. C. Curtis, "Current Aspects of the Doctrine of Organic Evolution," *School and Society*, April 14, 1923.

because both came from a common ancestry and because neither whale nor man has lost the type of organization thus inherited.

This is a familiar statement of the argument, but what I wish to emphasize is that the same kind of a statement can be made with reference to embryological stages. Crude statements of the "recapitulation" that is supposed to occur in development were once made by competent zoölogists and still survive in places where information comes at second or third hand. If one must have some brief characterization of the significance of such structures as the gill-slits of a human embryo, it would seem better to say that *men have gill-slits because they have never completely lost them*, than to say that we "climb our ancestral tree," or that development is a "recapitulation," since it is now known that the recapitulation of phylogeny by ontogeny is a very shadowy reality. The anatomy of the gill-slit stage of a man should be compared with early stages in the development of a fish, rather than with the adult fish. Why not speak of it in the same terms as we do the final stage of development when we compare the anatomy of two adult types?

The evidence from distribution, including here the geographical distribution of the present day (zoögeography) and the distribution and nature of fossils (paleontology), is very convincing and can be presented in striking fashion, either by restricted examples or by comparisons of faunas. Good illustrations would be the camel family past and present and the faunas of the British Isles and of New Zealand as compared with their neighboring continents.¹ These offer excellent opportunities for inductive presentation.

Paleontology is included under the head of distribution on the assumption that distribution implies knowledge of the *nature* as well as the vertical and horizontal occurrence of fossils. A single item might be cited in this connection. From the days of Cuvier it has been known that anatomists can sometimes recognize an animal type from a single bone. The idea that an exact reconstruction of an entire animal can be made from a small part is of course untrue. What is true is that, knowing a given type, the anatomist is able to recognize a part in relation to the whole.

¹ Cf. W. B. Scott, *Theory of Evolution*; and Parker and Haswell, *Textbook of Zoölogy* (3d ed.), II, 599-605.

A very small portion may be highly significant. Anticipating the ridicule that might be heaped upon the reputed importance of a single water-worn tooth of an anthropoid found in the river gravels of Nebraska, one might draw the following analogy. If one found in the débris brought down by the recent flood of a South African stream a fragment of sheet iron showing indistinctly but unmistakably certain corrugations on either side of the word "Ford" stamped in characteristic lettering, most of us who live in the United States would explain that piece of iron as part of a mechanism that was made in Detroit. It would not be necessary to have "Henry" stamped in front of the word "Ford." Also, we would think the piece of iron reached its position in the débris by a *natural* course of events. The same kind of reasoning applies to the finding of a single tooth or bone if sufficiently distinctive.

The tracks of the puppy who lumbered over the unhardened surface of a cement sidewalk or the impressions of the leaves that fell thereon are similar examples of observed facts and their natural explanations that may be used in making clear the reasonableness and matter-of-fact nature of the evolutionary evidence derived from paleontology.

With reference to the order of appearance in geologic time it is perhaps better to speak of geological *succession* than of *progression*, since the latter term possesses implications that are sometimes resented in scientific quarters.

In a summary of the lines of indirect or circumstantial evidence, emphasis should again be laid upon their amount and diversity. When we find facts of adult anatomy, of development, of distribution, and of physiology all locked together by a single interpretation the evidence becomes overwhelming. Comparisons may be made with the amount of such evidence we usually regard as convincing in matters of daily life. If the novice is to grasp the relation of facts to conclusions, it seems desirable that an inductive method of presentation be used. Otherwise there is a constant tendency to learn what are the *conclusions* without apprehending what is *fact* and what *inference*.

In place of suggesting methods of presenting inductively the direct evidence for evolution, I may submit an analogy which has proved effective in setting clearly in the minds of students the

distinction between the facts and factors of evolution. Instead of the familiar phraseology of "facts" and "factors" let us speak of the "fact," the "course," and the "causes" of evolution, drawing an analogy with a progressive series of events like the voyage of a ship. A vessel leaves a European port and sails across the Atlantic to New York harbor. We may distinguish between: (1) the fact that the ship actually crossed the ocean, instead of being "created" in the harbor of New York; (2) the course the ship may have pursued, whether direct or indirect, and the like; and (3) the causes that made the ship go, whether an internal propelling force like steam or electricity, an external force like wind or current or even direction by wireless. Compared with the doctrine of evolution, we have: (1) the fact of evolution, as representing the historic succession of events; (2) the course followed in evolution, for instance, whether the land vertebrates arose from fish-like ancestors, birds from reptiles, or the like; and (3) the causes of evolution or what made and makes it happen. These three aspects, like those in the voyage of a ship, are separate, though related items. They must be constantly distinguished, if there is to be any clear thinking on this matter by one who is not a scientist.

This analogy is effective in making clear the distinction between evolution as the historic *fact* and its possible *causes* like natural selection. The twofold meaning of the term Darwinism may also be illustrated in this connection. Darwinism may be used to designate evolution in general—that is, the historic fact; or to mean Darwin's supposed cause of evolution—natural selection. Confusion arises when its meaning is not made clear. As you well know, the intelligent layman has been disconcerted by hearing that Darwinism (natural selection) is on the wane when what he understands by Darwinism is the historical *fact* of evolution. Appreciation of the simple distinction between "fact," "course," and "cause" eliminates this confusion.

Human evolution, according to the scheme of indirect and impersonal presentation we are following, should be considered last and with the weight of all the other evidence at its back. The presumption in its favor can then be recognized and when we add the skeletal and cultural remains of man from Pliocene times onward the argument is overwhelming. The only rival interpretation is the

account of creation set forth in Genesis. The conclusion of such a presentation may be made at this point; or, if it be desired, one may challenge the Mosaic account as not being a record of scientific events, since it is so evidently a creation myth which the Hebrews inherited from an earlier source.

In the discussion of human evolution and the biblical narrative we touch the essential points at issue in the current controversy. Whatever we do in this connection, it is desirable that evolution and other scientific doctrines be presented with decent consideration for the feelings and prejudices of uninformed but conscientious folk. This has not always been done in the past. Moreover the scientist has sometimes carried his dogma over into human affairs, insisting upon an acceptance of the inhumane implications of faulty doctrines, as witness the dogma of the "survival of the fittest" when applied to society.

To summarize: It seems most effective, where prejudice is involved, to begin with facts and interpretations that are remote from human concern and widely accepted. Such for example are the concepts of cosmic and of geologic evolution. The former is vague, but the latter is everywhere evidenced by observable facts. Organic evolution can be approached in a similar manner, making the evolution of man the final conclusion that irresistibly follows from the universal evidence that has been presented. As to the formulation of each particular line of evidence, inductive presentation is necessary, if the learner is to distinguish the unquestionable facts from the overwhelmingly reasonable inferences in terms of evolution, instead of merely accepting conclusions on the strength of authority. Let the case be stated thus: Here are certain material facts that are indisputable and obvious to anyone who will take the trouble to examine them. What is the most reasonable explanation? What is *fact* and what is *inference*? Beginning with the declaration of a universal principle of evolution and then exhibiting the illustrations is a manner of teaching not uncommon in many fields, but one calculated to give the learner something to be "accepted" rather than something to be assimilated in the course of functional activity. The line of least resistance is from the impersonal to the personal, and from unquestionable facts to unavoidable conclusions.

TWINS AND THE RELATIVE POTENCY OF HEREDITY AND ENVIRONMENT IN DEVELOPMENT

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ABSTRACT

■ *Twins and the Relative Potency of Heredity and Environment in Development.*—The phenomenon of identical twins makes possible an interesting experiment in the relative potency of the two co-operating factors, heredity and environment, in the development of an individual. Galton in his study of one hundred pairs of twins found that identical twins tended to remain alike and the fraternal twins to remain different under both similar and dissimilar environmental conditions. The biometric study of fifty pairs of twins by Professor Thorndike, the elaborate comparison of duplicate twins by Professor Wilder, and the interesting set of comparisons of the consequences of human twinning by Frederick Schatz all indicate that human twins furnish little or no conclusive evidence of the exact relative values of the factors of heredity and environment. An animal peculiarly adapted for this purpose was found in the nine-banded armadillo of Texas which produces quadruplets at every pregnancy although always only one egg is fertilized at each pregnancy. An examination of over two hundred litters indicates that heredity accounts for 93 per cent of the bodily characteristics and other factors for about 7 per cent. Differences between individual sets of offspring and between individuals indicate the operation of a third factor, neither heredity nor environment, which may be called a distributional factor associated with the mechanism of cell division and body formation. The influence of environment upon heredity was brought out by the study of cattle twins by Professor F. R. Lillie. He discovered that the reason that (when the twins are of opposite sexes) the male is always normal and the female is nearly always an anomalous creature partly male and partly female is due to the influence in the foetal period upon the female of substances (hormones) given off from the male gonads. The study of these various types of twins shows that the organism is in general so plastic that environmental effects within the range of ordinary human experience are able to affect heredity only very slightly or temporarily.

Two sets of factors are involved in the development of an individual, and doubtless the same two sets of factors are responsible for racial development or evolution. One category of factors is intrinsic and seems to depend upon the physical organization of the germinal protoplasm or upon the mechanisms that are involved in cell multiplication and differentiation: all such factors are included under the term *heredity*. The other category of factors is extrinsic and seems to involve both environment and training: these factors are usually included together under the term *environment*. The controversy as to the relative importance of these two

sets of factors is so old as to be time-honored. In the case of man especially the question as to what characters are due to nature and what to nurture has long been an active issue.

Before the rise and growth of democracy the opinion was very commonly held that man was born noble or base, with high qualities or low, according as he came from good or bad stock. The various well-defined strata of society were believed to have a basis in blood. Blue blood was the criterion of nobility or of high character. With the rise of democracy, however, the view has come to prevail that "all men are created equal" and that inequalities arise only as the result of inequitable distribution of environmental and educational advantages. This has been until recently the prevailing opinion in educational, sociological, and political circles. This ignoring of hereditary differences and overemphasis of the potency of environment have caused the pendulum to swing to the opposite extreme.

The present century has seen such a surprising advance in our knowledge of the laws and the mechanism of heredity that it is no wonder that biologists have come to feel that heredity is far and away the chief factor in human development and that environment and training are only minor modifying factors.

No one can deny the equality of heredity and environment in one sense: for both are absolutely essential. No organism can develop without a basis of germinal substance; neither can any development take place in the absence of the proper environment. The hereditary material is, however, what *we are* and the environment and training are what *we have* and what *we do*. What *we are* is really more fundamental in determining character. This is the opinion of the great body of biologists.

Geneticists have ceased to consider a man as a whole unit. He is a highly elaborate complex of characters. It is futile to attempt to determine whether a man as a whole is more the product of nature than of nurture, but it is quite reasonable to attempt to measure the relative contributions of nature or nurture to any single human character, such as his eye-color, his stature, his brain power, his well-defined idiosyncrasies.

A natural form of experiment to test the relative potency of two co-operating factors would be to keep one factor uniform and

modify the other; and vice versa. We might conceivably rear several individuals with identical heredity under varying environmental conditions and compare the end results. Or we might place individuals of unlike heredity under identical environmental conditions and compare the end results. If the former tended to remain alike despite the environmental differences, it would appear that environment was impotent materially to affect heredity. Similarly, if individuals with different heredity fail to grow more alike under the same environment, a similar conclusion would be justified. The crux of such an experiment is to discover individuals with identical heredity and it is to the insight and ingenuity of Sir Francis Galton that we owe the first crucial test of the problem along the lines proposed.

TWO KINDS OF TWINS

Galton was perhaps the first to recognize that there are two kinds of twins: identical twins and ordinary or fraternal twins. Ordinary twins are merely brothers and sisters that happen to be born together. Each comes from a separate fertilized egg, and they differ in their hereditary complex as widely as do brothers and sisters in general. Such twins may be both male, both female, or a male and a female. Identical twins have an origin quite different from this. It is particularly certain, though not as yet fully demonstrated for human beings, that the two individuals are derived from the two halves of a single egg which had been fertilized by a single sperm. They constitute, therefore, just the type of material we need: two individuals with identical heredity.

Thus we have twins with identical heredity and twins with quite different heredity. If we could always distinguish the two types we should be able to determine the effects of diversified environment in the former and similar environment in the latter. Galton assumed that if the environment has the power to modify the inborn character of individuals, identical twins that arise from one germ cell and have identical heredity ought to become progressively more and more unlike if separated and reared under different conditions. Fraternal twins, on the other hand, though quite different in heredity, should, if reared under the same environ-

mental and educational conditions, tend to become progressively more and more alike. If, however, the identical twins remain alike and fraternal twins remain different it would appear that environment has little if any power to modify inborn constitution.

GALTON'S USE OF DATA FROM TWO KINDS OF TWINS

In order to put this matter to the test Galton collected data on one hundred pairs of twins, eighty of which he classed as identical and twenty as fraternal.

After a considerable amount of comment on the extraordinary closeness of resemblance between identical twins, some of which are rather comical, he comes to a study of a number of cases where the twins were separated early in life and reared under diverse environmental conditions. The resemblances in physical appearance, in ideas, in habits underwent no divergence, but the twins remained as much alike as ever up to old age. Only serious illness or accident to one twin seemed to have any effect upon their inborn resemblance.

With reference to the twenty pairs of fraternal twins who were unlike from birth, the conclusion was equally striking. In no case was there any tendency for unlike twins to grow alike when reared together under the same environmental conditions. The comments of the two parents are typical:

a) "They have had *exactly the same nurture* from their birth up to the present time; they are both perfectly healthy and strong, yet they are otherwise as dissimilar as two boys could be physically, mentally, and in their emotional nature."

b) "They have never been separated, never the least differently treated in food, clothing, education; both teetted at the same time, both had measles, whooping cough, and scarlatina at the same time, and neither has had any other serious illness. Both are and have been exceedingly healthy, and have good abilities, yet they differ as much from each other in mental cast as any one of my family differs from another."

Galton finally concludes as follows: "There is no escape from the conclusion that nature prevails enormously over nurture when the differences of nurture do not exceed what is commonly to be

found among persons of the same rank in society and in the same country."

This was a strong statement and needed to be confirmed and made more exact. Two American specialists set out to put this conclusion on a firmer basis.

Professor Thorndike used biometrical methods, especially the coefficient of correlation. He studied fifty pairs of twins in the New York City schools with reference to their closeness of resemblance in eight physical and six mental characters. He found that on the average twins, not distinguishing between fraternal and identicals, were from two to three times as similar as were ordinary children of the same ages brought up under similar environment; that twins from twelve to fourteen years old were no more alike than twins nine to eleven years old although they had been several years longer under similar environment during an extremely plastic period; that twins were no more alike in traits subject to much training than those subject to little or no training. Thorndike concludes:

The facts are easily, simply and completely explained by one simple hypothesis; namely, that the nature of the germ-cells—the conditions of conception—cause whatever similarities and differences exist in the original natures of men, that these conditions influence mind and body equally, and that in life the differences in modification of mind and body produced by such differences as obtain between the environments of present-day New York City public school children are slight.

It will be noted that Thorndike, although he used the data of twin resemblance to test the relative powers of nature and nurture makes no clear distinction between fraternal and duplicate twins. In experience he discovered that in many cases the twins were obviously of one category or the other, but that there were many marginal cases that he was unable to classify.

About the same time or possibly a little earlier, Professor Wilder was making a very elaborate comparison of duplicate twins with reference especially to such minute details as finger prints. He showed that in some cases the resemblance between the palm and sole patterns of twins was startlingly close, but that in other cases, although the twins appeared to be duplicate twins, there was

not much resemblance between their finger-print patterns. One cannot but be impressed with Wilder's feelings of uncertainty as he attempts to classify certain pairs. The following extract makes my point clear. Speaking of case VII, Wilder says:

This case caused me considerable trouble owing to the preconceived notion that the marks ought to be found identical. The family emphasized the facial resemblance of these twins and when I first saw them they certainly looked much alike. One was, however, an inch taller than the other, and the facial resemblance, after a short acquaintance did not seem as great. . . . The case is plainly one of fraternal twins that resemble one another somewhat more than the average.

This is typical of the method used in gathering statistics on this problem of twins and the relative values of nature and nurture as factors in development. We assume that twins that come from one egg are nearly identical and that two-egg twins are no more alike than ordinary brothers and sisters. From this we conclude that heredity is almost the sole factor in determining the character of the individual. Then we infer that strikingly similar twins are one-egg and those less similar are two-egg derivatives. We assume that identical heredity should give identical characters and then turn around and assume that identical individuals, and only those, have identical heredity, while individuals that fall considerably short of identity have unlike heredity. This is reasoning in a vicious circle with a vengeance. If we find that twins are sufficiently alike to meet our preconceived ideas of what one-egg twins ought to be, we class them as duplicate twins. If we find that they are less alike than we think they ought to be, we class them as fraternal twins. Sociologists should be made aware of this fundamental weakness in the methods used. Unless we can be certain at the outset whether twins are of the one-egg or the two-egg types no safe conclusions can possibly be based upon their degrees of resemblance or difference.

The only way in which one could at all safely determine whether twins have the same or different heredity is to observe the placental connections of the twins at birth. Authorities such as Spaeth and Schatz agree that one-egg twins are attached to a single placenta,

while two-egg twins have separate placentas which may be more or less fused, but even when fused show no intercommunication of placental blood vessels. There are on record no data as to the degrees of resemblances and differences between twins in which the placental connections are known. Hence there is but little definite data upon which to measure the relative proportion of hereditary and environmental factors in the case of human twins.

One interesting set of comparisons has, however, been made by Frederick Schatz, who more than any other writer has gone into the details of the consequences of human twinning. This author had a large amount of gynecological material at his disposal and was able to deal statistically with the resemblances and differences between one-egg and two-egg twins before and after birth. He found, strangely enough, that one-egg twins, though they have the same hereditary composition, are considerably less alike in size and weight at about the middle of pregnancy than are two-egg twins. The cause of the great inequality is associated with the fact that the placental blood vessels of the two individuals struggle for supremacy in the single placental area and undergo more or less extensive anastomoses, so that one twin sends blood over to the other and vice versa. There is great opportunity for unfairness of give and take and, as a rule, one twin is disadvantaged at an early time. At the time of birth, however, the differences in size and weight of the one-egg twins are essentially equal to those of the two-egg twins; which means that the one-egg twins have grown more alike and the two-egg twins have grown less alike in spite of all the environmental factors that have been at work to make the one-egg twins less alike and the two-egg twins more alike. This is indeed a test of the relative potency of heredity and environment and the result is greatly in favor of heredity; but we have information only about matters of size and weight which are perhaps the least valuable characters for comparison because they are so notoriously changeable and seem to depend so largely upon nutrition, a factor of the environment. The fact that even these characters seem to be so definitely governed by heredity is at least not in favor of the environment side of the discussion.

ARMADILLO QUADRUPLETS

On the whole, then, we may say that human twins furnish little or no conclusive evidence of the exact relative values of the factors of heredity and environment. What we need to find is some species, preferably a mammal, in which we know that one-egg twins occur and in which there is no doubt that we are dealing with individuals with identical heredity. Some years ago I was fortunate in finding just the right animal for this purpose—the nine-banded armadillo of Texas. This armored mammal, belonging to an archaic race, abounds in southwest Texas. We discovered that it always produces not merely twins but quadruplets at every pregnancy and always only one egg is fertilized at each pregnancy. Over two hundred litters sufficiently advanced for detailed comparisons were examined and in this material we have the data for determining just exactly what are the extreme limits of heredity and how much leeway there may be for environmental modification. The animals are beautifully designed for detailed comparison. Their nine bands of armor, composed of definite scutes, the rings of scutes on the tail, the definite scale pattern of the head, all these and many other characters lend themselves to exact statistical treatment.

Some of the results of such a comparison are these:

a) All individuals of a given litter, derived from one egg, are of the same sex. There are no exceptions.

b) The coefficient of correlation of a considerable number of body characters for 115 sets of quadruplets which showed no marked anomalies of scute pattern was approximately .93, where 1 is complete correlation or exact correspondence. This may be taken to prove that heredity accounts for 93 per cent of the bodily characteristics and other factors for about 7 per cent.

c) When, however, individual sets of offspring were examined, very great differences revealed themselves. With regard to certain characters some sets showed .99+ resemblance and others showed very little more resemblance than would be expected in unrelated individuals. Yet every set of quadruplets is beyond question the product of the division of a single fertilized egg.

d) In some of these sets of quadruplets where the differences among individuals were great, it was found that one, two, or three individuals closely resembled the mother while the others were quite unlike the mother, and presumably like the unknown father.

e) In several sets where the mother had some rare peculiar arrangement of the scutes, one, two, or three offspring repeated the maternal character more or less definitely while the others failed to show any trace of such peculiarity.

f) Frequently an asymmetrical peculiarity inherited from the mother was found on the left side of one twin; the right side of another, sometimes on both sides of a third, and wanting in the fourth.

All of these results indicate that there is operating here a third factor, neither heredity nor environment, but what we might call a *distributional factor* associated with the mechanism of cell division and body formation. This factor involves some profound inaccuracy in the supposedly exact mechanism of mitosis which should equally distribute hereditary materials to all cell products of a single zygote. Whatever this third factor is, call it developmental inaccuracy if you will, it tends to interfere with the degree of resemblance between twins and is consequently to be thought of as explaining a considerable part of the failure of the quadruplets to show complete identity. In spite of this factor and in spite of whatever influence may be exerted by environment, the average potency of heredity is about 93 per cent as compared with 7 per cent for both environment and the third or distributional factor. We have no basis for estimating how much of the 7 per cent is environmental and how much distributional, but I suspect that very little of it is environmental. In the case of the armadillo, therefore, we are forced to the conclusion that environmental factors such as may be concerned in the development of bodily characters are largely ineffective in modifying heredity. The environmental differences of position, variations in food, or any other developmental variables are not sufficiently great to disturb at all seriously the equality of the quadruplets, all of which start out with a common heredity. We know nothing about the mental qualities of the armadillo;

whether his mentality is more or less plastic than his body is hidden from us.

TWINS THAT ARE MODIFIED BY THE ENVIRONMENT

Quite the opposite conclusion with reference to the influence of environment upon heredity is brought out by a beautiful experiment of Nature upon cattle twins. Twins are very rare in cattle. When they do occur they are two-egg twins with a different hereditary make-up from the start. They may or may not be of the same sex. When they are both of the same sex they are merely like ordinary brothers and sisters; but when they are of opposite sexes, a male and a female, the male is always normal and the female is nearly always an anomalous creature, partly male and partly female, called a *freemartin*. This much has been known for some time, but it remained for Professor F. R. Lillie to work out the details and to solve the problem. Using the unexampled opportunities of the Chicago stockyards, he obtained large numbers of cattle twins at all stages of their development. The situation is this: Sex in cattle, as in other animals, is inherited. An individual is zygotically determined as either a male or a female when the egg is fertilized. The uterus of cattle is bicornate, consisting of two long horns communicating with a common region. One egg usually ovulates from each ovary, when twins are produced. Each twin develops separately for some time in its own horn of the uterus and their membranes grow down toward the united part of the uterus. As a rule the chorionic membranes of the two fuse and the blood vessels unite so that their blood supply is in common. It is now known that the male at a very early period develops glandular tissues in its gonads that are a necessary agent in differentiating the characteristic male features, while the female does not develop ovarian gland tissues till a late foetal period. The result is that the substances given off from the male gonads, which we call hormones, pass through the common blood supply to the individual that is by heredity a female, and so profoundly transform this prospective female and in many cases she has more male qualities than female. Apparently it is not possible completely to reverse the sexes, but in some cases reversal is approximated. The male

hormones that come to the prospective female from outside her body are obviously environmental factors, and that heredity is profoundly modified by environment cannot be denied in such cases as these.

What light is thrown upon the human situation by the study of these various types of twins? The influence of environment as an agent capable of modifying heredity is not denied as a general proposition, but it appears that the organism is in general so plastic, almost elastic one might say, that environmental effects within the range of ordinary human experience are able to affect heredity only very slightly or temporarily. By the time an individual is born its characters are already so far advanced toward the definitive condition that only such radical disturbances as serious illness or gross poisoning of one kind or another are capable of altering the course of differentiation that has been shaped by heredity. If we could change the environment during an early embryonic period we might hope effectively to modify heredity, but no such control is yet within our power. Prenatal influences through maternal impressions are believed in by many, but the geneticist looks upon this notion as among the most patent fallacies with which he comes in contact.

I suppose that the motive actuating the invitation given me to speak before this representative body of sociologists was the hope that I would emphasize the factor of heredity and thus tend to neutralize to some extent the prevailing overemphasis upon the factor of environment. Perhaps I have in turn overemphasized heredity. Somewhere between these extremes of overemphasis lies the truth.

BIAS, PSYCHOANALYSIS, AND THE SUBJECTIVE IN RELATION TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

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ABSTRACT

Bias, Psychoanalysis, and the Subjective in Relation to the Social Sciences.—The idea of this paper is that our desires tend to distort our conceptions of reality, producing a type of thought the extreme form of which is the day dream. Reflective thought, particularly where there is emotion and a scarcity of fact, is influenced to a great degree by the forces that make the day dream. Thinking in the field of the social sciences, particularly in respect to social theory and social philosophy, is of the fantasy-making type resulting in divergencies from reality. Finally, a knowledge of our desires and their mechanisms of behavior, though perhaps not increasing positively the scientific output, ought greatly to reduce the amount of unscientific work now turned out.

It has been difficult to find a title which suitably describes the idea presented in the following paper, and the title chosen is suggestive rather than accurate. The paper is more the presentation of an idea than the systematic exposition of a hypothesis, for the limitations of time preclude any such adequate exposition. It is rather the fragment of an outline, lightened with illustrations, which conveys the main ideas out of which a consistent theory, it is thought, could be constructed.

The paper falls into two parts. The first part concerns the theory of the rôle of desire in the thinking process. The second part deals with the application of this theory to scientific method in the social sciences, particularly its bearings on social theory and social philosophy.

I wish to introduce the subject of the relation of desire and thinking by a very brief consideration of bias or prejudice, because I think an understanding of prejudice yields a very good working analysis of thinking in general.

Where prejudice is found there are two accompanying conditions, ignorance and emotion. The word, prejudice, is derived from the Latin words, *prae* and *judicio*, and means a hasty judgment or an opinion formed without due examination. Prejudice is an

attitude taken without a knowledge of the facts. I know a man who after several years of living in China had broken down a prejudice against the Chinese, a prejudice which had been built up from a childhood experience in a small town with Chinese laundrymen, who were supposed to be very odd and curious.

But ignorance is not the sole determining condition of bias or prejudice. Prejudice is always accompanied by emotion. We are not only ignorant of the Kaiser or the I.W.W., but we hate them. Emotion in prejudice is characterized by the fact that the emotion tends to keep us ignorant and to prevent us from getting the facts. It does this by selecting some facts for keen attention and by blinding us to others. The employer may be prejudiced against the minimum wage for women, because his self-interest prevents him from seeing the facts of the life of working women. It is very easy for emotion to prevent us from seeing the facts, because so often the situation arousing emotion in prejudice is not a single fact, but a complex mass of facts. The white man sees very well some facts concerning the negro, but to other facts he is quite blind.

The study of prejudice is, therefore, a study of the behavior of desire in a condition of relative ignorance. There are, of course, many other interesting psychological and practical aspects of prejudice, but I am interested here only in pointing out that wherever prejudice is found there is an absence of facts and a tendency of desire to imagine them or select them or distort them. If the preceding analysis be correct, it must follow that bias is very common; the more extreme degrees of bias, found in conditions of great ignorance and strong desires, are what we call prejudice.

The analysis of bias is not without interest for the social sciences. The social sciences are young as sciences. They are largely in the stage of theory and hypothesis. There is a scarcity of fact—one of the conditions necessary to bias and prejudice. The social sciences also deal with highly emotional material, such as the family, sex, religion, the distribution of income, industrial relations, and politics, all of which arouse intense desires. Therefore, the two fundamental conditions of bias are present in the study of the social sciences.

It is now clear that the interesting and important idea in bias is how desire keeps us ignorant by attracting some facts and repelling others. We now wish to inquire just what desire does to our thoughts in the absence of evidence, that is, what is the relation of desire to thinking.

That desires and interests select our observations is very well illustrated by reports on the Russian revolution by visiting investigators. The radical found pretty much what he wanted to find, and the conservative found quite the opposite, though both visited the same country at the same time. Such a selection of observations is not due wholly to subjective causes, but also in part to the objective situation. Russia is large and the conditions were varied.

Employers and employees usually give entirely different reports on the conditions of industrial relations, the point to note being that the differences are such as to make the reports accord with the respective wishes. Investigating a strike once for the government, I was told by the employer that there were 400 men on strike. The employees said there were 10,000.

Desires not only select the observations that we make at a particular time, but they also determine out of memory which ideas will rise to consciousness. For instance, when we are hungry thoughts of food arise. Explorers who are forced to a very limited diet tell us that at such a time they think and talk a great deal about food and eating. With the enforcement of the prohibition of the sale of liquor there is increased talk and thought of drink. In a particular mood we will hum a certain tune. At certain times the status of the organism forces a wealth of sex images and symbols upon our attention. The process appears as though the images and ideas were floating particles borne into consciousness by currents in the stream of desires.

Ideas and images also come to consciousness from other causes than desire, as, for instance, because of associations due to proximity and to time. For illustration, pen suggests ink, or 2×3 suggests 6. In this fashion we memorize a poem. But ideas and images are linked by emotion. For instance, in a mood of sorrow or despondency memories quite unlinked by time or proximity will come to the mind. The emotion seems to provide the linkage.

Of course, these thoughts come and go and we do not ask why. The psychoanalysts have directed their attention to the emotional nature of these associations, and their data indicate an almost unbelievable amount of such emotional associations. The reason why associations on the basis of emotion are found to be so much more frequent by psychoanalysts than by ourselves is that we find it hard to recognize the emotional linkage due to the great prevalence of symbols and disguises which the psychoanalysis is able to interpret. Indeed, quite generally to the psychoanalyst association is of emotional significance.

One of the extreme forms in which desire selects out of past recollections the ideas which appear in consciousness is the day dream. Such an instance is the dream picture made by a weak, sickly boy who is outclassed by his playmates and who is frequently told by his elders that he is too little and that when he is bigger he can do and have certain things. He constructs a fanciful picture, a day dream, in which he sees himself a strong and powerful knight in shining armor riding on a white charger at the head of a cavalcade of knights, the whole procession moving before an admiring throng, including his mother, his sweetheart, and his playmates. Desire not only brings images but it constructs a series of those images into a complex picture, out of, of course, previously learned cultural material.

The psychoanalytic theory of the night dream is the same as that of the day dream in that the materials of the dream are the product of desires. The mechanism of the night dream is, however, highly complex, so that it must be interpreted before one can see the desires.

Desire not only carries selected images and ideas into consciousness, but it also tends to force out of consciousness certain experiences and prevents us from remembering them. This tendency is usually spoken of as a tendency to forget the unpleasant. It is not correct to say that we tend to forget what was unpleasant at the time; animal trainers teach by punishment. Rather, we tend to forget what is unpleasant to remember. It should also be noted that the word "pleasant" has no particular technical psychological meaning, and is not especially connected with former pleasure-

pain theories. The whole theory of repression is built on this point of purposeful forgetting. This aspect of repression is seldom questioned, the theory of repression being usually criticized as to the continued influence of the repressed material or the repressed desire. No less a scientist than Darwin said that it is well to write down facts contradictory to a particular theory that we wish to prove, for otherwise we are likely to forget them. It should also be noted that desire does not explain all forgetting and is only one factor; so we say there is a tendency to forget what we do not want to remember. Hence we note that desire can prevent memory as well as make us remember.

It has now been set forth that desire directs our observing, so that in certain cases where the materials to be observed are numerous and complex, desire selects certain things for observation. And the claim has also been advanced that desire selects out of the vast storehouse of impressions certain ones for remembrance and tends to prevent us from remembering others. It is as though desire were some electromagnetic power which both attracts and repels observations and memories.

The rôle of desire, therefore, is to give us a picture that is not like the real. It gives us distorted impressions. It is not photographic. The trade unionist says there are 10,000 on strike; the employer says there are 400. "The pictures we carry around in our heads," to use Lippman's phrase, are not like the pictures of reality. A conservative and successful citizen's first reaction to the problem of unemployment may be that there is no unemployment, or else his first analysis will be that the man who is out of work is out of work because of lack of ability or lack of initiative in finding work. If the attitude of such a person is so emotional that he continually refuses to see the facts, we rightly call him prejudiced. In ignorance, then, desire tends to distort our impression of reality. Desire may thus become an enemy of science.

A very good illustration of the distortion of reality is the belief of primitive peoples in a world of magic, taboo, animism, totems, supernatural forces, and religious beings. There is much support for the theory that these unreal beings and forces are the results of desires. Freud has characterized the basis of such unreality

as "the omnipotence of thought," as contrasted to the omnipotence of fact, thought in this case meaning imagination or desire which seems free from fact (other than tradition) in creating fantasies.

A most excellent test of science is prediction. The astronomer can predict an eclipse. But real-estate dealers in our growing western cities are, I think, very likely to predict a much larger population for their cities than the next census will show. Their strong desire for growth greatly distorts the real picture of the forces that make for expansion. Note how eagerly the sick believe in miracles, patent medicine, or Dr. Coué.

I have tried to show how, in general, just as in prejudice, desire tends to distort reality and how in the absence of facts it tends to give us erroneous pictures and conclusions. I wish now to push the analysis a little further by reviewing briefly Dewey's account of how we think.¹

Jung,² the psychoanalyst, has said that there are two kinds of thinking. One kind is the day-dream type of thinking, and the other is the kind we meet in, say, mathematics. In the preceding paragraphs I have somewhat fully considered the day-dream type of thinking, which is characterized by a flow of ideas or images on the stream of desire. I wish now to take up the other kind that Dewey has singled out for discussion and called reflective thinking. I wish particularly to inquire to what extent this second type of true reflective thinking is divorced from the day-dream type where desire plays the dominant rôle.

Dewey has analyzed into five steps the complete thought process. This process boils down to three processes that occur in varying degrees in these five steps. These three processes are observing, recollecting, and planning. He gives the following illustration. A child's flow of ideas is arrested by observation on the ferry boat of a long pole sticking out from the floor of the upper deck. He is curious and wonders what the pole is for. There is a problem. He thinks about it. His first thought is that it is a flag pole, the suggestion of the flag pole arising from the length and size of the pole and the gold knob on the end. But the pole is in a curi-

¹ John Dewey, *How We Think*.

² C. G. Jung, *The Psychology of the Unconscious*, chap. i.

ous position, being almost horizontal, whereas flag poles usually are vertical. The next thought is that it might be designed to carry a wireless apparatus, but he observes the absence of the necessary apparatus and also that wireless apparatus on boats are generally placed very high. Further speculation leads to the suggestion that it may be used as a guide for the pilot. From the pilot's position on the upper deck, the pole would appear to project out far beyond the deck and point in the direction the boat is going. Further observation confirms this suggestion. The thinking process is concluded, and the stream of desires and habits continues to flow. In this illustration we see the three processes of thought, observing, recollecting, and planning. Awareness of the problem arises through observation; suggestions come through recollecting, and the planning or testing involves further observation and recollecting.

Such a thought process is relatively free from desire and emotion, though no doubt desire may partly occasion the suggestion of the wireless. But not all thinking is so free from emotion. This is true of many social questions. Consider, for instance, the problem of reparations as it presents itself to a Frenchman. Almost every act of observing, recollecting, and planning would be accompanied by desire and emotion, which we think would play a selective rôle.

But let us consider separately these three processes of thought and inquire whether they are free from the influence of desire.

The first process is observation. We have already pointed out that desire distorts observation, particularly where the material to be observed is extensive and varied, and especially if the observation requires some effort. The observation of a simple object such as the length of a table is not likely to be distorted; but even simple sensations are affected by the emotions, as, for instance, in the phenomena of hallucination.

As to recollecting, we have already discussed at some length how desire selects forgetting and remembering and how suggestions come to the mind on the stream of desire.

So also wishes affect our planning and attempts at verification. I have previously pointed out cases of the influence of desire in prediction. Attempts at scientific prediction easily go astray under the influence of desire. When we do not know, do not have

the facts, we say we believe. Belief is, of course, partly a matter of tradition as well as the desire of the individual. But omitting the factor of tradition, we tend to believe what we want to believe. Where testing and verification are difficult, as is frequently the case in social issues, social experimentation, voting, etc., desire is very likely to play a determining rôle in planning.

It, therefore, appears from a review of Dewey's analysis that the process of so-called reflective thought affords abundant opportunity for desire to prevent a correct conclusion. There are, therefore, not two kinds of thought, day dreaming and reflective thought. Rather there are two extremes, differing only in degree. So, much so-called reflective thought tends to be like day dreaming. There are two conditions that make reflective thought differ from the day dream. One is the presence of facts and the other is the relative scarcity of emotion and desire. Mathematical thinking is of the reflective type of thinking, the farthest removed from the day-dream type, for the reason that it is usually so free from emotion and the facts for testing are usually at hand. Thus we see that the processes of reflective thought do not themselves distinguish it in essence from the day dream. Reflective thought becomes trustworthy when we do not have the prejudicing or biasing influence of emotion and when we have adequate facts for testing, and when bias is present it usually takes an unsuspectedly large amount of fact to keep emotion from distorting reality, due to the many opportunities for desire to manifest itself in the thinking process.

That desires bias thought is generally admitted. The exposition of the thesis has, however, shown much greater possibility of the force of desire in thinking than is usually conceived. Unfortunately, we have no statistical measure of the frequency of the day dream, prejudiced type of thinking, but I am sure that even in the absence of statistics the researches of psychoanalysis have shown a hitherto unbelievable amount of the day-dream type of thought even in what we are accustomed to thinking of as the true reflective type of thought. The psychoanalysts have been particularly successful in uncovering the motive in our thought through the penetration of disguises, symbols, and rationalization, which are so numerous in our thought processes. Contrast this position with the picture

Dewey gives us of thinking. Dewey gives a most excellent, clear-cut analysis of the logical processes of thought, but unless the reader is forewarned, he will leave Dewey's book with a totally inadequate idea of the great part emotion and desire play in thinking, and will have quite an exalted idea of the logical and scientific qualities of the human mind.

I wish now to apply the foregoing theory to the attempt to use the scientific method in the social sciences. I have already reminded you of the emotional nature of the subject-matter of the social sciences, and it seems to me that it is the emotional nature of the social sciences that has hindered scientific development rather than their frequently mentioned complexity. At any rate, the present stage of these sciences is characterized by much theory, such as economic theory, political theory, and social theory.

Let us consider for a moment the bearing of the processes of thought on the social theory. We understand by theory hypotheses unsupported by facts, otherwise we would call it law. Theory is therefore unverified speculation. We have previously asserted that where thinking occurs without the verification of evidence it tends to be shaped by desire. In the absence of facts, we tend to believe what we want to believe. From the point of view of science, theory is good simply as a means to an end. It seems strange, therefore, that there should be so much admiration of social theory, particularly economic theory, on the part of the profession. Theory, alone, is so very likely to be distorted by desire, particularly where the subject-matter stimulates emotion. We all know how the theory of radicals tends to run into the construction of utopias, which are made of the same stuff day dreams are made of. It seems very probable that social theory in general, particularly where the materials serve as stimuli to emotions, must tend to resemble the day dream. It is quite appreciated that theory is often a necessary step in the development of science; there must be something to verify. There is also such a thing as good theory and bad theory; the more checking by facts the better the theory. But I think we fail to appreciate the day-dream aspects of theory, particularly when it is couched in technical terms and rationalistic language.

Another highly respected feature of the social sciences that appears to be somewhat removed from scientific processes and to consist in large part of fantasy-making processes of thought is social philosophy. A social philosophy is a well integrated, consistent viewpoint on a wide range of social problems. If a specific theory is likely to be largely a product of desire, how much more likely is theory, which is so general that it covers the whole range of social problems, to be a product of desire, particularly if it be consistent.

Before discussing the scientific worth of social philosophy, I wish to make a brief departure for the purpose of considering what the psychoanalysts call the complex, because it appears to play a most important rôle in shaping our social philosophies.

Of our many desires, some are strong and frequent. Some of these are sex desires and wishes centering around self, such as ambition and hope. The power of these desires to attract, select, and assort observations, facts, and memories is great. It seems as though constellations of ideas and images cluster in masses around a strong wish. Such a cluster of images and ideas around some unconscious desire is called by psychoanalysts a complex. What these complexes are to be is said often to be determined in childhood. For instance, as a young child, one's affection may be strongly conditioned to respond to stimuli in the form of some early companion—one's father, mother, brother, or sister. This conditioning of affection in early childhood to such a model may, for instance, have profound directive force to the expression of one's affection in the future. So we have the famous Oedipus complex. Or many habits and responses may be built up around feelings of inferiority, and we are said to have an inferiority complex. These conditioned responses of early childhood may persist all through life, and become determining factors in our own personality. They become great centers of desires, and often it is in these complexes that are found the desires which are the sources of prejudice and bias, and from these flow the desires that persistently and consistently influence our thinking and distort reality for us. It seems very probable that these complexes tend to shape our social theories and social philosophies.

As an illustration, let us consider the possible complex at the basis of a certain type of social philosophy of laissez faire. The holder of such a philosophy of laissez faire is an individualist. He believes that that government governs best which governs least. He is opposed to government boards and commissions and extensions of power. He thinks there is too much legislation. He is a lover of liberty and freedom. He is opposed to paternalism and authority. Now suppose, upon analysis, such as Frink¹ has made, we find such a man to have a complex against authority. We learn that in early childhood his father and mother were unhappy together; that his mother was tender and loving; that his father was severe, domineering, disciplinary, and continually mortified him with his humiliating punishments. It is easy to think that the child is conditioned to react with hate to the stimuli of authority. Governments become to him symbols of authority, stimuli to which he reacts violently because of this early conditioning.

But in objection it is argued that this man has studied political theory. He is familiar with Adam Smith, Thomas Jefferson, and Herbert Spencer. He has studied society and government. It cannot be that his laissez faire social philosophy is simply due to the fact that as a child he hated his father. This is absurd. But is it absurd? We all know how addicted man is to rationalizing, to covering up his desires with scientific terms and the paraphernalia of reason, and we know how desires select and distort evidence. May not such a strong desire, the product of early childhood experience, live on and determine this social philosophy? If so, then how much is this man's social philosophy worth? How much should we follow his advice as to whether the legislature should pass an unemployment insurance law? If we asked him whether he favored the passage of such a law and he replied that he hated his father when a child, we should consider the answer irrelevant, but it would be true. But if in answer to such a question as to how to vote on an unemployment insurance law, he advised voting against it and quoted laissez faire philosophy, would not his answer be just as

¹ H. W. Frink, *Morbid Fears and Compulsions*, p. 150. See also Flügel's *Psychoanalytic Study of the Family*.

worthless because it flowed from a social philosophy determined by his childhood relations to his father?

It is altogether probable that social philosophies are largely determined by desires. And it is altogether possible that many of these determining desires are conditioned by early childhood expressions.

Another man has a survival-of-the-fittest social philosophy. He believes in ability, that success is a test of ability. He thinks the race progresses by letting the weak die off. He is an ardent eugenicist, a strong believer in family, does not think much of democracy. The common people are inferior. He believes in a government by brains. He opposes social legislation and does not believe in social work. It is quite conceivable that a person who is selfish, accustomed to winning, easily irritated at the rules of the game that, although protecting others, hinder his success, who is inconsiderate and has little sympathy, would have desires that might build up such a survival-of-the-fittest philosophy. Of course, his philosophy would be expressed in the biological terminology of Darwin, he would refer to Nietzsche and he would be familiar with the latest work in eugenics. But it goes without saying that references, terminologies, and authorities are not science. And rationalizations are very common, while at every turn in the thinking process emotional desires push in.

It is not, of course, asserted that the desire will create, that is, invent, the materials that go to make up one's social philosophy, such as the *laissez faire* or the natural selection doctrines. Desire rather selects the material out of the existing mass. The library is filled with different books; desire drives us to particular ones. Cultural contact is quite essential to the development of a particular social philosophy. A potential socialist will not become one unless exposed to the propaganda. It should also be remembered that desires are complex, and there are great varieties of conditioning influences in early life.

Social philosophies are just an extreme instance of the sort of thing that tends to occur in a study which has not progressed far in reliance on fact and measurement, and which deals with emotional material. The foregoing analysis does not appear to profit us any in

the development of the technique of scientific method, except that it makes a powerful emphasis on the need of such a method, for we cannot have a science without measurement. And science will grow in the social studies in direct ratio to the use of measurement.

While I think we cannot well be scientific without measurement, still in the absence of measurement, I think the foregoing analysis does make an important contribution. It is this. It tells us how to be less unscientific if not more scientific. The way of becoming less unscientific is to know the etiology of our own desires and the mechanisms of their behavior. In other words, a knowledge of the origins of one's prejudice will do much toward eliminating its unscientific influence. The study of abnormal psychology and of psychoanalysis is doing a great deal to acquaint us with the way our desires disguise themselves, how they originate, how they are conditioned, and the part they play in forming specific opinions. A knowledge of the origins and behaviors of our prejudice and bias, while perhaps not adding to scientific output in the social sciences, might conceivably reduce the unscientific output by, say, over 50 per cent.

SOME SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF COERCION

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ABSTRACT

Some Sociological Aspects of Coercion.—Coercion belongs primarily under social control, and secondarily under social pressure. "Non-violent coercion" is suggested to designate methods falling between persuasion and violent coercion. Non-violent coercion takes form in the strike, the boycott, and Non-Co-operation in India. Utilizing the fact that all social arrangements, even tyrannies, subsist upon voluntary co-operation in part, this form of coercion operates through concerted withholding of social contacts. *Non-Co-operation and Secret Intimidation Contrasted.* These two coercive methods are diametrically opposed, because of their divergent attitudes toward secrecy, fair play, and willingness to suffer the consequences. Non-violent coercion, being the suspension of co-operation, regarded both as an attitude and as a system of objective social relations, is most vitally related to those fundamental principles which form the frame-work of fair play. And this last, as the supreme social virtue, is outraged by night-riders, cherished by Non-Co-operators, but best conserved, in the long run, through the persuasive-coercive methods of political procedure.

I. CLASSIFICATION OF FORMS

Persuasion.—Persuasion means, in common usage, the "act of influencing the mind by arguments or reasons offered, or by anything that moves the mind or passions, or inclines the will to a determination."¹ Persuasion, as that form of social pressure which operates by *convincing* other persons of the rightness or expediency of any given course of conduct, may rely (1) upon argumentation, which is too familiar to require explanation, or (2) it may seek to convince the subject, not by a chain of reasoning as in the preceding case, but by the patient *endurance of suffering*. Finally, persuasion may be recognized in some of the processes of (3) political government, which is a combination of persuasion and violence, or at least of physical force, the beneficence or malevolence of any particular government varying with the relative dependence placed by it upon these two methods. The persuasive aspect of government, with which we are just now concerned, is expressed in the political campaigns preceding elections, the deliber-

¹ Webster's New International Dictionary.

ations of the law-making assemblies, and the educational activities of the various departments. For these reasons, government is here subsumed, although only in part, under the method of social pressure by persuasion.

Violent coercion.—Noticing the next of our three main categories, we have violent coercion, which includes also intimidation, as being the *threat* of violence, implicit or explicit. Under this head must be classified: (1) that aspect of political government which rests, in the last analysis, on the physical force and capacity for coercive violence of the ruling element, whether a minority faction or a popular majority; (2) open domination by individuals, classes, or groups; (3) secret intimidation, which will be more fully discussed in later paragraphs.

Non-violent coercion.—When the suffering referred to above is self-inflicted, as in the hunger-strike, it ceases to be a case of persuasion, and partakes of the nature of coercion. In such instances the purpose is to create a dilemma in the mind of the subject by distressing him with the spectacle of suffering which a simple word or act of desistance on his part might avert. He is not convinced, his sentiment-attitude¹ is not changed, he is not persuaded in any way, but is deliberately coerced, that is, made to do something contrary to his will and judgment. However, the purest, most typical examples of non-violent coercion are to be seen in the strike, the boycott, and in Non-Co-operation as organized in South Africa and India under the leadership of Mohandas K. Gandhi. The three methods may be discussed together because they are essentially one, the movement known as Non-Co-operation being really the strike and boycott expanded to a national scale and infused with the spirit of personal non-resistance of the religious order.

II. ANALYSIS OF PROCESSES

The essential procedure in typical instances of non-violent coercion consists in the concerted withholding of social contacts or relations which lie within the control of those applying the pressure. The strike cuts off the relation between employer and

¹ Cf. Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 442, for a clear explanation of the process involved.

workmen, while the boycott suspends the essential contacts between buyer and seller. In all such situations the subject under pressure is presented a pair of real alternatives, provided the strike or boycott is soundly timed and managed. If the alternatives are, for example, to cease buying materials produced by non-union labor or see his business interrupted by a suspension of work, the employer may not be convinced, i.e., persuaded, of the excellence of either course. In fact he may be utterly opposed to both. Thus his judgment remains unchanged, and his attitude unreversed, but he has to choose the lesser of the two evils, and in doing so he is coerced—non-violently coerced, it is true, but coerced none the less. So far as the active agents are concerned, their success depends, of course, upon their choosing those forms of contact which they and their followers can actually control in sufficiently large numbers to affect the interests of the victim in some substantial way, without resort to violence or intimidation, in which case the phenomenon passes over to another category.

In Non-Co-operation, as practiced under Gandhi in India, this coercive element was doubtless present, in spite of all his most sincere efforts to conceive the movement in different terms. Certain earnest and very fair-minded students of the movement reported their views, both favorable and unfavorable, concerning the Non-Co-operation movement, before the Madras Christian Conference, in terms worth quoting here.¹

Those who cherished misgivings said in part:

Granting that physical force is ruled out, two other kinds are left: that which persuades and that which compels. When you persuade some one you bring him to your point of view. You convert him, and he comes along with you gladly or it may be with hesitation, but still you have in some measure won him over to your way of thinking. This is soul-force² at its best, and is indeed the only kind of power to which the term soul-force can be applied. This, however, is not the soul-force of Non-Co-operation. It despairs of persuasion and proposes to compel by reducing the Government to impotence. When Non-Co-operation passes from the method of persuasion, which leaves the Government still free to choose, to compulsion, which would eventually

¹ See *The Young Men of India* (Magazine) for August, 1921.

² A term much used by Gandhi.

leave neither individuals in India nor the Government of India free to choose, it has adopted a method which may be as soulless as physical force, and which in India as it is today will inevitably lead to the use of physical force.

In a word, the complaint here is that Non-Co-operation is a form of non-violent *coercion*, with tendencies toward violence as a concomitant, or by-product. This is exactly what it is, in the present paper, held to be, but it does not seem correct to say that it leaves the government not free to choose. It not only leaves it free to choose, but requires it to choose. The unfreedom imposed consists in limiting the possible objects of choice, and in thereby imposing a more or less real dilemma. The alternatives in the case of India were for the government to give a greater share of self-determination to the Indian population or forfeit in large measure their co-operation in economic, social, and political affairs.

One of the most significant things about the whole movement would seem to be the light which it sheds upon the essential social processes involved—not only those actually operating in these forms of non-violent coercion, but the fundamental facts of social life upon which they more or less implicitly rest. While Gandhi himself is cast more strictly in the mold and temper of a prophet and martyr than a social theorist, his speeches and writings contain profoundly suggestive passages for the student of social theory.

Thus, in his "Reply" to the commissioners of the Kaira district, in 1918, he remarked that there was "no mistaking the fact that India is waking up from its long sleep"; and he declared that the Ryots (peasants) "have but to realize their invulnerable power and no Government, however strong, can stand against their will. . . . They will show that it is impossible to govern men without their consent." This sounds a note of compulsion, but Gandhi adds that whereas "the Civil Service rule is a rule of fear, the Kaira Ryot is fighting for the rule of love." While Gandhi is apparently over-optimistic when he goes on to say that those in power "willingly yield" to the Passive Resister, he does strike the root of the matter when he says, "Without his [i.e. the peasant's] concurrence they cannot make him do their will." For it is profoundly true that those who are above the fear of suffering and death are beyond the reach of any oppression they may not choose to endure. Hence

Gandhi is warranted in saying, as he did in his appeal to the Viceroy against the Rowlatt Act in 1919, that "this movement is undoubtedly designed, effectively to prove to the Government that its authority is finally dependent upon the will of the people and not upon force of arms, especially when that will is expressed in terms of Satyagraha."¹ In short, Gandhi perceived that *co-operation* is indispensable, being one of the most fundamental and universal social processes, and that by the concerted withholding of its prescribed activities men could, without violence, strike a paralyzing blow at the existing order of things. He had found here, it seemed, the master-key for the problem of injustice. A newspaper correspondent put it tersely and picturesquely as follows: "If thine enemy smite thee on one cheek, turn to him the other also. But don't work for him." This he dubs "Gandhi's amended text."²

Refusal to work for another, in concerted numbers, constitutes a strike, and a similar refusal to trade with him amounts to a boycott. Yet Gandhi has said that Non-Co-operation, which makes these refusals and many more, is *not a boycott*. Thus in a speech of 1917³ he says, "A Passive Resister never wants to embarrass a Government or anybody else. . . . He therefore shuns *boycott*, but takes the Swadeshi vow as a part of his religion and never wavers in practising it." But that was two years before he launched his movement on a national scale, with the avowed purpose not only of embarrassing the government but also of paralyzing it. In another writing, of about the same time, he says it is "necessary to understand the distinction between Swadeshi and Boycott. Swadeshi is a religious conception . . . whereas boycott is a purely worldly and political weapon. It is rooted in ill-will and a desire for punishment; and I can see nothing but harm in the end for a nation that resorts to boycott." Yet in the same speech he says, "We are not bound to sell our cotton to anybody and when Hindustan rings with the echoes of Swadeshi, no producer of cotton will sell it for its being manufactured in foreign

¹ Cf. *Speeches and Writings of M. K. Gandhi*, pp. 175, 362, 429. Madras, 1919.

² Herbert Corey, in *Washington Despatches* (August 11, 1921).

³ *Speeches and Writings*, p. 160.

countries."¹ It would seem that he condemns the industrial boycott, but admits the *nationalistic* boycott as exemplified in the case of Egypt, China, and elsewhere, during recent years.

One and the same principle underlies all these various manifestations, and that is a strategic utilization of the fundamental and indispensable importance of *co-operation* in every form and phase of associated life. More vital even than this is its recognition that this co-operation is necessarily more or less *voluntary* in every social situation and process, not excepting the grossest forms of exploitation, oppression, and tyranny. In the last analysis the victims always gild their own chains, even where they do not help to forge them. No people on earth ever yet had the dignity and self-control to refrain from gaping at the triumphal processions of its conquerors, or to refuse to validate the master's aggressions by accepting at his own valuation the titles and honors bestowed by his hand. India has come nearest to attaining this high moral level, but even there it is apparently no more than a passing phase. Nevertheless the method has been utilized to a greater or lesser degree, as witnessed by the fact that the strike and boycott are quite familiar instruments of coercive social pressure today.

Indeed, it does not seem too much to affirm that here lies at hand, so far as its *theoretical* merits are concerned, the most just and powerful weapon conceivable in human affairs. If resolutely applied, in a spirit of unswerving fairness, by populations or classes able to restrain themselves from violence and to pay the price in suffering, non-co-operation seems capable of destroying every last program of tyranny and exploitation in the world. But, while the abstract truth of this can hardly be denied, it is valid largely in theory alone. In actual practice the strike, the boycott, Non-Co-operation, with its western form as the "general strike," and every other program of non-violence, is dogged by two mortal enemies, to either one or the other of which it is almost sure to fall a prey. That is to say, it either dies away through discouragement and apathy, or flares forth into self-destructive violence. And the longer the struggle the more sure is its defeat through the one or the other of these

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 477, 480. Gandhi defines *Swadeshi* as the utilization of one's own native or domestic resources and institutions as a matter of principle.

defections. In short, non-violent coercion demands a stronger self-control, a more enduring solidarity of purpose, a greater capacity for passive suffering, a higher ethical development, than most human beings have thus far attained.

III. NON-CO-OPERATION AND SECRET INTIMIDATION CONTRASTED

Non-co-operation, as witnessed in India, is as closely related to the ancient philosophy of *passive resistance* in its inner spirit as it is to the modern strike and boycott in its outer form. In fact it represents an astonishing fusion of the two. Moreover, no program of non-violent coercion can hope for success in practice or approval in theory unless it clings with equal tenacity to both these elements, difficult, or even impossible, though that may seem to be. Therefore, in order to estimate the social value of non-violent social pressure in these modern forms, I propose next to place non-violent coercion in contrast with another form of social pressure which is having an incredible vogue in the United States at the present time. This is the practice of coercion and intimidation by the combined use of violence and secrecy. We have here a problem of the first magnitude, for according to the most recent press despatches, it is now spreading, under different names, into various European countries also. Without arrogating to myself the functions of the courts, and attempting to fix responsibility for such doings upon any particular organization, I wish simply to point to the fact of their surprising growth, and designate them by the general name of terroristic night-riding. Let us now, in this scientific spirit, compare passive resistance, more particularly in the form of non-co-operation, with night-riding, in the briefest possible way. In so doing it will be necessary to make assertions, based on the history of non-violent resistance and coercion, which time will not permit me to support, in this place, with the facts.¹

Non-violent resisters in general, and non-co-operators in particular, are peculiarly distinguished, as already remarked, for their *endurance of suffering* as a fruitful social process. This becomes, in some cases, an actual devotion to suffering as a means

¹ Some of this evidence is brought together by the present writer in a study entitled *Non-Violent Coercion*. New York, 1923.

of persuasion. No less remarkable is their universal *refusal to evade the penalties* of the law, although these are often made especially severe for their benefit. Thus Gandhi, speaking at a mass-meeting in 1919, declared that

Civil disobedience even of certain laws is only a seeming disobedience. Every law gives the subject an option either to obey the primary sanction or the secondary, and I venture to suggest that the Satyagrahi by inviting the secondary sanction obeys the law. He does not act like the ordinary offender, who not only commits a breach of the laws of the land whether good or bad, but wishes to avoid the consequences of that breach.

Consistently with this we find him saying to his followers, "we court imprisonment;" and, "our duty is chiefly to get ourselves arrested."¹ The entire history of Western non-violent resistance, from the medieval Anabaptists to the present hour, reveals the same attitude. *Adherence to truth* is another distinctive feature of this program. The experience of the Quakers during the Irish Rebellion of 1798, one of the most remarkable cases of non-violent conduct in history,² was largely due to their unbending veracity and rectitude; and it will be recalled that Gandhi's program in South Africa and during its early stages in India was spoken of by him under the term *Satyagraha*, or "assertion of truth." We also find him warning his followers, at a critical juncture, that "a departure from truth by a hair's breadth, or violence against anybody . . . will surely damn the great cause."³

Inclusiveness of aim is another disposition, which lies back of the one just mentioned. For since he asks nothing for himself that could not be shared by all men the non-co-operator has nothing to conceal, and therefore finds extreme truthfulness both expedient and congenial. For this reason it is not strange that *entire publicity* should characterize his policy throughout. For example the historic passive resistant sects have uniformly condemned even secret fraternal orders, and we find that Gandhi instructed his co-workers to "write their names and addresses as sellers" of prohibited literature, upon the documents, "so that they may be traced easily

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. xiii, xiv, 452, 455, 463-65.

² Reported in Thomas D. Hancock, *The Principles of Peace Exemplified in the Conduct of the Society of Friends in Ireland*, etc. London, 1826.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 463.

when wanted by the Government for prosecution.”¹ “We will do nothing secret,” his co-laborers announced with well-grounded pride and confidence.²

From the nature of its aims and methods it is clear that passive resistance is *necessarily democratic*, and, as explained above, it presents, in its more positive and aggressive modern form of non-violent coercion, particularly non-co-operation, a theoretically sound, even if not practically feasible, cure for all exploitations, despotisms, and tyrannies.

Let us glance next at that other current mode of social pressure, which works through secret intimidation, and is incarnate in the type to which we have given the name *night-rider*.

The night-rider is obviously not different from the mass of humanity in the fact that he shows no devotion to suffering as a method, but he does manifest a special predilection for *inflicting injury on others* whose ways have displeased him. This, in civilized societies, necessarily converts him into a law-breaker, and often into a felon, but he has developed an elaborate and effective *system for evading the legal consequences* of his lawless deeds. Indeed night-riding tactics represent, in some instances, a masterly scheme for safely disregarding the law in the name of upholding the law. This is brought about by an elaborate *system of concealment*, disguise, and deception which is in the sharpest possible contrast with the open “assertion of truth” referred to above. An *exclusiveness of aim and sentiment*, inherent in all groups that practice night-riding for purposes of intimidation, is the necessary and inevitable source of the preceding traits, and also some of those that follow.

This point is so significant that it warrants further examination; and for understanding the psycho-social processes here at work the analysis by Professor Simmel is of the utmost significance. Simmel shows³ that secret organizations are either expressions of existing differences and separations within the larger containing

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 460.

² In the Open Letter of Lala Lajpat Rai to Sir E. Maclagan, Governor of the Punjab; in *India*, for December 31, 1920.

³ See Georg Simmel, “The Sociology of Secrecy and of Secret Societies,” in the *American Journal of Sociology*, XI (January, 1908), 441-98. Translation from the German, by Albion W. Small.

society, or social *forms* devised for fostering and enhancing the pleasurable feelings that go with separateness and secrecy. All this may be done in socially harmless ways, and is actually so done under various names the world over; but the night-riding groups now under consideration are generally understood to rest primarily upon invidious distinctions and hostile attitudes that are actively and viciously divisive, when viewed from the standpoint of social harmony and welfare in the widest sense. Their more or less conscious purpose is probably to support, with all the psychological influences of weird mystery and inscrutable force, the social prestige, power, or leadership of waning customs, standards, institutions, and racial elements in the population, or of minority elements aspiring to greater influence. Hence *secrecy* is indispensable to them. Secrecy, however, is, as Simmel points out, simply a form, neither right nor wrong in itself. It has, therefore, no necessary connection with evil; but evil is necessarily dependent on secrecy. "For obvious reasons, the immoral hides itself,"¹ and so also must every selfishly exclusive purpose nourish itself in secret.

Just as the non-co-operator courts publicity because he has no private, exclusive purposes to conceal, so the night-rider is *wedded to secrecy* by virtue of the fact that his aims are those of some exclusive, more or less limited faction or anti-social class within the larger social whole. So far as the essential spirit of democracy is concerned, night-riding can have no real communion with it. This is true because, as Simmel points out, while "democracies are bound to regard publicity as the condition desirable in itself," conversely

¹ *Op. cit.*, p.463. The following words of Professor Hutton Webster (*Primitive Secret Societies*, New York, 1908) apply with almost if not quite equal force to many so-called civilized communities: "They [i.e. secret societies] arouse the universal sentiments of curiosity, fear, and awe; they surround themselves with that veil of mystery so attractive to primitive minds the world over, and they appeal with ever growing power to the social and convivial aspects of human nature, to feelings of prestige and exclusiveness, and to the consciousness of the very material privileges connected with membership." The present mania for secret terroristic coercion will be found paralleled in every detail in Professor Webster's account of the doings of savages, showing as I see it, how easily the civilized mind of a certain type reverts to the primitive level. He adds, in another passage, that "the development of social life is necessarily associated with the decline of secret organizations of the type that has been described" (pp. 106, 121). And this is as true of America as it is of Africa or Melanesia.

"among the requisites of *aristocratic* control *secrecy* has always had a place."¹ Thus, in the most fundamental sense, the increase of night-riding intimidation and violence is the symptom of a deep-seated degeneration of the democratic principle within any people among whom it finds rootage.

From even this hasty and inadequate analysis it seems to follow that we behold, in this phenomenon, not a fair or constructive movement in any sense, as many honest yet deluded citizens imagine, but on the contrary, the worst menace that could threaten a democratic society, whose progress is inseparably bound up with openness of conduct on the part of individuals and voluntary associations, and the utmost publicity and impartiality in the orderly administration of laws made to apply to all alike. This form of social pressure is inherently oligarchic, so we may quote here the words of Simmel, that this "employment of *secrecy* within the *aristocratic* régime is only the extreme exaggeration of that social exclusion and exemption for the sake of which aristocracies are wont to oppose general, fundamentally sanctioned laws."²

On the points mentioned above, we find these two methods about as sharply opposed as two things could possibly be, and still remain under a common category, namely coercive social pressure. Yet while the diagnosis seems true to the facts, it should be recognized that the exponents of non-violence have often been clannish sectarians, traditional, ascetic, and sometimes extremely fanatical—even unshaven, unwashed, and uncombed, in their own persons—despite the social soundness of their principles of action; while those who support such a hopelessly evil social practice as night-riding have sometimes numbered among them men of high personal morality and wholesomeness, and a genuine zeal for established social values; among the latter, strange to say, the form and symbols of a constitutional government, whose inner meaning they nevertheless fail utterly to comprehend. They do not seem to understand that there is an unmitigated badness and unfairness in night-riding, which is due not merely to the fact that it is coercive, or even that it is a form of violence, but to *the operation of these two under the form of secrecy*.

¹ *Op. cit.* Italics mine.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 487. Italics mine.

We seem therefore to have before us here not at all a question of *personnel*, but purely one concerning the relative value of impersonal *forms* of association and their concomitant *psycho-social processes*. Viewed from this level, apart from personnel and even from objects sought, we see that the one is totally indefensible and execrable as a *method*, while the other will at least bear serious study as being possibly a new discovery in the field of legitimate social pressure.

IV. THE SOCIAL IMPORTANCE OF FAIR PLAY

In a really enlightened social order, where justice rather than sentiment presides, the supremely important and priceless social value is obviously the sense and practice of *fair play*. Generated in the small primary group, as Professor Cooley has shown, it comes to maturity as the fundamental virtue of citizenship. Nothing, therefore, could be worse than the decay or destruction of this ideal and attitude among men. Yet this is precisely what must happen wherever the devastating terrors of night-riding coercion or any other terroristic practice gains a foothold. For, whatever else may be said in its favor, when this spirit enters into any man's breast the love of fair play is already dead or dying. These are, in a twofold sense, such works of darkness that there is no need to tell this assembly that their general practice or condonement would drag any community back below the ethical level of the Stone Age. For this reason it needs in these times to be more generally understood by the citizens at large that secret organizations can be tolerated in any freedom-loving society only so long as their functions remain purely fraternal and ritualistic, centering upon the organization itself and upon its membership. When secret societies go beyond this and connive at political or social control or coercion in any way or degree they become essentially pernicious, indefensible, and insufferable, from the standpoint of social welfare and justice.

By the same reasoning, non-violent coercion, being *necessarily* public, inclusive, and democratic in the nature of the case, is worthy of consideration as a method of social pressure, but it also has serious limitations, which have been mentioned above only in part. Therefore, in a final estimate we should probably be led to the state and

the persuasive-coercive processes of government as the best agent and conservator of fair play in the long run. In saying which, there is, of course, no reference to anything less than a real constitutional *democracy*, in the social as well as the political sense of the word.

The limits of this paper will not permit even the briefest argument in support of this last statement, if any is needed. I must be content to remark merely that in the processes of truly democratic constitutional government we witness the working union of *persuasion* and *physical compulsion*, which latter becomes *violence* when wielded by private hands. Government, in this sense, admits of high emotional experiences on occasion, as during political campaigns or legislative deliberations, but it does not place its dependence upon sheer violence and terrorism as does the night-rider, nor upon the unstable and more or less fleeting sentiment-attitudes, as is the case with non-violent coercion. On the other hand, the reliance of government upon past emotional and ideational experiences stored and objectified in the enduring form of *institutions* and systematic rules of *procedure* should, by *theory*, whatever may be said of *practice*, enable it to exercise whatever coercion is needed; and that with the greatest possible amount of fair play in the long run.

MENTAL PATTERNS IN SOCIAL EVOLUTION

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ABSTRACT

Mental Patterns in Social Evolution.—The social life of man is not transmitted by heredity, but is built up on acquired mental traits passed along by means of intercommunication. Its distinctively human features are *learned by each generation* from preceding generations. The vehicle by which culture is transmitted is the web of intercommunication among human beings which, in human groups, has supplanted instinct as the dominant factor in social adjustment. Culture is made up not simply of acquired habits, but on its inner side of ideas, standards, and values which are patterns of action in the minds of individuals. Mental patterns for institutions are essentially the same as those for tools. They are in every case *learned* by individuals and as such can be changed by controlling the learning process. *Culture and Social Progress.* Wrong patterns for institutions may persist indefinitely, and can be eliminated only by rational selection. Many wrong patterns in our civilization have persisted from barbarian times, and we now need a new set of social patterns.

As Professor Faris said in his paper before you last year,¹ sociology finds that current popular psychology errs in abstracting the person from his social environment, and assuming as innate very frequently that which is social in origin and nature. Certainly we must agree that science shows that human personality is created in a social situation and that it is always largely a social product. It follows that the social behavior of men and the institutions of human society are the result, not of innate traits plus the influences of physical environment, but rather of habits and of accompanying mental patterns in the minds of individuals. In other words, our social behavior and our institutional life come to us mainly from custom and tradition. As we attempt to trace back their remote origins in human history, we shall find that, while physical environment and innate dispositions have had something to do with their origin, yet many other factors, such as the ignorance or knowledge which human groups have possessed, have also entered in and played a part. In other words, sociology finds that human institutions and human social organization are outgrowths from

¹ *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society*, XVI, 113-20.

social habits and customs, which have supporting them certain beliefs and opinions of groups, which may be right or may be wrong.

Social evolution is, accordingly, to be sharply distinguished from organic or biological evolution. All social adjustments imply interstimulation and response in some form. The higher forms of interstimulation and response we call forms of intercommunication, since they make common certain psychic states. Hence social evolution is essentially psychic or spiritual in its nature, that is, dependent upon mental evolution. There is no question, of course, but that biological evolution provided the basis for social evolution; for the early forms of intercommunication appear to be the result of biological evolution. Articulate speech, for example, is dependent upon the two fundamental biological mutations which produced man—namely, increased brain capacity and organs capable of vocalizing sound. Whether these mutations were accidental or teleological, whether they were the outcome of the use of the brain as an organ of co-adaptation between members of sub-human groups, or of some other process not yet understood, need not concern us. Our concern is only with the significance of the process of intercommunication as a means of social adjustment after articulate speech had been evolved. It may help better to appreciate the significance of this new method of social adaptation if a brief account be given of the way in which animal organisms belonging to different levels of development adjust themselves to one another and to their environment.

Insects furnish excellent examples of animal life in which all or nearly all adjustments are provided through inherited instincts. So far as can be observed the instinctive reactions of insects are not modified in any appreciable degree by the experience of the individual. What social life there is, is static, and a pronounced change in their environment or in their method of living would result in extinction, unless the change were slow enough to permit biological adjustments through variation and selection.

In the lower forms of the mammalia also, we find the fundamental adjustments provided for through inherited instincts much the same as in the insects; but the organism now is capable of modifying its reaction to some extent through the formation of habits.

However, if any individual thus acquires any special skill or superior means of control, it does not possess the ability to communicate these attainments to any appreciable extent to its fellows; and the behavior of the group is accordingly not affected or modified. Social life is still the result of organic evolution through natural selection.

But when we ascend the animal series to man, we find a new factor in his social adjustments and hence in his collective behavior. While man possesses, probably, fundamental instinctive adjustments in common with all animal life, and while he shares with the higher animals the capacity to modify his conduct through the formation of habits, he possesses in addition superior means of intercommunication with his fellows in the form of articulate speech. This becomes for man the basis for a new type of social evolution. It becomes possible to develop a type of social life which is almost wholly a matter of acquired habit, of acquired intelligence, and of acquired values.

Superior skill and knowledge acquired by an individual, or any advantageous modifications in his reactions, whether the result of accident or of reflective intelligence, may, by means of articulate speech, be communicated to the other members of his group. One individual is thus enabled to profit by the experience and intelligence of others, and in this way the conduct of the entire group may be changed through the attainments of one fortunate or exceptionally intelligent individual. Nor are these newly acquired adjustments lost by the death of the generation in which they were learned. Through passing along the pattern of the activity or the adjustment by means of intercommunication, each succeeding generation may acquire the knowledge and skill, or habits of modified adjustment, found advantageous in the experience of past generations.

Now, while cultural evolution is fundamentally an evolution of co-adaptive habits, it has developed its own peculiar method which, as we have just said, is the method of social intercommunication. The vehicle by which culture is transmitted is the web of intercommunication among human beings which we call language. The ideas, standards, and values which circulate through a group by means of language intermediate and control the formation of the co-adaptive habits which make human culture. The patterns

of action among the animals below man are shut up, so to speak, within their nervous organization as individuals, or communicated, if at all, only by means of the imitation of one animal by another. But among human beings, the patterns of behavior have escaped so to speak from the individual brain, and are transmitted from individual to individual, not simply by imitation, but by the spoken word or language. Thus *the web of intercommunication in human groups has supplanted instinct as the dominant factor in social adjustment*; and articulate speech together with written language, preserving knowledge, tradition, custom, and convention, has become the main control over social behavior. Thus man's superior power of intercommunication, together with his superior powers of ideation and the formation of habits, has enabled man to build up a world of behavior unlike that of any of the brutes.

It is evident that culture, or civilization, is made up not simply of acquired habits, but on its inner side of the ideas, standards, and values which are *patterns of action* in the minds of individuals. It is evident also that these mental patterns in the minds of individuals, when communicated through language, are the means by which the members of the group control their behavior and develop their culture. If we take the making of a stone implement as a concrete example, we find that it is invariably made with a pattern in mind. If the actual stone implement made conforms to the mental pattern, we may properly call it the objectification of an idea. Such patterns for the making of stone implements become a part of the social tradition of a group and are communicated from individual to individual. There, of course, goes along with them more or less imitation of objective bodily movements. The superior imagination, reasoning, or skill of some individual may improve the pattern which he has received from others, and consequently the tool which is made. This would mark a further step in tool-making and so in culture. On the other hand, it is possible for a new pattern for a tool not to mark an improvement, but a deterioration, in which case experience in the use of the more poorly formed tool will probably lead to its elimination.

Now this process of the formation of mental patterns for the making of stone tools illustrates the whole process of cultural development. Practically the same process is used in the making of institu-

tions, that is, of sanctioned and systematized ways of living together. It should be noted that the getting and testing of patterns, and so cultural evolution, necessarily proceeds by the trial-and-error method. There was no other method of learning in primitive times, and even yet mankind is making very slow progress toward any other method. Whatever errors may be made in the making of physical tools may, as we have just pointed out, be easily detected and corrected; but this is not so in the case of institutions. To test out the good and bad points of an institution may require the experience of several generations. In transmitting the mental patterns of institutions to the young, immediate objective tests of the correctness of the pattern and of its utility are out of question. While the patterns for the making of tools may be set immediately before the young and their relative correctness tested by actual experience the pattern for an institution has to be received more or less upon faith by the younger generation, usually under conditions of social pressure, and the trial of its utility must be the work of years. The "pattern ideas" associated, therefore, with forms of the family, of government, of industry, and of general social organization have always attached to them peculiar social sanctions, usually of a magical or religious character, which makes it very difficult to change them. Nevertheless, it is true that man has learned to perfect his institutions just as he has learned to perfect his physical tools—through trial and error, or the ordinary experience of life. However, for the reasons just noted, in the case of institutions errors may persist for thousands of years and possibly for thousands of generations. But human history is a process of striving on the part of man to perfect patterns for human relations as well as for tools. It is these patterns for human relations, as they manifest themselves in social evolution, which I wish especially to discuss.

Let us now recall that the pattern ideas for tools, for institutions, for all sorts of social adjustments, when passed along on the web of communication from generation to generation, become the social tradition. This tradition continually grows by the addition of new patterns and by the modification or elimination of old ones. Originally man must have started without social tradition. Like

the brutes he lived merely in a world of physical objects. With the formation of the first pattern ideas and their transmission by the spoken word came the first beginnings of social tradition. While all savage groups which we now know are dominated by their traditions, yet at first social tradition must have been very small in amount and its social influence very slight. But with the growth of speech and with the perfecting of tools and their patterns came the growth of social tradition. And with its growth in bulk came growth in its social influence. The web of intercommunication became the main element in the social environment of individuals. Men now came to live not so much in a world of physical objects as in a world of ideas—largely of pattern ideas—which immediately controlled their adjustments both to the objects of nature and to their fellows. Moreover, this growing social tradition soon had attached to it the prestige of antiquity and so of mystery. It was easy to attach to traditions under such circumstances supernatural sanctions which made it very difficult to change them. If the patterns of the social tradition were erroneous, there was little chance of sifting out the errors except possibly through the competition and elimination of the groups affected by them. Thus errors in the folkways and mores once started might easily persist for thousands of years. Conceivably, indeed, erroneous pattern ideas, if they do not affect vital organic processes, may persist indefinitely so far as natural selection or elimination is concerned. Only rational criticism and selection of patterns for human relations would be equal to the task of eliminating such errors; and adequate rational selection came into our world practically but yesterday.

If the evolution of culture is in essence an evolution of pattern ideas, by means of which human conduct and so social evolution is controlled, then how did men get these mental patterns? How did they first start, and what has been their course of development, especially of the patterns concerning human relationships? In the case of tools, it is not difficult to see that some of the patterns came from objects in nature, some from animal impulses and the organs of the body, and some, perhaps, from accidental adjustments which proved to be happy ones. In the case of human institutions or human relations the patterns came in part from animal impulses,

in part from those primary groups, such as the family and the neighborhood, which sprang up primitively to satisfy human needs, and finally in part from primitive¹ occupations.

Much has been made especially of the primitive occupation as a source of primitive social patterns.² Thus the occupation of hunting has been claimed to furnish most of the patterns for the life of primitive man and many even for the life of civilized man. From the hunting of animals, it is said, have developed all predatory and many non-predatory occupations. Thus modern war is but a development of the hunting pattern. Modern business, it is claimed, is largely a development from the primitive hunt, and even modern scientific research, it is said, is a hunt after truth. Granting this, how did man ever develop anything else than this "hunting pattern"? The reply is that hunting was not the only occupation of primitive life. At most, it was but the main occupation of half of the primitive community, namely, of the men. The other half of the primitive community, the women, had as their main occupation the care of the children. Alongside of the hunting pattern, therefore, there developed in primitive society the pattern of child care and all that goes with that occupation. If, with any justice, the patterns of modern war, business, politics, and science may be traced to the primitive hunting pattern, we might with equal justice trace the patterns of modern home life, education, philanthropy, and religion back to the primitive child-care pattern.

Both of these patterns have certainly played a fundamental part in the development of human culture. They have often strangely intermingled and at times we find them both manifesting themselves in the same social situation or institution. However, in general, we seem to have followed the hunting pattern with its use of force, domination, and predatoriness toward those outside of our intimate group, while we have followed the child-care pattern with its sympathy, gentleness, and altruism within our group. Through all the ages, there has been more or less contest and con-

¹ Primitive is used in this paper to designate the earliest human stage.

² See especially Professor Dewey's paper on "Interpretation of Savage Mind" in Thomas' *Source Book for Social Origins*, pp. 173-86.

flict between these primitive patterns of human conduct. Even yet our civilization is uncertain whether the hunting pattern with its predatoriness and ruthlessness, or whether the child-care pattern with its sympathy and gentleness, should dominate human relations.

We can more accurately state our problem of the origin of the social patterns in our present civilization, however, by saying that men have always had two broadly contrasting sets of patterns or types of conduct, one which they followed in the social life within their groups, and another which they followed in their relations with men outside of their groups. Now the primitive groups were face-to-face groups, or, as the sociologist calls them, "primary groups." In other words, they were chiefly the family and the neighborhood groups. The standards of conduct within these groups seem to have been from the beginning those of sympathy, kindness, and mutual aid. In other words, they were mainly what we have called "the child-care pattern." But the standards of conduct toward those outside of these groups were usually those of distrust, hostility, and even hatred. These standards, therefore, tended to conform to what we have called "the hunting pattern." Men outside of the narrow face-to-face groups of primitive times, in other words, were regarded with such suspicion, distrust, and hatred that they were easily treated like the animals hunted. They were legitimate objects for the hunt and for predatory practices of all sorts.

However, primitively, while the world was slowly gaining its human population, human groups were scattered, and lived in relative isolation. The typical group was a horde, or a neighborhood, made up of a few, usually not more than a dozen, related families. Such groups had little contact with other human groups. Their main struggle was with the brute world and with physical nature. In other words, primitively there was of necessity little war between human groups, because the world was scantily populated, groups were widely scattered, and their struggle was largely with the forces of physical nature. Paradoxically enough, these "nature peoples" who seldom engaged in war but lived mainly by hunting animals and gathering wild fruits, we have called "savages,"

though it is certain that they had developed few, if any, of the predatory traits which we later find highly developed in the stage of barbarism.

It is easy to see how these predatory traits developed. With the improvement of tools, and especially with the first beginnings of the cultivation of the soil, food supply and so population would increase, human groups would no longer be so isolated, but would be in more or less close contact. During the period of isolation, however, the attitude of human groups toward strange groups had become one of suspicion and distrust. Kindliness and mutual service had been limited in their development to the small face-to-face groups. The later multiplication of groups and of contact between groups along with the limitation of natural resources, especially of food supply, accordingly brought conflicts between groups. The groups which encroached upon one another regarded each other as enemies, and not as human enemies, but as like the brute enemies with whom they were accustomed to struggle. Hence the predatory and hunting attitudes which man had developed, through long ages of struggle, toward the brute world become easily transferred to other men. The hunting pattern became the approved pattern of conduct for all relations with strange groups. An added incentive toward the development of this pattern as a standard of conduct in intergroup relations arose as soon as it was discovered that the food supply and even the women of a hostile group offered booty of very considerable value to those who could take them. A premium was put upon predatoriness. Strong fighting groups made it their business to hunt out weaker groups whose food supply, women, and children they could seize. Thus these fighting, conquering groups increased in size through the absorption of other groups and continued to grow by war and other predatory practices until they became tribes and still later nations.

This stage of human development, we have come to call "barbarism." While the primitive stage was of necessity one of relative isolation and hence of relative peace between human groups, the stage of barbarism was one of group contacts and of continual warfare in which large and powerful groups conquered and absorbed smaller groups. Throughout all this stage, the traditional ethics

of group relations was one of hostility and warfare, the right of the strong to plunder the weak being practically unquestioned. Moreover, as the weak were made slaves by their conquerors, it was also held that the conquering or master class had the right to exploit without limit any subject class. Men came to live by plundering other men, warfare became the most honored occupation, and power to exploit masses of men came to be regarded as the highest social honor. The peaceful mores of primitive life were completely reversed, so far as the relations between groups were concerned; and even within the group self-interest, power, and pleasure became acknowledged more and more as the ends of action. Man had awakened to self-consciousness, but the consciousness was almost entirely in terms of self-interest and directed toward the attainment of power or selfish pleasure.

A totally new culture with new patterns had evidently come to replace primitive culture. It is not unfair to say that this new culture was in the main predatory, though, of course, the primitive patterns of kindliness, sympathy, and mutual aid still dominated the primary or face-to-face groups of men. The external relations of the larger groups, however, were relations of almost unceasing hostility and war. This stage is well illustrated by the population of Papua or New Guinea. Every Papuan village regards its surrounding villages as hostile and potential if not actual enemies, so that it is almost impossible for the British administrators to secure any sort of co-operation, even among neighboring villages. The same condition obtained, of course, for ages in Europe. At the height of barbarism, indeed, it would have seemed to a reflective mind almost impossible that humanity should ever escape from the cul-de-sac of unending conflicts between races, nations, classes, and even to some extent between individuals, into which it had been plunged by the developments of barbarian culture. Indeed, it has not yet completely escaped thus far, but there is every reason to believe that barbarian culture was a transitional stage between the relatively adjusted and harmonious life of the lower-nature peoples and the even more perfectly adjusted and more harmonious life of higher civilization, which for the most part is still to be realized.

For the social patterns set by the life of primary or face-to-face groups were not destroyed by barbarism; and while men found satisfaction in plundering and destroying other men and in pursuing power and pleasure as ends, yet the deeper social satisfaction always remained in the sympathy, kindliness, and mutual aid experienced in primary groups. A life of predatoriness, modeled on the hunting pattern, has its drawbacks, and as soon as men reached the stage in which they had leisure to do some thinking, they perceived this. It became clear that the patterns for human living set by the primary groups were, after all, more satisfactory. Hence we find, as soon as written literature began to become common, protests against the mores of barbarism with their predatory patterns. These protests began to become common among the great semi-civilized peoples of Asia in the first millennium before our era. It was no accident that that millennium witnessed all over Asia the birth of new ethical and religious systems, which sought either to break entirely the mores of barbarism or else greatly to modify them. Such was Zoroastrianism, Confucianism, Buddhism, and finally Christianity. All of these new systems of ethical and religious thought and values must be regarded sociologically as gropings toward a new and better social system than any which barbarism or early civilization had afforded. They were steps, even though we judge them as inadequate, toward the ushering in of true civilization, or of a culture truly adapted to the requirements of man's social existence.

It is needless to say that our institutional and social life has not even yet escaped from the organization upon the basis of force and self-interest which was so firmly established in barbarian times. But the student of human culture has, as I have already said, every reason to believe that barbarian culture was but transitional to a higher, more settled, more harmonious, and more satisfactory way of human living. The whole barbarian period was one of readjustment in which the mind of man was, so to speak, just awakening to its human possibilities. It was one, therefore, of crude experiments, such as cannibalism, slavery, polygyny, autocracy, and militarism. Only at the close was writing invented which gave man some power over his ideas and traditions. When these ideas and traditions were set down in writing man first began

to be able to criticize them effectively. Hence, he developed the power to break even with his own traditions and to remake his human world through remaking his pattern ideas. From all that we know of the limitations of barbarian society and barbarian culture, it is inconceivable that its patterns should be taken as the patterns for man's ultimate conduct and social life. They were too much merely the patterns of the relations of strange and hostile groups. As men become acquainted with themselves and with the rest of their human world and as their sympathies and understanding widen, it is inevitable that these patterns upon which barbarian culture was founded, and which, as we have said, go back to the old hunting pattern of savage times, should drop to a secondary place. New social and cultural patterns are bound to take their place in the social life of humanity which, as this social life is more and more coming to resemble that of a neighborhood or of a family, are bound to be derived from the patterns of primary group life.

This view is in accord with the general position of social science; for modern sociology and modern anthropology are one in saying that the substance of culture, or civilization, is social tradition; and that this social tradition is indefinitely modifiable by further learning on the part of men of happier and better ways of living together. And the implication is that, if it were possible to control the learning of all individuals in the way both of ideas and emotional attitudes as they come on to the stage of life, it would be possible to modify the whole complex of our civilization, and so of our social life, within the comparatively short space of one or two generations.

The mental patterns embodied in the group opinions or group beliefs which lie back of an institution are the result, not of organic evolution or of any innate biological traits, but of a learning process which has gone on in the group by the method of trial and error. Human institutions, sociology shows, are in every case *learned* adjustments. As such, they can be modified through individuals, provided we can control the learning process of individuals. The custom or tradition out of which an institution is formed is easily enough changed provided we can show all individuals concerned that such change is desirable, and provided also we can change those

material conditions in the environment which have come to support the institution and to make it advantageous for individuals or a class of individuals to maintain it. This may be in practice difficult to do, but practical difficulties do not negative the conclusion that the social and institutional life of man is indefinitely modifiable.

This is not saying, however, that human groups can devise any sort of institutions which they choose and establish them in practice. Modern science has made untenable the contract theory of society either as a theory of the origin of human institutions or as a theory of social reconstruction. On the contrary, the scientific study of human institutions shows that while there are many wrong ways of constructing institutions there are only a few right ways; and that thus the matter of building institutions aright becomes, so to speak, as much an engineering problem as the building of roads or bridges. What social science does show is the modifiability or plasticity of institutions, and therefore the possibility of reconstructing them in accordance with rational ideas and human advantage—theoretically even within a comparatively short space of time, if we understood practically how to control all conditions. Thus the scientific study of institutions awakens faith in the possibility of remaking both human nature and human social life.

SOCIOLOGY A BASIC SCIENCE TO EDUCATION

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ABSTRACT

Sociology a Basic Science to Education.—Education is now a field of public work of great magnitude. It tends to become scientific, and to draw increasingly from basic pure sciences, of which sociology must be one. Sociology offers something toward the "socialization" of education, but its most important contribution must be toward determination of more adequate objectives for all kinds of school education. Now problems of education for democracy, of vocational education, and of better civic education require scientific solution. The "case group" method now offers considerable promise as a means of scientifically determining school curricula.

The direction and support of education constitutes the largest and most costly public function now exercised by civilized states, barring only the function of public defense. Education is now in the early stages of developing large bodies of serviceable scientific knowledge. The various transformations and reconstructions of basic theories and traditional practices now taking place suggest many analogies with the progress of medicine fifty to one hundred years ago.

Education, as a field of applied science, may be expected to develop in part its own scientific methods and to evolve its own peculiar scientific knowledge. But only in part; for the rest it must utilize the methods of research, and the findings of detailed fact and of interpretation drawn from certain other sciences.

Psychology is, obviously, one of the basic sciences to education. Only through contributions from "pure" psychology, or through its own psychological research, can education scientifically determine the "educabilities" of different kinds of learners, under various conditions of age, health, motivation, and the like. Only thus, also, can "methods and means" of maximum or optimum effectiveness be scientifically determined, once tangible, possibly measurable, objectives have been established.

The second basic science for education is sociology—the science of human group life, including the forms or structures of these groups, their interrelationships, their values to their component members, and to other humans, and other facts of significance to men.

So long as relative simplicity characterized the social inheritance (especially as transmissible by any guild or class) the desirable and practicable objectives of education seemed readily deducible from experience, discussion, trial-and-success processes. Thus derived, like other art-processes and products, they tended to become fixed as traditions and customs. The usual processes of historic education originated little except method—they simply took up and transmitted, often uncritically, the vocational achievements, the cultural acquisitions, the social controls, the sumptuary standards, the social attractions and repulsions, the aesthetic appreciations, and the religious aspirations as supplied by the more influential exponents of these factors of human activity in a given time and place. The actual sociological sources or foundations of educational policy and practice were, in fact, empirically derived and traditionally consolidated—with as good effect, at least, as were historic processes of tillage, medicine, warfare, and government. Only occasionally were the social relationships and responsibilities of ordinary men and women other than simple and understandable—these exceptional occasions being periods of folk migration, of military conquest, of enforced acculturation, of religious propaganda, and of basic economic dislocations.

For modern civilized societies the social inheritance of knowledge and other transmissible products expands in high geometric ratio, group relationships for every individual subdivide and multiply, and most group structures become indefinitely larger and more complex. Production, trade, defense, the administration of justice, the diffusion of culture, the collective conservation of health—all these social functions become involved, delicately adjusted, and vital to general welfare in ways and to degrees not found in primitive life. Co-operative discharge of essential functions passes largely from small, intimate, associate, personality-warmed groups to large, federate, impersonal groups.

Not only, therefore, has the social inheritance of knowledge, arts, and institutions become so extensive and complex that even the most gifted or mature men can now comprehend and assimilate only an infinitesimal fraction of it; but also, the selection, organization, and presentation of such portions of the social inheritance as are of importance to various classes of the members of society has become a matter of extreme complexity and difficulty. From the lowest to the highest our schools are now endlessly confronted by problems of choosing, from a wealth of possible offerings, the most significant and teachable. Confronted by embarrassments of riches, their administrators persistently recur to such sweeping and often futile inquiries as "What is education?" "What are the true values in education?" "What are educational essentials for the schools?"

Speculative studies of societies have, indeed, often proved rich sources of educational philosophy. Plato and Aristotle, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Hegel are among the names often recurring in histories of educational thought. Comte and Ward integrated education extensively into their schemes of social reconstruction, but they failed to attain, for their educational theories, as much publicity as did Spencer, whose skilfully presented criticisms of educational practices then current elicited attention far beyond the areas influenced by his sociology.

From the enormous mass of contemporary sociological literature it is difficult to disentangle the actual from the potential contributions to educational science. Every broadly observant and thoughtful sociologist almost necessarily develops a fairly intense, if not always fully coherent, philosophy of education. Frequently this finds expression as criticism of aims, methods, and administration now controlling current practices.

Education has undergone certain extensive transformations toward more socialized aims and methods during the last fifty years. This process has been both extensive and intensive. The possible contributions of education to the larger means and ends of social well-being—social control, democracy, economic and health efficiency, international order and harmony, and the like—have been substantially analyzed, and given some degree of con-

crete formulation. But, also, the individual school, classroom, and learner are now conceived in their more co-operative or social aspects—and that not only as one of the objectives of educational effort, but as a means as well. Under this influence the very discipline of classroom and school has been humanized, democratized, in a word socialized.

But there is little evidence that scientific sociology has contributed materially to this movement for the socialization of education. Rather is it probable that this movement has had its roots in the same soil which has produced recent extensions of social science studies in our higher institutions.

That branch of sociology which is commonly called social psychology has probably contributed, through Tarde, Le Bon, McDougall, and others, some valuable interpretations of the social instincts and of the psychology of groups; and these have come to have profound significance in educational theory and practice. But neither educators, psychologists, nor sociologists have been the sole pioneers here. Froebel, Baldwin, and Dewey should properly be numbered among the sources of the germinal ideas that have influenced advanced thinking about the “natures” of children, and are now beginning seriously to affect the practices of the schools.

The most active workers consciously applying the findings and methods of sociology during the last half-century have undoubtedly been those concerned with the several aspects of social pathology—crime, dependency, poverty, domestic maladjustment, and war. Through these workers, sociology began many years ago indirectly to affect certain phases of educational theory and practice, notably in the direction of demands for special schools for defectives and delinquents, for special vocational education for the handicapped, and for the educational correction of anti-social tendencies in youthful delinquents.

II

The indifference toward sociology heretofore manifested by educators has been due not only to the undeveloped and still somewhat inchoate character of sociology itself. It has been due largely to the fact that almost until yesterday educators have had little

or no appreciation of the practicability and possibilities of scientific study of educational needs and values—the field of theory and practice to which, obviously, sociology should make its most signal contributions. Long after many educators had become at least appreciative of possibilities of developing or borrowing scientific methods of administration and method, they remained content to accept the contributions of custom, tradition, and “cult-born” doctrines as to educational values. Endless debates over elective systems, materialistic tendencies in education, the values of the humanities, the conflict between cultural and vocational education, and the like, have practically always brought the disputants out at the same doors by which they entered, because of the almost complete absence of sociological criteria and methods. Modern psychology did, indeed, succeed in dislocating one pillar of tradition in its criticism of the dogma of formal discipline. But, in the main, the changes in the actual aims of education achieved in recent years have been due to the tedious and uncertain processes of trial and error.

But that this historic situation is now rapidly changing can hardly be disputed by anyone who has surveyed the enormous amount of writing produced during the last ten years in the field of educational aim or by one familiar with the aspirations and provisional programs of our experimental schools. The contemporary reader of Vallery-Radot's *Life of Pasteur* must be impressed by the many parallels between the advances achieved by medicine between 1840 and 1870, and those now actively taking place in education. The way is certainly being rapidly opened for close co-operation between sociologists and those educators who are seeking scientific foundations for more efficient and more economical education. In what respects does education now especially need the help of sociology?

We should in any analysis here avoid the frequently made mistake of interpreting education too narrowly. The schooling of the kindergarten stage may prove to be no less important than that of the liberal arts college. Vocational, civic, and health aims of education are tending to parallel the cultural in importance. The scientific study and control of education cannot ignore the tremen-

dous potency of numerous forms of extra-school instruction and training, even though these be largely informal and customary—such as the education of home, street, and workshop, and the varieties resulting from newspaper, photodrama, and club life.

A democratic system of education overlooks no groups, whether these be the mentally inferior, the morally delinquent, the adult illiterate, or the economically distressed. Neither does it under-value any of the particular kinds of education to be sought under such designations as habituation, training in skills, the expansion of knowledge, the development of ideals, and the like.

It is most important, too, that we fully appreciate the collective values to be sought in and through modern education at its best. Though that education must work with individuals of both sexes and all ages, and endlessly varied by heredity and environment, nevertheless certain collective goods or values—democracy, social righteousness, economic and physical well-being, the extension of possessions of knowledge and beauty, and others—must be the pole stars of greatest moment in guiding most of our steps.

Different major problems of education successively claim the widespread interest of educators and thinking laymen in a democracy like ours. At one time the major problem is that of securing public support for elementary schools; at another that of providing free, tax-supported high schools; and at still another that of insuring obligatory school attendance of all. A half-century ago the most prominent major problem was that of "enriching the curriculum." Then interest shifted to child-study and improved methods of teaching. Within recent years widespread interest has developed in the provision of publicly supported vocational education. More recently still have evolved our numberless preoccupations with psychological measurements—of intelligence, of several kinds of attainment, and of educabilities.

There are many signs that the next topic of nation-wide interest to educators will be that of educational values. Free public kindergartens, elementary schools, high schools, and colleges—what shall they teach, of the numberless things which they could teach, that will prove of most value to the individual, his compatriots, his fatherland, possibly the world-society of which he is a member?

All children compelled to attend school—to what essential purposes of instruction, training, fostered development? Improved methods of teaching—but toward what specific ends of habit and skill, knowledge, appreciation, ideal? Vocational education in schools—of what kinds, and to what degree of thoroughness? Psychological measurements of original or acquired powers of various kinds—with what consequences to curriculum-making, segregation of classes of learners, and possible exclusion from several kinds of schools or courses?

Above everything else, education now requires from sociology guidance in the determination of the aims, the objectives desirable in any given area of child life, social grouping, or other situation. To the extent that educators must work these objectives out for themselves they are, obviously, doing the work of sociologists—just as certainly as are physicians or dietitians doing the work of organic chemists when they conduct research into the character and functions of vitamins.

But there are two separate aspects of the study of educational objectives—the qualitative and the quantitative. It is comparatively easy for any moderately well-informed layman or educator today to point out that children, adolescents, or adults “should be taught”: foreign languages, mathematics, science, history; a trade, or other vocation; to swim, to be reverent, to write well, to keep clean, to “be prepared”; music, graphic art, literature, dancing, the care of the body, right behavior toward animals, the use of right recreations; and multitudes of other worthy things.

It is far more difficult, except on the easy bases of prejudice, fashion, and partisan aspiration, to define right quantities of these several kinds of desirable objectives. The learning abilities of all our students from the kindergarten to middle age are definitely limited things. The vital problems of educational objectives today do not essentially derive from the question “What is good?” but nearly always from the more basic questions, “What is better?” “What is best?”

Here, then, we find what the present writer regards as the central problem of educational sociology today. It must discover methods for the *comparative evaluation* of the objectives that the fertility

of thought and the richness of experience of the last century have made possible to the schools.

Psychology has its responsibilities here, especially in ascertaining the actual limits to educability under the methods now available, and no less in determining the *indirect* and *vicarious* values in education—since it may well be true that under some conditions, and in spite of the assaults on the dogma of formal discipline, the “longest way round is the shortest way home.”

III

As earlier suggested, there exists today among educators a state of much confusion as to certain of the larger objectives which should guide the work of schools and colleges. These confusions are made manifest by the disagreements as to fundamentals which are expressed by those high in authority—including university presidents.

For example, granting that all men of good will accept and approve the best prevalent aspirations for more and better democracy, what are some of the derivative conclusions as to specific directions and means of making education, on the one hand, more democratic in operation, and, on the other hand, more conducive to promotion of democratic spirit and behavior among men?

Again, what is “culture,” as it should be defined for the curriculum- and course-makers for schools and colleges? What is it for persons of inferior intelligence and environment? What is it for the gifted who aspire to high vocational proficiency in much specialized fields? What are the potential losses and the actual cultural gains to democratic culture of much newspaper reading, the photodrama, and widespread interest in current events?

Another problem is that of social control in relation to leadership and followership, especially within political groups and through political action. What expectations can reasonably be entertained as to practicable diffusion, among all classes of minds, of the political insight and appreciation required to solve present-day problems of political action? Should we expect 100 per cent of our adults so to comprehend the conditions of sound and right law observance, opinion-making, and voting that their attainments here shall be

analogous to those expected in such simple fields of hygienic behavior as are involved in oral cleanliness, prevention of malaria, and practical devotion to fresh air? Or should we expect 90 or even 99 per cent of our adults, in the various issues of political complexity that are sure to confront them, to seek and to follow expert guidance even as we now expect them to resort to oculist, dentist, surgeon, and psychiatrist, when confronted by health situations of danger and urgency?

These problems and scores of others similar to them are absolutely basic to sound policies of educational aim. Only in the light of hypotheses or tested findings regarding them can particular studies be required, advised, or withheld from various groups of learners.

But it appears doubtful whether educators alone, working by methods appropriate to their own field, will be able to dig down to bedrock and to construct the necessary foundations for these policies. Probably the methods of philosophical analysis have by this time contributed all that is possible for them. If education is to get out of the wilderness of aspirations, theories, and uncoordinated facts in which it now finds itself as regards democracy, culture, and social control, it would seem as though sociology must point the way.

There are other problems of educational objectives as to which the responsibilities of sociology are less evident, though perhaps none the less real. Nearly twenty years ago a considerable group of Americans, including some educators, some social workers, and many leaders among employers and employees in industry, became keenly interested in the furtherance of vocational education for the rank and file of workers. Already considerable progress has been made in providing for publicly supported and controlled schools of vocational education. But every step of the way is made difficult by absence of authentic knowledge regarding the economic constitution of American society—that is, of knowledge regarding social factors to which censuses and Department of Labor studies contribute little that is helpful. Data giving number, sex, ages, and daily and yearly incomes of several hundred classes of workers are helpful here, but not sufficiently basic. Either sociology

or its ancillary science economics (as here defined) should presently give us data, for example, as to relationship between actual and potential productivity under present conditions: as to the relative importance in the total productive process in each field of work, of the systematically trained worker, as against the haphazardly trained worker; and as to many other conditions.

Another great problem is found in physical education. The physical examinations of the draft produced a mountainous quantity of data relative to the health and defects of the three or more millions of men examined. From that data fairly numberless inferences have already been hastily extracted and used by various kinds of propagandists—not a few of these being educators. One of these speaks, in a report intended to be authoritative, of “the diseases that are undermining the nation” and solemnly alleges in italics that “*in the long run ineffectiveness in peace is more likely to retard National progress than ineffectiveness in war*”—whatever that may mean.

Now, no sane person attempts to dispute the prevalence among Americans of many serious kinds and amounts of disease and other physical defectiveness. But to disentangle the practicable responsibilities of school education for prevention and cure of these from the very plexus of responsibilities of nation, state, and district in their political or sanitary capacities, as well as from those of industry, the family, medicine, and the like, is obviously going to prove too great a task for educators. And preliminary to this in part, too, is the urgent necessity that we shall find out where we stand now—whether we have progressed or retrogressed as compared with other times and other peoples. Here again we are confronted by a social situation involving so many factors that only a science as comprehensive as sociology seems adequate to deal with it.

IV

What methods of attack are now practicable in deriving the sociological foundations of educational values?

The philosophical methods thus far employed in the discussion of the aims and values of education have given us an extensive literature treating, first, of the values of various studies and

curricula to society at large, and second, of their values to "the child," "the student," or some other abstract individual.

These discussions have heretofore only moderately affected the making of working programs of education for schools and school systems—and that for two fundamental reasons. First, little serious attempt has been made to show, in the case of any given subject of study—whether that be music or Greek, trigonometry or agriculture, ancient history or economics—to what extent the realization of optimum results for society was dependent upon the number of learners mastering that study at any given time. In the second place, little attention has heretofore been paid to the inevitable dependence of the educational values of subjects upon the native or early developed abilities of students.

For example, no one can dispute the tremendous value to American society of the prolonged and exacting study of, let us say, trigonometry. But is it important that such a study be so pursued by 100 per cent, 10 per cent, or only 1 per cent of the more than two million youths who in the year 1922 were seventeen years of age? The present writer thinks it of great importance to the future culture of America that at any given time there shall be found in our larger secondary schools and in colleges a few gifted minds and ardent spirits devoted to the study of the Greek classics—in the original. But he would regard it as absurd that more than 1 or 2 per cent of secondary-school students should be induced so to dedicate themselves; or that, granted a fashionable popularity for such studies, more than 3 or 4 per cent should even be permitted such luxury at the expense of taxpayers and endowments.

Similar deficiencies of analysis have characterized discussions of those whom the schools serve. The "child," the "high-school boy," the "college student," has been regarded in each case as of one genus and one species, intellectually and vocationally speaking. It must be conceded, of course, that individual differences, either in abilities or in circumstances, cannot, administratively, be paralleled by curricula providing for all such variabilities. But it is certainly far more practicable than educational theory and practice have yet discovered to isolate distinctive classes or groups of fairly homogeneous composition in reference to the *prevailing* powers

and prospects (or needs) for whom it is practicable to devise curricula.

The potentialities of men and women toward serving the collective interests of societies or social groups, or of ministering to their own well-being, vary in kind and degree, not merely vocationally or economically, but culturally, civically, and otherwise as well. Education is still greatly afflicted by its uniformitarians to whom it seems very important that all children or youth shall be educated toward the same ends, and by the same means and methods, whether the objects be physical training, knowledge of foreign languages, or tastes for music.

In order to contribute best to the ends of democracy and other forms of human efficiency and well-being, the education of the future must almost certainly be endlessly flexible and adapted. Under some circumstances it may seek by prolonged effort to offset native deficiencies—in correcting inferior bodies, in making the mentally inferior able to cope with the strong in simpler business transactions, and in forestalling the credulities natural to the inferior toward medicine and toward politics.

In other respects it will specialize in aiding individuals to capitalize to the utmost for culture and the other satisfactions of life their own native gifts of power and taste, however specialized these may be. Even the moron may be aided to find special forms of superior gratification toward culture in music, story, and photodrama, just as certainly as he can be trained toward competency in certain of the world's simpler vocations.

It is submitted that there are now available for application in research in the field of educational values certain valuable methods essentially sociological in their nature. These will be referred to hereafter as the "case group methods of determining educational needs and educational values."

A "case group" for present purposes is any section of the adult or juvenile population that is fairly homogeneous as respects one or several qualities significant to makers of programs of education. In any school, for example, the pupils of a given age are usually classified together for convenience of teaching, thus giving school classes. These are sometimes subdivided according to their

capacities for making progress through the curriculum—into slow, medium, and fast, or according to some other standard. Contemporary efforts looking to the measurement of intelligence suggest even more extensive, and certainly more effective, classifications than the crude ones heretofore evolved by our schools.

But a "case group" for purposes of curriculum-making is somewhat different from a school class. The purpose of case-group differentiation is to determine objectives rather than method. It must first be so defined as to discover the *prevailing* shortages or defects that can be corrected or offset by suitable kinds of education. A case group will, therefore, usually be characterized by some degree of uniformity as respects *several* qualities. For example, in a certain northern city are to be found a thousand (*a*) negro (*b*) boys, (*c*) from twelve to fourteen years of age. Of these it is found that about 400 are (*d*) of less than average intelligence (for all boys of that age), and (*e*) derive from homes of less than a certain standard of financial and cultural resources.

Now it may be that the curriculum of courses recommended for pupils of this type as they are found in a junior high school should be exactly the same as that recommended, for example, for white boys of the same ages who are of superior ability and come from prosperous homes. But certainly a heavy burden of proof rests on educators in each case, if the education of each of these opposed types is to be to the fullest extent practicable, democratic, and efficient.

V

Of almost unimaginable magnitude and complexity are the functions of education in modern societies. Without scientific prevision and prearrangement that education must prove disastrously wasteful and disappointing.

If educators, now responsible for the expenditure on public education alone in America of over a billion dollars per year, cannot obtain guidance from political and other social sciences as to the right and effective direction of their efforts, they must proceed by themselves to create a body of scientific knowledge adequate to constitute secure foundations for curricula and courses, the concrete embodiments of educational purposes or objectives.

That educators should, however, be held more responsible for the development of this scientific knowledge than have been in parallel situations, physicians, electrical engineers, agriculturists, metallurgists, and miners, seems unnecessary and undesirable—it is not a proper division of labor. True, the practitioners of applied science, including even men like Pasteur, Edison, and Burbank, have often conducted research and have made important contributions to basic knowledge. But the preoccupation of practical men with the urgent processes of operation and production commonly precludes the kinds of application essential to the more far-reaching forms of study and research.

For these reasons the educational sociologists yet to be developed in the service of our systems of education should be in a position to turn increasingly to sociology and the other more specific social sciences for basic knowledge of societies and of the methods, educational and other, whereby societies can have conserved their best present qualities and be improved toward the larger achievements of which humanity is capable.

SOME PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF SOCIOLOGY TO EDUCATION

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ABSTRACT

Misconceptions as to the place of individual and mass instruction in the schools are being removed through the practical treatment of the group as a sociological concept. Both curriculum-building and classroom method are being investigated on the basis of this *group concept*. In consequence, a new point of view is being established, sharply differentiating between individualization and socialization in education, between *mass* instruction and *group* instruction. Through the processes of group instruction social forces function which are inhibited in the procedures commonly followed in mass instruction or in individualized teaching. That young people may be instructed in groups without breaking down their individuality as human beings is being demonstrated in the classroom, the auditorium, the library, the gymnasium, and the conference room of the modern school. Through the group concept the practical educator has become interested in ways of instructing the individual under the proper conditions of group life.

THE GROUP CONCEPT

Educators have formed within the past few years a kind of group concept which is influencing them in the development of both school curricula and classroom methods. Somehow this new concept seems to be giving them a more tangible way of getting down to work with social aims in mind; which is but saying that educators have at last hit upon a convenient and practical procedure in applying sociological principles to the choice and treatment of subject-matter in school curricula, and in developing teaching methods in harmony with these same principles.

In the adaptation of school curricula to social needs, the social group furnishes a rather concrete working unit, for these needs can be definitely analyzed by a scientific study of the groups composing the social life of the school community. The problem then becomes one of scientific investigation, and may be definitely controlled and studied on the basis of sound sociological principles. These same principles make it possible to educate young people in groups

without breaking down their individuality as human beings. The group concept points to ways of safeguarding personality without making individualism the sole arbiter of human life. The task of the teacher, therefore, becomes that of educating the individual under the proper conditions of group life.

THE SCHOOL IN TERMS OF THE GROUP CONCEPT

Society year by year becomes more complex as intricate group relationships are multiplied. All of the resources of genius and of productive labor are being taxed to meet the needs of the organized groups of the social world. Under the stimulus of group life, science and art are lavishing their tremendous contributions upon civilization. Upon the educator rests the responsibility of moving this enormous freight from one generation to another. Group life affords at once a scheme of distribution in handling this gigantic heritage, and science gives the educator working procedures to aid him in the task.

Society can be understood only by a scientific scrutiny of the numerous groups composing it. The school as one of these component groups can best be understood by a scientific study, first of its relation to other groups and of its function as an integral part of society; and second, by a scientific analysis of its nature and characteristics as a social group, an organic unit of social life. The school life of individual children is greatly complicated by their life-experiences in affiliation with or in association with a wide variety of groups. Necessarily these group experiences must be reckoned with as strong undercurrents in school life.

The school itself, moreover, is an exceedingly complex group in which there are many manifestations of group life. There are in the school numerous groups of exceedingly varied character. The classroom group corresponds in some respects to the institutionalized groups in life outside of school. There are the graded classes corresponding somewhat to the chronological ages of the children and utilized to a large extent to regulate individual progress through the school from year to year.

There are groups within these larger classifications such as the classroom organization, which are particularly important from the standpoint of methods of teaching. These groups are functional

in character, groups that are made and unmade in relation to the intent and purpose of pupil activities, groups that spring into existence with the inception of an idea and grow and strengthen with the development of the idea. Unlike these groups that have their origin on the intellectual side, there are other groups which originate under some emotional stimulus. Several individuals discover that they have sympathies in common, that they feel alike over some situation, and, if circumstances continue favorable, these several individuals become a group in the social sense. Groups in this sense are made and unmade in accordance with the movements of thought or emotion that spread through the school or through a class or portions of a class.

There are in school all sorts of subsidiary groups merging and coalescing along lines of kindred interest, or along lines of related sympathies. This is true, too, from school to school in the same school system, or under the proper social conditions will become true. There should be a form of school organization, therefore, strong enough in social principles to bring about such group integration as is necessary to the proper functioning of social life.

THE WORKING OUT OF THE CONCEPT

The practical-minded educator, interested in the group concept, keeps before him two fundamental considerations: (1) that the school is one of the numerous groups constituting *organized society* and must somehow be properly related to other groups of society; (2) that the school itself is an exceedingly complex group consisting of many smaller groups which require careful *social adjustment*.

To come now to the first of these considerations; educators are beginning in a practical way to do their work with due recognition of the fact that the school does not stand in group isolation. They are saying in so many words:

The children come from one type of institution, the home, into another type of institution, the school, with a view to being educated, as we would say, in order that they may live more and more completely in relation to many other social institutions, and that they may understand the uses and the needs of these institutions. It is well, therefore, to set up social conditions in the school that relate to the past experiences of the children, and that anticipate in some measure those of the future.

These principles are being applied in the schools, both to curriculum-making and to classroom methods. Only last week I was visiting a large school system in a neighboring city and was told that preliminary to re-writing courses of study, the entire teaching staff had been set to work to survey, from the standpoint of the school curriculum, the normal experiences of the children living outside of the schools under the influence of various social groups. Those responsible for making the new courses of study seemed to desire to be in a position to say: "These are the situations in life in which the children need arithmetic, or English, or civics."

In beginning the work upon the new courses of study, the supervisors expected to give the fullest possible recognition to the fact that the existence of individual children in the school is vastly complicated by the life which they live in affiliation with and in association with a variety of groups. Educational objectives listed in courses of study were to be challenged, specifically from the standpoint of the social background of the children for whom these objectives were to be set. Furthermore, the listing of activities of the course of study as a means of attaining the objectives was to proceed also on the basis that only such activities should be listed as seemed most appropriate in the light of the information obtained concerning the actual life-experiences of the children in the various social groups to which they belonged, or to which they might under reasonable circumstances be expected to belong in the future.

There is obvious need for more direct assistance than has yet been given by sociologists to educators at work upon the task of curriculum-making. In time this assistance will come in a form that will clarify greatly the bearings of life in community groups and social institutions upon school problems. It is regrettable that the sociologists themselves are not working more actively in the field of education. As an example of the important assistance that sociologists can give educators, in the nature of group analysis, may be cited the neighborhood and community surveys that are being made in connection with many social service activities. Curriculum-building such as that undertaken by Dr. Bobbitt in the public schools of Los Angeles, California, would be greatly expedited by social surveys of this character.

THE AUDITORIUM, AN AGENCY OF GROUP INTEGRATION

A study of the complex background of social groups of the typical class in public schools has resulted in an effort to introduce more systematically into the school organization some integrating influences that will tend to bring individual pupils together through the stimulation of group consciousness. A greatly enriched school program is being undertaken, at present, in many parts of the country through the agency of the auditorium which is being utilized directly as an influence upon group consciousness. In the Detroit elementary, platoon schools, the auditorium is designed to be the strongest single influence in the school upon the development of group life. Through the auditorium it is expected that the social tone and atmosphere of the school will be felt in the life of every individual, to the end that social impulses will be stirred within him at all times, whatever the nature of the task or activity that may engage his attention. The auditorium is expected to offset some of the narrowing effects of specialization in school subjects, to aid in bringing subject-matter into its desired relational aspects, to give bare facts and figures more vital meanings, and to make acquired knowledge better understood as means of social control in the lives of individuals.

The two accompanying charts show the place of the auditorium in the school as a social group. Charts I and II are my own analysis of the possibilities of using the Detroit elementary, platoon school auditorium as an agency of group integration. All pupils, in Grades I-IV, in these platoon schools meet in groups of from 80 to 160 daily, in Grades V-VI in similar groups four times a week, and in Grades VII-VIII three times a week (see column A of Chart I). Larger audiences may be developed about once in ten weeks by focusing the activities of the small class groups, meeting frequently, upon set programs to which these groups make special contributions. The plan, as is evident from an examination of columns B, C, D, provides not only for the integration of groups within the school but within outside community groups as well.

Chart II shows in detail the school organization, and platoon-school curricula, in relation to the group activities carried out in the auditorium. In column I is outlined the formal school work with

suggestions for the utilization of the children in the class as the connecting bond between the classroom and the auditorium. The auditorium as an agency of group expression, with its typical integrating activities, is diagrammed in column II. Column I gives an analysis of the scheme from the standpoint of formal school administration.

SOCIAL GROUPS, THE BASIS OF SCHOOL AND CLASSROOM ORGANIZATION

Such schemes of socialization as that represented in the auditorium were looked upon for a while in Detroit as complementary or supplementary to a uniform plan of school organization based

CHART I
THE INTEGRATION OF SOCIAL GROUPS
(Correlation in art forms—musical, pictorial, oral)

SCHOOL AND COMMUNITY WITHIN SCHOOL HOURS		SCHOOL AND COMMUNITY OUT OF SCHOOL HOURS	
School Groups	School and Community Groups within School Hours	Friends, Parents on Invitation as Guests	Patrons at Public Performances on Payment of Fee
A	B	C	D
Daily: Two or more sections or classes meeting in auditorium 1. Group activities to satisfy immediate audience situations 2. Development of co-operative group activities appropriate for staging before large audiences as in "B" or "C" Type Activities: Talks Discussions Dramatizations Pantomimes Music Movies, etc.	Occasional: (Twice each term, once in 8 or 10 weeks) Occasions: 1. Sections combined to build up audiences of 200, 300 or more Friends, parents, as guests on invitation; activities chosen from best under "A" or developed under "A" 2. Principals' meetings Costuming and stage sets, simple, involving no expense Elizabethan idea of direct appeal to imagination	Unusual or exceptional activities chosen under "A" or "B" Guests of the school Occasions: 1. Parent-teacher associations 2. Know your school week 3. Prominent citizens Prominent visitors to the city 4. Civic organizations or celebrations Costuming and stage sets simple and inexpensive	<i>Not more than 1 per term.</i> I. Pay performances for general public Opportunity for specially talented pupils May have origin in "A" or "B" II. Pay performances for pupils Nominal fee—5c or 10c May have origin in "A" or "B" Period of preparation not to exceed four weeks Type Activities: Plays Cantatas Operas Debates Festivals Pageants Concerts

upon general intelligence, but after nearly two years of experience with this plan of group organization, this city seems to be learning the requirements of many cross-classifications. In the *first place*, it has developed that there must be a shifting here and there from

the scheme of organization on the basis of general intelligence to provide especially for abilities such as those relating to silent reading, or other social accomplishments. There is, moreover, a growing recognition of social traits and moral qualities that seems to be swaying the school organization toward yet other groups. In

CHART II
THE INTEGRATION OF SUBJECT-MATTER

I Classroom Organization Subject-Matter	Teachers and auditorium teachers confer in advance on general plan of activities for each month	II Auditorium Mixed Groups Enlarged audiences Daily activities 1. General auditorium activities 2. Visual education 3. Music appreciation 4. Art appreciation 5. Health education 6. Public welfare <i>Integration of interests through group expression</i> Typical integrating activities: Reports by class representatives
1. Home Room 2. Special Rooms 3. Gymnasium 4. Special Educ. Rooms 5. Library <i>Stimulation and Development of Special Interests</i> The Curriculum:	Auditorium teachers hold individual conferences and committee meetings with teachers	Takes
<i>Home Rooms</i> Exact Sciences Arithmetic Language Composition and Grammar Handwriting Spelling or Reading Supervised Study <i>Special Rooms</i> Literature English 1-4 Social Sciences Art Domestic Science Manual Arts <i>Library</i> <i>Gymnasium</i> <i>Special Education</i> Sight conservation Open-air classes, etc.	Teachers and auditorium teachers post notices of work, daily or weekly, as changes progress	<i>Dramatisations</i> <i>Discussions</i> <i>Debates</i> <i>Dialogues</i> <i>Monologues</i> <i>Readings</i> <i>Symposiums</i> <i>Playlets</i> <i>Pageants</i> <i>Songs</i> <i>Operas</i> <i>Movies</i> <i>Declamations</i> <i>Speaking</i> extemporaneously Small group expression <i>Speaking</i> from notes <i>Speaking</i> from memory <i>Group</i> discussions, teacher or pupil leading formally or informally <i>Illustrated talks</i> Exhibits explained Slides explained <i>Charades</i> <i>Pantomimes</i> Interpretative dancing
Each subject so taught as definitely to contribute something to the auditorium activities. Pupil representatives from the auditorium make systematic reports, suggestions, recommendations in classrooms concerning auditorium activities	Written bulletins from auditorium teacher when co-operative group work is in progress	Each week pupil representatives report systematically on work in progress or planned in the classroom
	Type Correlation (a) Auditorium teacher suggests to science teacher that she initiate appropriate activity to focus in auditorium (b) Science teacher asks co-operation of literature and other teachers in shaping activity for presentation in auditorium (c) Auditorium teachers assist, advise, etc.	

final analysis, all of these social factors have a strong influence upon *group consciousness*, which in turn becomes a force of *considerable importance*, when definitely utilized in school administration and in methods of teaching. Group differentiation to meet the requirements of the children in the school is consequently being extended in Detroit to include many *social* factors as well as *general* intelligence.

The extremes in emphasis in classroom activities today lie between the individual and the group. Scientific standards and instruments of measurement are being developed which make it possible to give the *individual* personal training without isolating him from group life. This is highly important, since it becomes possible thereby to educate the individual under the conditions of group organization which may provide the proper *conditions* for *learning*—proper in the sense that learning in the school may thus be carried on under conditions that are identical in human elements with those outside of the school.

An intelligent application of the principles of sociology to education should mean the enriching of teaching methods through the influence and the agency of social groups. Conditions in the world are such as to make this application a practical necessity. Group organization constitutes a feature of growing importance in the scheme of classroom teaching.

The traditional school has been a place of attenuated social relationships—a place of social inhibitions. It is becoming a place, however, filled with social groups, not merely with individuals. It is becoming a place where the individual frequently has an opportunity to tackle headlong wavering public opinion, where the choice of individual judgment is made under social pressure, where individual pacing is occasionally required for one to hold his own among his associates. The classroom is becoming a place where children in small groups have occasion to make adjustments to social situations with a tendency to respond to the stimulus of common interests. It is becoming a place where real situations develop, situations through which direct social struggle takes place in the attempts of the individual to make adjustments to elements of social life.

SOME SOCIOLOGICAL SIDE LIGHTS ON THE SCHOOL LIBRARY

The groups of readers that come and go in a well-regulated school library reading-room constitute one of the best examples that can well be pointed out of the functioning of individual life educationally under the conditions of group organization. The librarian has somehow succeeded in establishing what is commonly spoken of as library atmosphere. In final analysis this implies that a con-

sensus has been arrived at throughout the entire school with reference to the rights of individual readers and with reference to the decorum favorable to the maintenance of these rights. The groups not only understand the purposes of the individual in coming to the library reading-room, but sympathize and co-operate with him to the end that he may achieve there his purposes most satisfactorily.

An analysis of school-library situations from the sociological point of view reveals elements that lead to social growth in the properly administered reading-room. A knowledge of the great working classifications of books, with attendant confidence in the availability and accessibility of library materials so classified is undoubtedly one element. Other elements are respect for public property, association within groups where like needs are felt, common methods of satisfying needs, and forms of group conduct determined directly by the purposes of individuals with common or related ends in view.

It would be difficult to find a better example than the school library of a place where the individual is properly cared for educationally, under the conditions of group organization. Here is an example of socialization as opposed to individualization in educational work. Here the individual is adequately cared for without suffering isolation from the social groups in which his active interests place him.

Yet occasionally, a librarian is found who seeks individualization rather than socialization. A few comments to the point will be illuminating, and useful in differentiating between individualization and socialization, between mass instruction and group instruction. This differentiation is of considerable importance because in public-school education the individualization of instruction and mass instruction tend to become synonymous in so far as the individuals concerned are massed in non-social or externally controlled groups for convenience and economy. The librarian who works toward individualization rather than socialization formulates *rules* that will bring individuals severally into a kind of goose step. Her rules must so operate as to mass or bank all other individuals while any one individual is being served. The lines of constraint are direct from *headquarters* to each individual, and consciousness

flows toward headquarters rather than toward public opinion. The entire organization is set up on the basis of this kind of individual domination. Even the furniture may be designed for the purpose of massing individuals rather than for that of bringing them into sociological groups. At the present time in school-library circles, a few enthusiasts are praising some newly designed *individual reading-tables*. These tables are ingeniously constructed to give the individual what these persons regard as the advantage of actual physical isolation from other members of the group, and if not this, certainly to break down any possible social relations, to give a feeling that the reader is detached, aloof, removed, or unrelated in interests from others around him; this in order that he may concentrate upon the task before him, upon the page in a book. The atmosphere in the room becomes not "library atmosphere," but the high-tensioned, electrified atmosphere of external domination—very conducive to concentration? This situation is typical of individualization and mass instruction as opposed to group instruction.

Where some form of individual or personal convenience or of small group convenience is necessary in the library, small conference rooms, or alcoves, are being built opening into the reading-room, or constituting a part of it, constructed largely of glass. The essential point is that even in matters of physical convenience one individual may be served adequately without imposing upon his associates situations directly in conflict with sound sociological principles, such situations for example as stimulate or nurture smug individualism. The point may be put differently, that overemphasis upon the individual makes for group disintegration and selfish individualism, whereas the proper emphasis upon the individual in his group relationships tends to bring about balance between the requirements of individual and social life. The isolation of readers in the library by an individualized seating arrangement is an improper and injudicious emphasis upon the individual.

The school library administered on sound sociological principles is a place of individual and group integration. There should be no irreconcilable conflicts. As a matter of fact in the layout and furnishing of the high-school library reading-room standards have already been fairly well established for the proper care of the

individual under the conditions of group organization. Ratios have been worked out between the needs of the individual reader and the actual floor space required for total service to the group. This means that on this basis ratios are being established that make it possible to construct a library reading-room architecturally and furnish it so as to keep the proper balance between individual and group requirements. Such matters as the needs of readers passing back and forth at will individually or severally, sitting quietly in an uncramped position free from crowding or jostling, occupying seats reasonably near sources of material, having equal opportunity with others for service from the library staff, having an abundance of light without striving for positions occupied by someone else, and many other elements making up a balanced social situation may be predicted almost mathematically. Conditions such as these bring individual selfishness into a strong relief that tends to arouse disapproval in the group. Selfishness under such conditions not only is, but is seen generally to be, a social abnormality. Anyone who attempts to live a gorilla-like existence in the socialized school library will soon be marked for his unsocial habits. Yet the individual reader, even if he cannot reign there in blissful solitude, may merge with the group without becoming separated or lost from his personal interests and comforts, and with gain rather than losses in educational opportunities.

A NEW TYPE OF GROUP CONTROL WITHIN THE SCHOOL

Application is more and more commonly being made in school régime of some of the same laws of group control as operate ordinarily in the groups of society that rather spontaneously regulate themselves. This is a type of group control that should be distinguished from the more highly institutionalized forms of organized government. It is to the group what "manners" or social poise is to the individual. Examples may be cited in the regulation or social control that takes place in some characteristic way in such groups as audiences in a theater, spectators at a baseball game, guests at a party, congregations in church, or spectators at a moving-picture show. Each group is not only controlled by characteristic modes of behavior, but by certain typical attitudes on given

occasions that seem somehow to foreshadow behavior. Persons in charge of groups on a given occasion learn to expect the characteristic thing and to plan accordingly. Officers on duty at a baseball game know that the group is very likely to rise and stretch after the seventh inning, or that the spectators may toss their neighbors' hats into the air in demonstrations following particularly brilliant playing. This same kind of behavior on the part of the same individuals in church would be madness. It is true that there is such a thing as the characteristic personal behavior of the members of a group. It may not be at all startling for an individual to yell suddenly and lustily at a football game, but he may not do so without causing consternation in a church or even in a theater. There may be manifestations of personal behavior on the part of individuals in a group, but only such as are recognized or approved by the group customarily.

In the school, teachers and administrators are becoming more and more adept in utilizing factors of group control. In some cases deliberate measures are taken to make pupils aware of typical group moods and attitudes in order that they may regulate their conduct appropriately in moving from group to group. For example, the groups in the corridors are taught to project themselves forward somewhat into particular group situations ahead.

In moods, in purposes, and in attitudes the groups in the corridor are in a fluid state; some there show excitement of exuberant, physical energy as they move toward the gymnasium; the members of another group are sorting out mentally the precise instruments that they will soon be using in the biological laboratory; others are discussing excitedly a question coming up for class debate or discussion; still others move along trailing the moods and the spirit of the groups that they are just leaving. The moods and the behavior of the corridor groups are fluid. These groups are in consequence not expected by the school authorities to be quiet nor are they expected to fall into confused social disorder. As the corridor groups go their several ways they are expected to anticipate in some measure the typical attitude of the groups which they are about to become. Those reporting as classes in English are expected to enter the classrooms in such a manner as to

make it possible for class activities to proceed promptly without loss of time. If one of these classes has just previously been to a swimming pool, the individuals may have considerable difficulty swinging themselves into proper attitude for the English class, the attitude felt and recognized as proper by the group.

The time is rapidly coming when group control of the kind just discussed will be as widely recognized as formal student government and teacher guidance are today. In the classroom the individual will, by his very anticipation of typical group attitudes, assist in maintaining group control. A pupil, for example, rising to talk to a class will exact of his audience a fair hearing. He will expect them to fall into an attitude of courteous attention. He will have a kind of eagerness to be heard fairly that will bring his audience into the desired *listening attitude*. Every participant in group activities will in some such way as this help enforce group discipline. Pupils very quickly respond to suggestions concerning group control enforced on this basis.

THE FUNCTIONING OF GROUP ACTIVITIES IN THE MODERN SCHOOL

Through the new methods of teaching, group instruction is gaining an important place chiefly because of its influence upon the attitude of the children toward schoolroom problems. Group instruction in the best sense of the word means not only that the individual pupil is affected by the human impulses of the group, but by his regard for the opinions of those around him, and by the comparisons which he may make between his own records of achievement and those of other members of the group and of the group itself.

In the design of new school buildings there has been taking place a reorganization providing for the functioning of group activity in school life. In these new schools, with their appropriately planned and well-equipped libraries, classrooms, auditoriums, gymnasiums, and laboratories, the school plant is architecturally fitted to social methods of instruction. Throughout the building physical conditions are made appropriate to a life of active interest on the part of the children. The definite provision for group activities in the auditoriums, the conference rooms, the libraries,

and gymnasiums give strong social motive to school work. This means that although drills and practice exercises may occupy much of the time of the individual, there is yet a social effect in that the individual looks forward as a result of drill and practice to *higher* forms of social expression within the school itself, to *opportunities* of testing his progress in social ways within the school, and to *comparing* his progress in these respects to those with whom he is from time to time associated in group activity.

THE GROUP CONCEPT MAKES SOCIALIZATION
PRACTICAL

In conclusion: it means a great deal to educators to be able to attack their problems definitely from the standpoint of social groups, and to recognize the school as an integral part of society. It seems strange that they have not been doing this all of the time; but they have not. They have been talking vaguely of socialization without a definite program of action. Somehow, it seems that this group concept is furnishing them more means of getting down to work. In consequence, they are, as has been pointed out, beginning to set up school objectives that are appropriately related to outstanding social groups in the school community. Furthermore, within the school itself, the proper adjustment is being sought within the many complex groups that make the school a social institution.

SOCIOLOGICAL BASES OF EDUCATION FOR CULTURE

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ABSTRACT

Sociological Bases of Education for Culture.—Culture groups differ from most others in that membership in them is voluntary. Hence sanctions for conformity to culture group standards are largely worth, instead of external pressure, sanctions. As a result of democratic movement we are now demanding that schools give genuinely functioning culture-education, hence application of engineering spirit to cultural education. Two problems arise: (1) to find out what culture *is* when resolved into specific detail, in order that each element may be sought as a definite objective, and (2) to determine what part the school should assume as its responsibility. *Particularization of the idea of culture.* We must replace philosophical definition of culture with a sociologically determined one, which will consist of a specification of the many particular abilities an objective study shows to be necessary for meeting effectively the problems actually confronting people in those relationships called cultural. *Systematic job analysis, method of defects, and method of agreement,* are among the methods available for determining scientifically the content of culture. *Finding function of school.* The school's function is residual, i.e., it must do what other agencies would leave undone. Sample studies for finding residual function of school include: (a) Snedden's type-group plan; (b) group surveys measuring present attainment against reasonable expectation; (c) direct study of contribution of non-school agencies.

For reasons that will appear later, it is impossible to define culture satisfactorily in the sentence or two that would be appropriate at the opening of this paper. It will be perhaps enough here to say that cultural education is to be used as one division of the whole field, of which vocational, moral, physical, domestic, and civic education are the other divisions. Following the traditional, though rather loose, use of the term, we shall be thinking of culture as covering: (1) enrichment of the personal life; (2) the characteristics that make for facility in one's associations with one's fellows; (3) resourcefulness and power in meeting the problems of one's unspecialized relationships.

There are certain types of groups in which, in the present-day world, we cannot escape membership. One of these is the state and its subsidiary political divisions. Every normal individual must be a member of some political group. If he does not like one city or one state or one country he can go to another, but immedi-

ately he becomes subject to the civic pressures of the new community to which he attaches himself. And just as the individual cannot withdraw from the state, neither can the state withdraw from its unsocialized individuals. They are inevitably linked together by reason of physical contiguity. The only relief, then, that the state can have from the disrupting influence of recalcitrant members is socialization of its complete membership. To this end the state sets in motion machinery for social control—suggestion, the cultivation of public opinion through newspapers, addresses, etc., programs of civic education in school designed to bring the pupils to the state of mind approved by the group. For those who cannot be socialized by these persuasive measures, restraining laws are enacted with such penalties attached as will lash laggards into line. Into this effort to bring all of its members to harmony with the group interests and the group will, the state throws itself with great vigor and vigilance. The same sort of thing is true of community groups in respect to morality and to matters of health. All who live in the neighborhood belong to a single group in respect to these relationships, for all are affected by what anyone does. In consequence the community throws itself very actively into restraining unsocial acts and forcing conformity with the group will, employing as pressures educational propaganda, praise and censure, evidences of group resentment, legal penalties, and even mob violence.

But culture groups are no such compulsory ones. Membership in them is voluntary. If a person out of consonance with the spirit of a culture group is found within the fold, the group does not alight upon him and prod and twist and prick him into conformity. Instead it simply permits him to depart in peace and go where he feels at home. A group formed on the basis of a love for classical music would not, for example, feel obliged to coerce, or even to educate, a philistine into conformity with its modal members. Instead the group would expect him to go his way and attach himself to a bunch specializing in jazz. Thus the culture group maintains its solidarity and its continuity, not by forced socialization but by selection. He who makes overtures to the group but does not possess its spirit is met with such indifference, such stony silence, or such half-suppressed amusement, that he is speedily frozen out.

It therefore happens that the sanctions for the acquisition of culture are very different from those that operate in most other forms of education. The impetus to culture must come from within the individual rather than from the group. If the individual does not himself seek culture, he is allowed merely to sit out the world's dance alone. He is subject to plenty of stimuli, of course, in the form of suggestion, models for imitation, or prospect of public approval for conformity; but to no coercion.

But if group pressures for cultural efficiency are weaker than for civic, vocational, or health efficiency, individual pressures are compensatingly stronger. The individual old enough to have matured his own social aspirations will make very serious sacrifices to acquire the credentials admitting him to the charmed circle of the élite. He will eagerly study the dress, the table manners, the speech, the artistic tastes, of those "who know," and seek to copy them. He will work assiduously over conventional studies in school or college that he may gain the coveted diploma which, whatever else it may be worth, will admit him to the company of the elect. If he is not old enough to be concerned about his own social career, his parents and friends are actively concerned for him. They want no doors to be closed to him. Such eager search for the ethos of a group, and such strenuous effort to conform, are entirely unknown outside of the cultural life.

Until comparatively recently what we call culture was pretty largely restricted to the class of gentlemen. By reason of the wealth and the traditions of this aristocratic class its members had leisure for reading and travel, and valuable opportunities for intermingling. They had access also to schools and colleges which, as a part of the traditions of their class, they attended often as a matter of form. By reason of these opportunities, they maintained certain intellectual possessions and graces which marked them off from the common people. This gap between gentlemen and commoners was especially characteristic of Europe, but obtained also to a considerable degree throughout our own history. With the rise in the tide of democracy the common people tried to cross this gap and break into the class above. They sent their boys and girls to school so that the children might be better off than their parents had been.

And by "better off" they generally meant occupying a "higher social status." The recent phenomenal increase of attendance on secondary schools and on colleges is often taken as evidence of faith in the intrinsic value of education on the part of the American people. I am inclined to believe that it does not so much express faith in the intrinsic value of education as it does indicate a determination of the common people to force their children into the gentleman class through the schools as an instrumentality, and a determination on the part of the upper classes to hold their places by the same means.

But now that the mass of the people have forced themselves or their children into the charmed circle of the élite, they have found the life there much more sterile than it seemed in prospect to be. There were, indeed, a few charmingly cultured people within that circle, but much of the education that was supposed to prepare for that life of culture proved to give only empty credentials, not the substance of a really functioning culture. Hard-headed men have a sense for those who are genuinely cultured and they are perceiving that our expensive school machinery is not producing this type anything like as largely as might reasonably be expected. But their solution is not to withdraw from the patronage of schools and leave them again to a class of gentlemen of leisure. They have faith in the potency of education in principle and, instead of withdrawing, are demanding that education be revamped in such a way as to enable it to make good on its possibilities. They are demanding, in short, that the principles of efficiency, which have transformed business, be applied to schools, even to education for culture.

When we undertake to introduce into cultural education the engineering spirit, two questions are at once raised: (1) What, when resolved into specific detail, *is* this culture that we must learn how to achieve? (2) In the educational process by which it is to be won, what is the part that must be accepted as its responsibility by society's chief agency of formal education—the school—and what may be safely expected to come as by-products from social agencies that give education merely as an incidental feature? Obviously the first of these two questions—as to the elements required to make up culture—is absolutely fundamental. It is

just as foolish to work for culture without knowing what it is we are seeking as it would be to blaze away aimlessly into the blue sky with the hope that our shots might somewhere find a duck and lay him low. The only way in which to shoot ducks economically is to spy out one after another and aim directly at him. In like manner the only way in which to train economically for culture is to ascertain what are the fifty or the hundred types of elements required to constitute it, then work consciously and definitely for each of these elements. So long as culture is conceived merely in the lump and quite mystically we can expect our frantic efforts to hit upon only a very little of it and that by accident. Of course a curriculum that has been the product of long years of social evolution could not well be wholly wrong, but it is almost certain to have vestigial elements not yet squeezed out, the time spent on which is largely wasted.

Our idea of culture as an educational concept has not, of course, gone wholly undefined. There have been some hundreds of efforts to define it in what we might call a philosophical manner. But these definitions have usually been couched in a single sentence, and have been so vague and general as to get us practically nowhere. I am ready to assert that we shall make no substantial headway in clarifying our ideas of culture as an educational objective until we abandon these philosophical definitions and seek instead a sociological one. Now a sociological definition of culture cannot be couched in a single sentence. It will cover instead twenty pages, will arise not from the logical tracing down of the implications of some a priori principle but from field surveys of groups of individuals, and will be an elaborate set of generalizations from a systematic study of the qualities and reactions of cultured people.

There are several methods by which the principle of social surveys can be employed in the search for a sociological definition of culture. Logically the simplest of these is that of *systematic* job analysis. I can describe that most briefly if I may be allowed to approach it through an analogue that is somewhat more concrete than culture, namely the job of plumbing. If one wished to find out what abilities are required to make a good journeyman house plumber, he might sit down, pencil in hand, and note the particular

tasks with which his observation has shown him a plumber is confronted, translating each of these tasks then into a specific correlative ability needed for meeting it. At his first sitting he would miss many significant elements. These he would need to pursue by going at his list again and again, always with his thoughts turned on the job as actually practiced, never on the logical balance of his analysis. He would be more likely to catch all the elements if he got other experts besides himself to make similar lists—five, ten, fifty, or a hundred experts—using the many lists as checks on each other. His lists of needed abilities would be yet much more complete and reliable if, instead of merely jotting down items from memory, he followed an actual workman about for a period of time—either himself or some other workman—noting down the tasks with which such workman was actually confronted. But his list would be most complete and dependable if he followed about, not only a single plumber but a hundred or a thousand plumbers, or had other observers do so, and telescoped together all of these industrial diaries or biographies. This would certainly give him practically a complete picture of what the tasks are with which a house plumber is confronted, and what are the abilities needed for meeting them.

Now by the same sort of procedure a job analysis can be made of culture. Just as one can think about the tasks a house plumber is called upon to perform, list them up, and translate them into a set of correlative abilities, so can he also think over the situation, to which one must adjust himself as he goes about in life, list up those that fall within the area we call cultural, and translate them over into the traits necessary for making the most out of them. This will give a long list of specific abilities—ability to enjoy the higher types of music; ability to appreciate good paintings; ability to get satisfactions out of recognizing and knowing the characteristics of birds, animals, and insects; ability to use the English language in such way as to talk with superiors without embarrassment; ability to “place” in historical perspective present-day social institutions, and several scores of others.

But the investigator can go further. He can invite other observers also to list such elements as they can find, and then telescope the lists together into a composite one. Professor Bobbitt

and his disciples have made much use of this principle. But the investigator can go farther still. He can get some hundreds of people to keep diaries of those of their experiences that have anything to do with culture, can generalize from these as to what are cultural needs, and translate them over into abilities to meet these needs. This list of abilities would be a definition of culture. Professor Charters has urged the use of such diaries in the study of this problem, and I have used it with myself and my students enough to make me believe there is great promise in it.

After we have laid our fingers on the various types of cultural needs by this sort of qualitative analysis, we can press our study into further detail by making quantitative investigations into the demands under each heading. Let me make this clear by an example. I have spotted, by the method of job analysis supplemented by other methods yet to be mentioned, some seventy elements in culture. One of these is the ability to get satisfactions out of "placing" (that is, understanding) the references met with in one's reading and conversation. The questions then arose, *What* references does one need to place? What information is needed for this purpose? In order to find out, my classes in educational sociology read a wide sampling of the most popular literature of the present, including twenty-six of the best-selling novels, four thousand jokes, five hundred comic pictures in the newspapers, twenty-five short stories, and the legends of ten moving picture reels, listing up the references made in them. This gave us an array of items that had occurred from a total of one hundred times (in the case of New York City) down to one time, and indicated by what particular abilities the general ability to place references must be made up. Similar analyses of the other sixty-nine major abilities must eventually be made into a total of hundreds, if not thousands, of specific ones before we shall have a complete definition of what culture is.

A second possible attack on the problem is by the method of defects. We can ascertain in what specific respects individuals fail in their cultural relationships. Each of these failures suggests a complementary positive quality essential to culture. I have been asking the members of my classes in educational sociology

to make a list of specific ways in which they have found themselves handicapped in respect to relationships that are generally called cultural. Not all replied but I have sixty-nine lists of such deficiencies already worked up and a number of additional ones on my table. These sixty-nine persons mentioned a total of 134 different experienced deficiencies. Here are a few samples of them with the number of persons mentioning them:

Lack of knowledge of current events.....	45
Lack of habit of reading the newspapers.....	4
Poor in keeping up a conversation or in steering it.....	14
Too talkative, garrulous, monopolize conversation.....	5
Unable to appreciate sculpture and paintings.....	37
Unable to appreciate classical music.....	14
Lack knowledge of the Bible.....	3
Suffer from too limited vocabulary.....	16
Lack knowledge of the rules of etiquette.....	11
Uneasy among superiors or among strangers.....	12
Hypercritical of others' faults.....	11
Lack poise and dignity.....	7
Lack wide range of information in history, geography, science, etc.	14
Lack tact.....	3

Obviously each of these defects suggests a complementary ability that would help to constitute culture. If we could get such lists of actually experienced handicaps, not only from college students, but from many other type groups as well, totaling hundreds or thousands of individuals, our enumeration of items would become very long and would suggest to us practically every element that enters into the making of culture. Of course the recognition of handicaps is determined by the standards over against which one measures. This limitation of the method could be in part overcome by having reports from onlookers as well as from the individuals themselves.

A third procedure is by the method of agreement. In this we study groups of cultured people to determine what traits they tend to have in common. A certain amount of headway can be made in this by looking at the group in the lump and generalizing about it, but this loose procedure lays the way open to conclusions that may far overshoot or undershoot the mark. Much more

reliable results are to be expected when the investigation is quantitatively controlled, when many representative individuals are selected from the group, perhaps by random sampling, analyzed as individuals, and generalizations made by telescoping the many individual analyses together. This method will again, if we have used many cases, give us a very long list of abilities, which should at length include practically every element essential to culture. I am using this method informally every day, and have made enough systematic use of it to be convinced of its very great promise.

There are available three or four other methods for studying this problem, but the foregoing three seem most promising and will serve to illustrate fully enough what would be involved in a scientific search for a sociological definition of culture.

But to isolate the elements that together constitute culture is only a part of our task. It does not at all follow that because an ability is an essential part of culture the school should set it up as one of its objectives and work definitely and consciously for it. For the school is only one of many educational agencies. Many of the essentials of culture are at least fairly well taken care of by the home, by the newspaper, by contacts on the street, and by many other social forces that are constantly playing upon the individual. It is the school's business to give only that training which the informal agencies will not sufficiently provide. Its function is distinctly a residual one. How shall we discover what these residual functions are—which of the many particular abilities that enter into culture are left over by other educational agencies for the schools to develop? I answer here again, not by arm-chair philosophizing, but by social surveys.

Several methods for making such surveys have been tried. Professor Snedden has been urging as a method the prognostication of adult deficiencies in the case of type groups of youth for whom we must provide training. His steps are:

1. Isolation of a definite type group.
2. Careful diagnosis of the group.
3. General prognosis, that is, prophecy regarding the future characteristics of the members on the supposition that no substantially different education be given to them than that now in sight.

4. Cultural prognosis—prophecy as above but having to do specifically with their cultural status.
5. The listing of prospective deficiencies.
6. Proposal of objectives for education which, if realized, would forestal these deficiencies.
7. Search for materials and methods of teaching for attaining these objectives.

There is much of merit, and also, it seems to me, some weakness about this procedure; but I cannot here undertake to criticize or evaluate or even to describe it. Anyone interested can find an exposition of it in a number of Professor Snedden's recent articles, and illustrations of it in the last chapter of his *Civic Education*.

I must confine myself here to describing very briefly two types of field survey that we have been using. The first of these is based on the supposition that we can get a pretty reliable picture of the kind of individual into which the present-day youth is likely to grow up by studying the characteristics of the present generation of adults. The things that present adults have picked up by the way, the rising generation is likely also to pick up. The deficiencies with which the present generation now find themselves handicapped are threatened also as deficiencies for the next generation unless we adopt measures to forestal them.

Guided by this principle some sixty of the members of my class devoted the spring vacation of last year to a survey of the cultural status of a number of type groups of adults. Each member studied from three to twelve individuals belonging to such relatively homogeneous group as small-owning farmers of central Ohio, small-shop keepers, girl stenographers, men in the higher professions, etc. Each surveyor carried a schedule containing the sixty-six elements of culture we had been able to spot up to that time. After explaining the purpose of the survey in such a way as to enlist co-operation, the surveyor asked the subject to indicate, by check marks in one of the five columns provided, how efficient he believed himself to be in respect to each item in turn—greatly, considerable, moderately, very little, or not at all. The surveyor, also, guided by his observation of the conduct and the talk of the subject and by previous acquaintance with him, marked him on a duplicate

sheet but without the subject's knowledge. When the class reassembled, those who had studied the same type groups threw their results together, so that we had covered eighty-nine high-school teachers, seventy-six small-shop keepers, fifty-four small-owning farmers, forty-four men in the higher professions, thirty-four housewives of the upper middle class, eighteen young female stenographers, and a smaller number in several other groups. Our results enabled us to draw two graphs, one showing the average of the surveyors' estimates of efficiency on all of the individuals of the group for the several elements of culture ("outsiders' estimates"), and the other showing similarly the average estimate of the individuals on themselves ("insiders' estimates"). The surveyors' judgments on the individuals and the individuals' judgments on themselves proved to be in remarkably close agreement. We found, of course, as practically all investigators using self-judgments have found, a tendency of people to over-rate themselves, but, though a little distance apart, the graphs for insiders' and for outsiders' evaluations ran very nearly parallel.

But efficiency measured in absolute terms means little in itself. We need to know how efficient these adults are *in comparison with what they ought to be*. Consequently before we could interpret our results we were obliged to do a third thing: namely, establish some sort of standards. Obviously perfection could not be expected in all elements. Obviously all groups could not be expected to attain the same level in respect to any one item of culture. So the surveyors were asked each to make a judgment as to what, considering the many demands that are made upon the group and considering relative values, would be a reasonable expectation on the several items for this type group. These estimates were averaged and gave us a standard over against which to measure attainment.

In respect to whatever elements of culture the graphs for present efficiency and for reasonable expectation closely approach each other, no particularly urgent problem confronts the school. The present adult generation was fitted to meet these needs by non-school educational forces and by such school training as we have been giving already. But where efficiency falls far below reasonable expectation, there a task is indicated for the school. In respect to these

elements of culture the school is challenged to bestir itself and seek means for training the oncoming generation in such way that its members may not come into adulthood with the same handicaps. On the next page is given for illustration a few elements, selected from the whole number, with the graphs showing various amounts of divergence from each other.

I believe this method of studying actual individuals in a group and generalizing quantitatively from the findings is much safer than attempts to judge on the group in the lump. It may be possible, however, to develop more impersonal methods of getting data than those we used. It is possible to devise standardized tests by which efficiency in many of the elements of culture—possibly in all—could be actually measured, this making unnecessary self-judgments or other free judgments on individuals. It may also be possible to replace an average of judgments as to what is reasonable expectation with norms otherwise derived, perhaps derived from quantitative measurement of the attainments of the B class of individuals in a group ranged into classes from A to E on the basis of relative efficiency.

The procedure I have just described illustrates a method of finding the new obligations of the school by inquiring, through social surveys, what are the defects in culture still prevailing among adults after all school and non-school agencies have played their part. But it is possible to attack the problem from the other end. In seeking to know what the school must do in relation to other educational agencies, we may make a direct study of the contribution of these other agencies. One of my students has undertaken to study the part now played by the home in improving the aesthetic tastes of children. She gave out questionnaires to pupils in the seventh and eighth grades of four cities. The children were asked to give, with the help of their parents, the names of pictures on the walls of their home. Each child was asked to name four pieces of music he likes best, and to get his father and mother to name the four pieces they each like best. The same question was asked regarding books. The children were also asked whether they had learned the names of any birds or trees from their parents, whether their parents ever talk with them about beautiful pictures or take

them to art galleries, and so on. About a thousand questionnaires were returned. These are now being interpreted in such way as to show what sort of efforts parents are making to train their children aesthetically, how largely these efforts or the unconscious influence of parents are actually affecting the tastes of children, how this is related to nationality, social status, number of children in the family, etc.

It is possible in the same spirit, though by different methods, to evaluate by social surveys the educational contribution of the newspaper, the moving-picture house, the city library, and the many other agencies that play a part in the education of individuals. Such studies would be immensely illuminating in our effort to align the school with the other educational agencies it must supplement and complete, though they could probably never be made so systematically as to replace entirely the guidance afforded through a study of adult deficiencies as danger signals for those now in school.

To summarize, I have tried to show that before we can make maximum headway in educating for culture we must first of all know what it is, in specific detail, that we are after, in order that we may be continually selecting our subject-matter and our methods with reference to definite objectives. For analyzing culture I have described three methods: systematic job analysis, method of defects, and method of agreement. We shall also need to know, on a scientific basis, what are the residual functions of the school in educating for culture. For doing this I have described, merely as illustrations, a survey of present adult attainments and deficiencies measured over against reasonable expectation, and a direct study of the contribution of one of the extra-school agencies as a type of what needs to be done also with the other non-school agencies. I have spoken here only of methods of finding the objectives of *cultural education*, but essentially the same procedures can be applied to all other forms of education.

SCHOOL DISCIPLINE AS TRAINING FOR THE LARGER SOCIAL CONTROL

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ABSTRACT

School Discipline as Training for the larger Social Control.—The sociologist has been so interested in general principles that he has failed to outline policies for their application in practical institutional work. We have not only the general problems of social control but each institution has its own specific problems. The school as our dominant institution needs sociological treatment, and the training of its leaders should constitute one of the largest missions of applied sociology. School discipline is social control within the school group. It dominates "school life" and is therefore one of the most significant phases of education. Discipline is not merely a means to the end of subject-matter instruction, but an end in itself. Its purpose is character education, and it gives about all of the moral training the schools give through laboratory practice in controlled situations. Discipline thus becomes the best training we can give for social control in society-at-large.

In his efforts to comprehend society as a whole and reduce the wealth of social phenomena to enough system and order to reveal general laws the sociologist has not infrequently become addicted to the generalization habit. He has been so interested in the state that he has sometimes overlooked politics, so interested in religion that he has failed to see the struggles of the church, so interested in education that he has neglected the study of school problems. His excursions into the interrelations of social groups and their co-ordination into social unities has been so enticing that he has been more or less oblivious to the fact that the ultimate value of general principles is determined by their net returns in specific applications. These applications must be made largely through ordinary institutional channels. In the last analysis, therefore, the sociologist's contribution to human welfare must be made, not merely by the discovery and interpretation of social laws, but by the formulation of methods and policies for applying these laws in institutional work. Hence the sociologist must occasionally descend from his aerial perch and dig in the earth, and plant and harvest crops alongside the common toilers in the social vineyard.

Pure or theoretical sociology must be plucked from the clouds and injected into the impure but practical minds of the plebeian herd if the sociologist's mission is to rival that of the natural scientist.

This may sound like an indictment of sociologists; but it is merely an introduction to the observation that when sociologists have dealt with either social control or education the treatment has been general rather than specific. With reference to social control they have expended an abundance of printer's ink and vociferous declamation; but their concern has been almost wholly with the problem as related to social control in society-at-large rather than to specific institutions. Little recognition has been given the very patent fact that each institution and each social group has its own problem of control. For example, family control, due to the withering away of the autocratic dictation of the erstwhile male head, is in a demoralized condition which might be somewhat mitigated by adequate sociological treatment. Likewise church control has passed out of the hands of ecclesiastical hierarchs into the limbo of self-determination, and needs sociological elucidation. Doubtless some of our political magnates would like an explanation of the decay of party shibboleths and the wandering of the faithful from the sheltered fold of partisan regularity. In other words, before sociology can render any vital contribution to the improvement of the varied agencies of social control it must show in detail how the general laws established may be applied to the illumination of the specific problems of control that arise in different institutions.

In a similar way we find sociologists discussing volubly the general import of education as an institution; but it is only recently that the most discerning have recognized the function of sociology in laying the scientific foundations of school programs and practices. Many of the most enthusiastic proponents of the social point of view in other fields are not yet weaned away from the individualistic bias so deeply imbedded in our school traditions, and unwittingly accept the claims of psychology as the basis of educational science and art. This is evident from the indifference of sociologists to the small number of institutions and states which require a course in sociology before issuing a certificate to teach. Not less significant

is the fact that many sociologists who have emphasized the basic nature of sociology in education have dealt only with its function in determining aims, or curricula, and have failed to see that the principles of administration, discipline, and method are as social as are those of objectives or curricular content. The result of our oversight is that of the three-quarters of a million teachers of the United States who should be well grounded in sociology only a small portion have an outside acquaintance with the subject. Yet they have practically all had to pass an examination in psychology and inevitably carry its individualistic bias into their work. Such an army of teachers would not only create an unprecedented demand for sociology, but they would instil into the rising generation an appreciation of the social point of view that would all but revolutionize our institutional work.

In coupling social control and education, I am not suggesting anything new; but for some reason, unaccountable except for a lack of training in the field of educational theory and practice, sociologists have generally failed to mention the phase of education most closely related to social control. They have emphasized the rôle of knowledge, culture, and intellectual training in social control, but have ignored the problem of discipline. It was suggested above that each institution has its problem of social control; it also has its problem of discipline. Nor would it be juggling terms to say that the processes are identical. Team discipline, gang discipline, family, church, political, industrial, labor union, and fraternal order discipline are merely applications of the principles of social control to these organizations. School discipline is nothing more nor less than social control within the school group. Probably the autocratic nature of earlier school control obscured the identity of the two processes; but with the inrush of democracy into school affairs we have been made more and more conscious of the influence of group feeling and opinion, tradition, convention and custom, fashion, fad, and craze, prejudice, favoritism, and exploitation, and ideas, tastes, and ideals in school control. The school is a small society, to a large extent a microcosm of the general society which it serves and of which it forms a part, and within it all of the social processes fulfil their legitimate functions. To such a degree

is this true that we shall ultimately discover the school to be one of our best sociological laboratories, a differentiated group in which most of the social forces of contemporary life may be studied in a simpler form than that in which they are displayed in the larger and more complex mature groups.

That sociologists have overlooked the significance of school discipline is scarcely to be wondered at when we note the lack of attention given the subject in recent educational writings. Educators themselves are at sea concerning the function of discipline in present-day education. They know that the domineering régime of the old-time schoolmaster, principal, and college professor has broken down, but not many of them have the social vision to connect it with general social change. Students will no longer be bossed. They must be led, not driven. In the transition era school authorities struggled blindly, without chart or compass, fixed principles, or clearly defined aims, and hence more or less chaos and anarchy were inevitable. As the old order crumbled pedagogues prated learnedly about the legal status of the teacher, his authority as a representative of the state, and his right to command *in loco parentis*. Meanwhile students absorbed from the changing atmosphere of the home, the church, neighborhood gatherings, and the freedoms of the larger society about them a spirit of independence and self-assertion that rode roughshod over traditional school decorum. They revolted at the stilted meekness and mollycoddleism idealized by many public school and college authorities and demanded a virile and red-blooded school life. This they inaugurated, either with or without faculty consent, and whether or not they have rightly used, or have abused, their vindicated power and privileges has been determined by the extent to which those in authority have sensed the situation and adapted the agencies of control to the spirit of the new order.

It is the difficulty of meeting this new educational situation that calls for the aid of the sociologist. In earlier times education was sought by individuals for individualistic purposes. Hence tutorial instruction and personal discipline were the normal methods of approach. Any sort of group activity was ignored or frowned upon. Under the dominance of such a régime psychology was naturally

appealed to by educators for the illumination of their problems. But with the gradual adoption of education as a deliberate social enterprise for the preservation and advancement of group interests the center of gravity changed. Society is now providing the education and compelling the child to take it. From the standpoint of the public which supports the schools the individual child is incidental, social welfare fundamental. As the point of departure shifted from the child to the social group class instruction supplanted the tutor, and group activities were incorporated into the disciplinary program. It is this transformation which requires a social point of view on the part of teachers and has created a demand for educational sociology; and sociologists will be thrifless with their opportunities if they fail to meet it.

To further clarify this proposition let us note some suggestive parallels. In crudely organized societies philanthropy has been dealt with as an individual matter. Charity took the form of alms handed out in response to the appeal of personal suffering. But as society became better organized, churches, governments, and philanthropic associations assumed the chief task of distributing aid to the needy. As the group accepted responsibility, poverty, sickness and misfortune became social problems to be dealt with in reference to the welfare of the group. Sociologists, therefore, took up the problem and are now offering scientific direction to philanthropic enterprises and are training social workers. In a similar way crime and punishment, the administration of justice, the care of disease, marriage and divorce, etc., have become group problems and are recognized as fields for applied sociology. Since the same transformation has been made in education, the sociologist must accept joint responsibility with the psychologist for its scientific study and direction and for the training of teachers.

Returning to our specific problem it would be presumptuous to define social control before this assembly; but when I attempt to set forth the sociological nature of school discipline I expect to encounter incredulity and possibly opposition. The very term itself has fallen into evil connotations, being apologized for by its friends and abused by its enemies. Because the rod has ceased to be the symbol

of the teaching profession many people assume that discipline has ceased to be a problem. But various studies have indicated that about 20 per cent of the failures of beginning teachers are due to failure in discipline. Probably an equal number above the margin of failure may be classed as undesirable on account of weakness along that line. And may I suggest the somewhat novel idea that the percentage is probably but little smaller among college and university teachers? Their failures may be a little harder to analyze, but my twenty years of observation in four collegiate institutions would very nearly corroborate the above-mentioned figures. Nor is the percentage of failure in discipline becoming less. As we transform the methods of discipline from physical to mental, from authoritative control to educational leadership, the demand for insight and ingenuity on the part of the teacher increases. The emancipation of childhood and youth has released an almost incredible amount of energy that must be directed; and the direction of the large proportion of this energy not devoted to school studies is a function of educative discipline.

Before we shall be able to appreciate fully the social significance of school discipline we must get a broader view of its scope and purposes than most people, especially college professors, now possess. College teachers, highly specialized and fully engrossed in subject-matter instruction, overlook or underestimate the value of informal education. They almost inevitably acquire the academic squint and tend to worship knowledge, particularly along the line of their specialization. Some have scarcely gone beyond Lester F. Ward's conception of education and knowledge as identical. But sociologists in general realize the value of character in civic and other social memberships. They are aware of the educative nature of experience and social participation. Many of them, however, are not sufficiently emancipated from the traditional overemphasis upon subject-matter instruction. Hence they deprecate the incorporation of student activities and what we vaguely call college life into the educational scheme. While conscious of the cultural worth of college associations they are still victims of the fallacy that the varied stimuli of group contacts in the school environment constitute

mere sideshows attached to the main circus of curricular drill. A few lessons from the European universities, particularly the English, might aid us in seeing the value that mere living in a university atmosphere has in training for social efficiency.

A little clearer vision of educational detail might enable the sociologists to come to the aid of the somewhat distressed school administrator. College presidents and deans, public school superintendents and principals, find themselves between the devil and the deep sea—the departmental specialist on the one hand and the student, with his demands for a varied life, on the other. In addition they must interpret the technical work of the schools to the untechnical lay mind. Sociologists should perceive the schools as a connecting link between the small group associations, contacts, and loyalties of the family, gang, and neighborhood and the larger outreaches of complex modern social organization. School experience must not only refine and intensify the student's consciousness of local responsibility but must enlarge his consciousness of the interdependence of all societies. Mental horizons and moral vision need to be expanded to cover inter-racial, international and intercultural relationships. The wide-awake administrator has seen, and the sociologist should see, that these things cannot be accomplished by instruction alone; they are equally dependent upon discipline of the larger sort.

Just what, then, shall we include in this broader interpretation of discipline? To get at the heart of the matter we must rid our minds of certain delusions that most of us have not outgrown. In the first place, discipline has generally been thought of as a means to an end rather than as an end in itself. People have taken for granted that children are kept quiet and orderly that more arithmetic, geography, and spelling may be taught. As a matter of fact the ends might as well be reversed by assuming that children are taught arithmetic, geography, and spelling in order that better behavior may be secured. Conduct is scarcely less important to society than knowledge. Nor is knowledge more dependent upon conduct than is conduct upon knowledge. They are mutually reinforcing elements in personal efficiency as they are mutually

dependent school problems. Instruction is no more the basis of intellectual development than discipline, rightly interpreted, is the basis of moral development. Hence the one must not be subordinated to the other but each must have its own purposes, teach its own lessons, and exist for its own sake.

A second fundamental delusion is that discipline consists wholly, or even mainly, in corrective measures. Even the constructive vision of sociologists in other fields has not entirely freed them from confusing school discipline with punishment. As a matter of fact, there is no more reason for confining the idea of discipline to the correction of misbehavior than there is for limiting physical training to the correction of physical disabilities, or confining English instruction to the correction of mistakes in speech. Corrective gymnastic work and the correction of grammatical errors constitute a legitimate part of training in those fields, but only a minor part. Likewise rebukes for misbehavior constitute a legitimate part of a disciplinary régime, but by far the smaller portion. As the major work of physical education is devoted to the normal functions of normal individuals and English instruction to practice in effective vernacular usage, so the major interest in educative discipline is centered about the inspiration in normal individuals of right ideals and the development of proper habits of conduct.

With minds free from the foregoing delusions it ought not to be difficult to see that discipline is primarily a positive and constructive rather than a negative and restrictive process. It has a definite teaching function in the realm of student behavior. Its field is co-extensive with moral education. No one knows better than the sociologist that teaching about morals, the mere iteration of ethical platitudes, is a barren procedure. Likewise he knows that student participation in co-operative and competitive social enterprises under favorable conditions and dominated by worthy ideals is a socializing and moralizing experience. Hence the only moral training the schools can give that is worthy of the name will come from the provision and sane direction of a wide variety of school activities that will cultivate leadership and followership, self-direction, and social self-control, and, through the medium of rationali-

zation and practice, expand small group virtues into large group moral principles. Moral education is essentially a laboratory affair and therefore a function of educative discipline.

The final feature of school discipline that should be firmly lodged in the minds of sociologists is its relation to social control in society-at-large. All education has both an immediate and a remote objective. From the standpoint of the paying public schools are provided, not for their own sake, but for their training value in promoting the general welfare. As previously noted, discipline is social control in the school society; but its remoter purpose is training for social control in general society. If this purpose is to be accomplished, the school society must be so organized that it will provide adequate emotional stimulus and the sort of social checks and balances needed in later life. Student feeling, opinion, and conduct should be utilized to build up a healthy esprit-de-corps and morale, and to develop an intelligently sacrificial attitude toward the social agencies necessary to civic safety and cultural advancement. In proportion as we recognize the constructive nature, the breadth of scope, and the educative purpose of school discipline and deal with it as a training agency for social discipline will it bear fruit in adding efficiency to the general processes of social control.

METHODS OF FIELD RESEARCH BY THE FEDERAL CHILDREN'S BUREAU

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ABSTRACT

Methods of Field Research by the Federal Children's Bureau.—The field research of the Children's Bureau is concerned with social and economic conditions as they affect child welfare, and with the extent and nature of particular problems and the methods of dealing with them. Topics of investigation that could be handled in small units have been selected, and a body of facts from which general conclusions could be drawn has been built up gradually. *Methods of research* include interviews with public officials and representatives of agencies, abstracting data from records, and gathering information by means of individual or family schedules. Data abstracted from records sometimes comprise the main body of an investigation and usually form the basis of studies made by personal interviews. *The schedule method* should not be used unless satisfactory material cannot be obtained in other ways. The persons interviewed are entitled to explanation of the purpose of the study. *Planning the study.* The purpose of a study may be primarily to give assistance in a certain local situation, or it may be to secure information of general interest in a specific field. In Bureau studies both these points are taken into consideration. The items of the inquiry must be limited by selecting only those of the greatest importance, and those that can be secured with a fair degree of accuracy.

The field research of the Children's Bureau has been concerned with the social and economic factors in American life as they relate to the welfare of children, and with the extent and nature of particular problems and the methods employed in dealing with them. With its limited resources, the bureau has usually selected topics of investigation that could be handled in small units, and has gradually built up a sound body of facts from which fairly general conclusions may be drawn. This was true, for instance, of the infant mortality studies and the studies of rural child welfare relating to child health and child labor.

The bureau has endeavored to approach each problem without bias, and without a preconceived hypothesis, and its aim has been to bring its inquiries in various fields to conclusions that would be of immediate practical value. This it has sometimes done by placing the facts that have been secured at the disposal of representative groups of experts who have made them the basis for formulation

of standards and recommendations. This plan has been followed in dealing with the subjects of physical standards for working children, legal protection of children born out of wedlock, and juvenile court standards. The earlier infant mortality and maternal mortality studies resulted in the movement for promoting the welfare of maternity and infancy through federal co-operation with the states.

FORMS OF FIELD RESEARCH

Studies involving field research, as carried on by the Children's Bureau, may utilize any or all of the following methods: (1) Securing information from agencies, officials, and others in regard to the phases of child welfare under investigation. (2) Abstracting data from records of agencies or institutions, public departments, vital statistics registers, or similar sources. (3) Gathering information by means of individual or family schedules secured through personal interviews.

For inquiries involving analysis of economic and social factors in relation to child welfare, and studies of the extent and nature of certain problems, the first two of these methods are used, or all of them combined. The extent to which information is obtained from each source depends upon the character of the inquiry. Studies of administration include the first method, possibly supplemented by the second.

BASIC INFORMATION

The first step in any inquiry is to secure information in regard to general conditions in the city, county, or other unit, that have a bearing on the study. This forms the background for the specific inquiry, and furnishes information concerning factors that are related to the subject under investigation. In the infant mortality studies, for example, it was necessary to have knowledge of the composition of the population, economic conditions in the city, housing, and sanitary regulations, the work of agencies concerned with the health of mothers or children, the standards maintained by or required of hospitals, maternity homes, and boarding homes for infants, and other conditions that might have a bearing on the

infant death-rate. Similarly, in studies of child labor, or of child dependency or delinquency, there must be first a basis of general information that is pertinent to the special subject.

In certain types of studies all the information may be secured from agencies, officials, and others familiar with the conditions which are the object of inquiry. In studies of methods of administration information is obtained from the officials and workers directly concerned, supplemented by information from others coming in contact with the agency, study of the agency's records, and observation of the work.

THE USE OF RECORD DATA

Data abstracted from records sometimes comprise the main body of an investigation. They usually form the basis of studies made through personal interviews with individual families. In most of the bureau's infant mortality studies the records of births and deaths during the selected year furnished the basis for inclusion. Certain child-labor studies have begun with information secured from schools or from the records of offices issuing employment certificates. Studies of child dependency have used as a starting-point agency and institution records of children removed from their own homes. Supplementary data are often secured from factory payrolls or from public records relating to incomes or property valuation, and use is made of engineers' maps and other material furnishing definite evidence bearing on the subject of the inquiry.

Frequently, as has been said, information secured from records of agencies, institutions, or public departments, take the place of schedules secured through personal interviews. This is particularly applicable to studies of child dependency and similar problems. The verified data that have been secured by agencies having close contact with each case over a period of years are better adapted to the purpose of some types of inquiry than single interviews would be.

FAMILY SCHEDULES

The schedule method of securing data through personal interviews is adapted especially to studies in which the aim is to gather information that cannot be secured from existing records, or in which first-hand information is essential. Like questionnaires, the schedule

method should not be used unless there is a very good reason for it. The American population is long-suffering, but there is a limit to the amount of questionnairing that agencies or individuals will stand for with equanimity, or the personal questions that heads of families will enjoy answering for the good of the social-welfare cause. Scheduling should not be entered into lightly. When such study is deemed to be desirable, the persons interviewed are entitled to explanation of the purpose of the study and the end that it is hoped will be served by the answers given. Unless there is such an understanding, the information secured will, in any event, amount to very little. From the point of view of a person editing schedules preparatory to tabulation, the interviewer who secures the most definite replies appears to be the most satisfactory. But the fact often is that the more experienced the agent is, the more complex the returns. The person experienced in family case work is suspicious of the glib reply, the ready memory for details, that may, after all, be merely the result of an effort to please the interviewer, or to get rid of him. The "facts" presented on some schedules represent merely the psychological ability of the person "scheduled" to give answers that he thinks are expected by the interviewer. Study of the initial information and its amendments as they occur on case records of family or child-caring agencies indicate the difficulty of obtaining from single interviews information of such scientific value as is sometimes imputed to this form of investigation.

The warning is, of course, directed not only against the too free use of the schedule method of inquiry, but also against the misuse of statistical interpretation of social data. Agents having good judgment and personalities that win the confidence of the persons interviewed can obtain certain facts with accuracy enough to warrant their use statistically. But some forms of social information do not lend themselves to mass interpretation, and must be presented sometimes case by case. Facts bearing on human life have a way of being very involved; they are not readily classified and catalogued. The more intelligent person may conceal the facts or save his own feelings by putting them in a little better light than they really are. The ignorant one may forget, or fail to understand the purpose of the questions. Some of the items on schedules

designed to secure social data often remind one of the questions asked in mental tests that are tried on the supposedly subnormal—a philosopher would hesitate to attempt a reply: “What is charity?” “What is the difference between a fly and a butterfly?” for example. No wonder people with college degrees score low in the tests for the subnormal. So we often find questions asked in social studies that would tax the ingenuity of a psychoanalyst; the answers could not be interpreted if secured. The foregoing implies that we have made many mistakes in the course of our bureau studies, though we are constantly learning, and that progress in schedule studies leads toward simplicity and concreteness, and wariness of generalizations concerning certain types of social facts.

PLANNING THE STUDY

The purpose of a study may be primarily to give assistance in a certain local situation, or it may be to secure information of general interest in a specific field. In bureau studies both of these points are taken into consideration. Studies with reference to particular local situations are never made unless the results will have more than local value. General studies are intended also to be of incidental help to the local units included. Examples of the first type are studies of the prevalence of mental defect that were made in states needing an institution for the feeble-minded, or studies of dependent and delinquent children to determine the need for new legislation or improved administration of existing laws for their care and protection. Studies of the second type have been made, for instance, of the organization and methods of work of juvenile courts and of child-caring agencies, with a view to securing information of general application to similar forms of work throughout the country.

Selection of the community in which a study is to be made depends largely on what the primary purpose is, as defined above. If the general interest is predominant, the selection would be of localities or units of work that best represent various situations, or that afford illustrations of the most constructive methods of work. If the primary aim is the value the study may have for the community or the special type of activity, the locality or unit of

work would be selected in which there are the greatest possibilities that the information gained would be put to practical use, and that the demonstration would be of more than local value. The bureau sometimes carries this second step of investigation one step farther, and itself makes the demonstration in co-operation with local authorities, as in work recently done in Porto Rico and the demonstration of the importance of physical examinations of children that is being made by the "Child Welfare Special"—the bureau's motor clinic.

In planning a study it is necessary first to determine whether it is to be intensive or extensive. Sometimes there may be a combination of both, as in a child-placing study now under way, in which an intensive study of methods of administration is accompanied by statistical data secured from the records of several thousand children under the care of the agencies studied. If it is desired to get a picture of a certain group of individuals with a common characteristic, such as that of being a placed-out child, and that characteristic involves the possibility of social control, the study may be limited to a small number of cases, providing the conclusions are restricted to those that may properly be drawn from a small basis of facts. If the study discloses the existence of unfavorable conditions that indicate the need for action, it is not necessary to determine the exact percentage of the whole group that might have been similarly affected. It is essential, of course, that the group for study shall be selected without bias, and that the base shall be large enough to be representative, in order that the conclusions may be convincing. If, however, an attempt is made to draw conclusions regarding the physical condition of children in this same group in comparison with children in the general population, the data would probably have little meaning unless secured for a large number of cases.

PREPARING THE SCHEDULE

The items of the inquiry must be limited by selecting only those of the greatest importance, and those that can be secured with a fair degree of accuracy, bearing in mind the sources of information, and the agents available for the study. For instance, items pre-

supposing medical knowledge cannot be included unless agents having this equipment are to be used in the study. Study of the technique of the care and protection of dependent children or of the work of courts requires specially equipped agents if the data are to be of value.

The report expected to result from the inquiry is outlined tentatively in advance of beginning the field work, and items which are not essential are eliminated. If the field of inquiry is new, outside experts are consulted in formulating plans. The sources of information are determined next, and the type of study—whether information is to be secured from agency records or family schedules.

The schedule is made in as compact a form as possible in view of the type of study undertaken. Where the inclusion is to be large and the analysis mainly statistical, items are arranged for checking or for answers in abbreviated form. Sometimes topical outlines are used—this, of course, in studies having a comparatively small base, and where the case method of presentation is to be chiefly used. All nonessential items are excluded; each additional item involves added expense, beginning with the field work and through the tabulation and analysis of the data. Questions are framed so as to elicit definite answers. Schedules, no matter how simple, nor for how small a group, are always accompanied with detailed instructions on each item, so that there can be no room for misunderstanding by the field agents or wrong interpretation by the clerks editing or tabulating the data. Special care is necessary in connection with items relating to social conditions, many of which do not lend themselves to briefing or tabulating, but which have to be complete enough to be of value.

In almost every type of inquiry extra space is provided on the schedule and agents are encouraged to secure pertinent case story material, in brief form, that may be used in the report as illustrations. Schedules are reviewed in the field shortly after they are taken, so that missing or contradictory information may be supplied or corrected. The person in direct charge of the field work must be able to size up the local situation, gather background data, plan the work of the individual agents, and guide the work to its conclusion.

THE PROCEDURE IN A RECENT STUDY

The methods used by the Children's Bureau in making field studies with the social and economic emphasis may be shown more concretely by the procedure used in a recent study which combined all the methods that have been described in this paper, and also touched upon several of the fields of interest of the Children's Bureau. The purpose of the study was to secure first-hand information concerning the effect of the father's unemployment on the welfare of the children. It was undertaken exactly a year ago, during a period when many sections of the country were suffering from serious industrial depression. Two cities—one in the Middle West and one in the East—were chosen for the study because they had serious unemployment problems, and also because their populations represented a variety of social and economic conditions.

The first step in the inquiry was, of course, tentative selection of the localities through study of industrial reports and information on the unemployment situation, and reference to Census data and other available material bearing on conditions in various cities. Next, the cities thus selected were visited, and information secured in regard to the extent of unemployment, measures taken to provide emergency employment or relief, the work of family relief agencies during the unemployment period as compared with normal times, and a general view of child welfare activities of public or private agencies. These preliminary interviews were in most cases followed by more detailed inquiries later. The sources of information indicate the scope of the study—state and city employment offices, city officials, manufacturers' associations, committees dealing with the unemployment problem, industrial concerns affected and welfare workers of factories giving assistance to families of employees; public and private relief agencies, visiting nurse associations, and other organizations giving aid to families or doing child-caring or protective work; offices issuing employment certificates to children, and vocational or continuation schools attended by working children.

The inquiry differed somewhat in the two cities, in accordance with the features of the situation that appeared especially significant

in each place. Aside from the general information mentioned, the study included several divisions. The most important part of the inquiry was the securing of direct information from the families of almost 400 unemployed men. The resulting schedules yielded information pertaining to all phases of the study, and since the group of families visited in each city was selected as fairly representative of the "average run" of families affected by unemployment, this material is especially significant. In one city a cross-section study was made of unemployment cases in the records of a large private relief agency. In the other city an analysis was made of the data recorded concerning the men with dependent children who applied for emergency city work. In both cities studies were made of the child labor situation, comparing the period of industrial depression with preceding years. Certain other special phases of the problem were stressed—employment of mothers, health conditions in the families during the unemployment period, juvenile delinquency and dependency, credit granted by retail stores, loans and charitable aid in tiding over unemployment. The report is therefore based on three types of material: (1) general information in regard to the situation, and data on special topics; (2) schedules secured through direct interviews with families; (3) data from records of family relief and health agencies, employment offices, and offices issuing child-labor permits.

It should be mentioned that the list of families to be scheduled was secured from the records of state and city employment offices. In order to be of value for the purpose intended, it was necessary that the group of families selected for scheduling should be representative of the general run of families of unemployed men, and not overweighted by families known to social agencies or from the lower occupational groups. In both cities it was the consensus of opinion that representative lists could best be secured from the state and city employment offices. While in times of normal industrial conditions laborers and casual workers predominated in the applications for work, the unemployment periods in both cities had been of such long duration, and all classes of workers had been affected

so seriously, that the danger was rather that the list of families might include an undue proportion of skilled workers.

The report includes certain statistical data in regard to the families of the unemployed men and the special subjects of inquiry. But much of it is descriptive rather than statistical, making use of stories illustrating various phases of the unemployment problem, and summaries of the items concerning individual families. Such human facts as those related to the lowering of living standards, and the illnesses and other special hardships coincident with a reduction in the family income, can be analyzed to only a limited extent by means of statistical data; they must be dealt with in the main by the "case method," presenting the combinations of elements in the conditions of representative families.

GETTING AT SIGNIFICANT SOCIAL SITUATIONS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

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ABSTRACT

Getting at Significant Social Situations in Foreign Countries.—The sociologist privileged for a brief while to make inquiries in a strange country is not restricted to what he personally can see. The method of interviewing enables him to tap the stores of observation and experience of many select minds. Such interviewing presupposes a theory of what social facts are essential and significant, and hence the sociologist's queries will be very different from those of the ordinary newspaper interviewer. In every country there are persons who, under intelligent questioning, will yield valuable facts and interpretations. The interview method will be relied on, of course, only when the statistical method is not available.

Nearly thirteen years ago I went out to China for six months of travel in the Flowery Kingdom and with the intention of preparing magazine articles on the anti-opium campaign, education, mission work, women, and industrial development. I traveled 10,000 miles in and about China and on my return wrote *The Changing Chinese* which is generally considered by the Chinese themselves to be an adequate interpretation of their life at its then stage. Since then I have visited South America, Russia, and Mexico, and in each case a book has resulted. It takes some temerity to write a book after one visit to a country of only six months and only the soundness of the method of investigation can justify it. I am willing, then, to comply with Professor Eaves's request to explain my method of probing the life and social organization of a strange people.

At a dinner party given me in Shanghai the evening after my arrival I was warned, "Now don't go and write a book as so many visitors do after their first visit. If you do you are sure to get it all wrong. Don't write until you have lived here at least five years." Inasmuch as professors are hardly at liberty to abandon the desk for five years, this was a polite way of advising me not to write a book at all.

As I then had no intention of attempting a book about China, I gave assurance that I would not rush into print with the impressions the traveler gathers from visiting the show places and viewing the superficial aspects of a life the motivation of which he does not in the least understand. The practiced writer may describe acceptably the odd, picturesque, and colorful in Chinese manners, customs, rites, and processions without in the least divining the intention and thought behind them. Naturally it is the long resident in China who, bit by bit, arrives at the ideas behind these visible forms.

In the end I did write a book; and this is how it came about. I had nothing to do but go about, gaze, wonder, reflect, and then consult some consul, educator, missionary, physician, merchant, Chinese official, or scholar, as to what lay back of it all. Gradually I perceived that the élite of these carried in their stores of experience everything that I wanted to know about the Chinese. The distillate from their recollections would be truer to the reality than anything one man could arrive at from his own observation and experience, for these observers had lived in different parts, moved in different orbits, approached Oriental life from different angles, and explored the minds of different groups of Chinese. I saw the possibility of a better book than any man could write on the basis of his own limited observations, provided I were skilful enough to extract from these canny old-timers their garnered wisdom.

It was, then, a problem of scientific interviewing; so I began quite systematically to question intelligent people on the matters they were likely to know most about. I would inquire of the philosophical trader as to the reliability of Chinese business men, graft, "squeeze," and gambling. From the surgeon I would learn how the Chinese react to lesions, infections, and major operations. The educator I sounded for estimate of the natural ability of the Chinese, of the handicap imposed by their ideographic language, and of the value of their traditional education in the classics. From the consul I sought light on Chinese law, government, diplomacy, and the ways of officials. To the old missionary, as the one best

acquainted with motive, I resorted for interpretation of the religion, morality, and family life of the Chinese.

I found that how much I could extract from a wise "old China hand" depended greatly on the way I framed my questions. If I asked, "Do spouses picked by parents love one another as much as spouses chosen by courtship?" I got less than if I asked: "Does the Chinaman show affection when he visits his sick wife in the hospital?" "How much suicide is there among young Chinese wives?" brought me more light than asking: "Is there much unhappiness among Chinese brides?" So I learned to ask quite concrete questions: "What do the Chinese do in this case? under these circumstances?" In Bolivia I found that native want of persistency could be brought out by the question, "Are there many private residences or public monuments in this town which have been started but never finished?"

Realizing that underlying character becomes visible in crisis situations, I have formed the habit of inquiring as to how the people I am studying behave in disaster or epidemic, under danger, in defeat, or before a stroke of luck. I appreciated that this method of quizzing was getting into the filing cases of memory when the interviewed would say in response to my question, "Let me think that over a while. No one ever asked me that question before. I'll have to review my recollections."

My experience shows that by interviewing you can come much closer to the truth than by any amount of reading. In the face-to-face relation, hosts of significant facts have been given me which would never get into print. Editors and scholars tell me things they would not dare set their names to. Only rarely has anyone attempted to mislead me. I fancy the interviewed feels it would be a shame to deceive an inquirer who has come so far. The sociologist, after he has gone about a bit in a country and has talked with a number of intelligent men, perceives quickly enough when one is trying to "stuff" him. When I have a "hunch" that the man I am talking with is trying to put over on me an *ex parte* view, I say nothing but I take no more notes and do not prolong the interview.

Of course it is the *admissions* of the interviewed that are most precious. When I asked Miliukov, "Of what value are these noble landowners to Russian agriculture?" and received the reply, "None whatever," the answer was worth infinitely more, coming from him, than coming from a radical. One has the feeling of finding a nugget when a Mexican archbishop admits that the Church cannot supply elementary education on the necessary scale; when an American smelter man in Mexico confesses, "All these rights bestowed upon labor by the Constitution don't worry us. We can still make plenty of money with labor costing but seventy cents a day; just give us political stability," or when a Chungking business man who had been sneering at the missionaries admits later that unlike the business men the missionaries stay on in Chungking right through the sweltering summer "because they are so interested in their work." In Russia the heads of soviets gave me many an insight into their troubles with the ground-down and enslaved factory workers. From what they told me I was able to form some idea of how "the dictatorship of the prolerariat" would work out.

I learned never to conclude an interview with an administrator without asking, "What's bothering you? What are your problems?" If the superintendent of schools, the prison warden, the soviet president, the bishop, or the mill owner will tell you frankly what his problems are, you can judge at what stage of development his institution has arrived. When the mill owner reveals that he is worrying about how to prevent his workers carrying off his raw material under their blouses or how to get them to show up regularly every day, you realize how different are his troubles from those of the mill owner back home. When the head of the mission college unpacks his heart on the subject of student walkouts and strikes, you obtain a precious insight into Chinese psychology. When, in Mexico, the head of the Girls' State Industrial School discloses her anxiety over the effect of the priests warning parents not to let their daughters go out to evening classes, you have a new view of the perennial conflict in Mexico between church and state.

In general I have not gained direct access to the minds of the humble. I could not explore the ideas of coolies or peons because

such a task would consume too much time. One of them could give you only his personal experience, for he has no outlook on the general situation of his class. As for getting at their thoughts and feelings, wariness has become a second nature to them and they will reveal themselves only to those who have gradually won their confidence. This is why old and wise missionaries are the best interpreters of what is on the native's mind for they come into contact with the spiritual side of the people.

Once, however, I came to grips with Russian *muzhiks* and obtained a view of what was on the mind of ninety million villagers. In the great cities everyone to whom I had brought a letter of introduction assured me in the autumn of 1917 that the Revolution had veered too far to the left and that the people of intelligence were going to bring it back to right lines. But an evening spent with a schoolmaster and four peasants in the parlor of a German blacksmith of the village of Balonda opened my eyes to the fact that the Revolution had not yet made good on the *economic* side and that the real revolution was yet to come—and it did.

None have given me better interviews than the scholars. In Japan American-trained economists and sociologists analyzed Japanese society and interpreted Japanese social phenomena with a candor and an objectivity which left nothing to be desired. In South America, likewise, the professors of the social sciences supplied me with a wealth of meaningful facts without being in the least concerned how they might affect my opinion of their country.

Provided he shows himself sympathetic, the inquiring foreigner is a privileged character. Everyone concedes that in quest of information he has the right to talk with anyone. He can pass abruptly from one end to the other of the social scale as no native could. This summer I dined with the archbishop and for three hours breathed a purely ecclesiastical atmosphere. The next day I was conferring in the town hall with nine radical leaders some of whom no doubt, were trying to kill that same archbishop seven years earlier! Neither group had any contact with the other but I could ask the labor leaders "The Archbishop claims that. . . . How about it?" In the afternoon I spent an hour with the Papal Legate and in the evening two hours with Protestant mission-

aries; and I challenged the missionaries with assertions as to Protestant missions made by the Legate. In this privilege of irresponsibility, of passing rapidly from one social circle to another without discrediting one's self, lies one of the chief charms of sociological research in a foreign country.

The method of interview, is, of course, both stimulated and corrected by the method of direct observation. With the two together you get as far in a month as either alone would get you in three months. Thus Don Raphael in Mexico City tells me that there were no more contented or happy laboring people in the world than the twelve thousand souls on his huge sugar plantation in Morelos before the Revolution. Next week I am in Morelos—he wouldn't dare set foot there—and am able to check on his statements. I note how spring water for the *hacienda* buildings has been piped right through the village but no faucet put in for them, so that one hundred and twelve families have no drinking water save from the irrigation ditch. I observe how peons had been thrust out of their habitations in order that a spur track to the sugar mill might be laid over the ruins of their huts and had been obliged to rebuild on a near lava outcrop. When a Chinese minister of education praises to me the provincial college, I visit it and try German on the professor of German and French on the professor of French, greatly to their distress.

I attach the greatest importance to the keeping of full notes. When I have had a long talk with an important man I sit down on the first park seat or step into the first coffee house and write the interview down in full. In the matter of description I sit down before the scene and ask myself "What really is this in front of me?" When I come to write the book I lift such sections out of my notes without altering a word. The idea is to avoid the gradual drift from reality which is likely to occur after one is back in one's study.

It is not for me to say how much success I have had with my method of social research. I am certain, however, that as a sociologist I have been wonderfully benefited by it. Nothing could have so effectually cleared my mind of radical, national, and age preju-

dice. In every country I have met individuals as disinterested and noble as are to be found anywhere in the world. Our finest Americans are not better than the finest Japanese and the most avaricious Chilean *hacendado* or Russian landowner or Osaka cotton-mill owner is not a particle worse than certain of my grasping fellow-citizens. In the old classical Chinese scholars I found an interest in the lot of the fellow-man, and abhorrence of war, a faith in moral forces, and a serene long-time view which made me blush for most of our own molders of opinion.

METHODS OF CONDUCTING RESEARCH COURSES FOR COLLEGE STUDENTS

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ABSTRACT

Methods of Conducting Research Courses for College Students.—A research course for college students should open with a clear statement of the principles of the inductive method, such as (1) the working hypothesis, (2) collection and recording of facts, (3) classification, (4) interpretation and generalization. It is convenient to illustrate the application of these principles in Mendel's law of heredity and Engel's laws of income. Each one of the steps of the inductive method has its own special dangers. It is important to illustrate fallacies connected with the use of the inductive method so that the student may learn caution. As soon as the student has obtained a clear conception of the meaning and procedure of the inductive method, it is important to give him the point of view that the skeleton of the inductive method is the backbone of scientific procedure in three such methods of social research as (1) the historical method, (2) field work, and (3) the statistical method. The historical method of documentary criticism is really an adaptation of the inductive method of modern science to the study of a particular form of data. The field-work technique of research is the technique of making direct observations of social phenomena in contrast to the historical method which is a technique of critically utilized observations which others have made and recorded. Field work may be taught in connection with a carefully planned survey of some concrete community problem. The method of class self-organization is useful in this connection. The statistical method also is fundamentally the application of the inductive method to the study of mass phenomena. Statistics often seem abstruse and abstract because the teacher fails to show students that statistics is a special method of classifying and interpreting material gathered by field work.

THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD

Many college students in social research and in social statistics flounder about quite unbeknown to the instructor between the vague generalities, on the one hand, which figures are presented to substantiate, and a mass of concrete numerical facts which seem unrelated and indigestible, on the other. To steer his way through this maze of principles and facts the student needs a compass and a plan. My experience has demonstrated the usefulness of a formulation of the principles of the inductive method at the very beginning of the course in connection with concrete problems, a formulation which can be frequently harked back to whenever a complicated problem has confused the student and he has for the time being

lost his bearings. In this way the student discovers at the outset that scientific procedure in the study of any social problem, whether that study takes the form of a social survey or the form of statistical analysis, is *always* and *only* the application of the inductive method of research.

THE INDUCTIVE METHOD

The uniform steps of the inductive method of modern science are as follows:¹

1. The working hypothesis. The scientist does not go out and make random and haphazard observations of all phenomena. He limits his field by adopting provisionally some hypothesis which will provide a systematic basis for selecting his material. This brings his problem within manageable proportions and saves time.

2. Collection and recording of facts of observation is the second step in the inductive method. The approach of the student to his facts should be objective. The effort to be disinterested should eliminate personal bias. There should be method, system, orderliness, in observing social phenomena. Standardization of methods of observation and recording by permitting the comparison of observations of different students made at different times and in different places, contributes to scientific progress.

3. Classification of the recorded facts of observation into series and sequences throws light on the natural relationships among these facts. This is the third step of the inductive method.

4. Discovery of some short formula or law to explain the sequence of facts and to express their relationships is the concluding step of the inductive method of science. Deductions from inductive generalizations established in this way form the reliable predictions of science.

It is strange how few students learn to appreciate the significance of these related steps of the inductive method. It has been my experience that illustrations of the inductive principle are of great assistance in making it a real thing to the student. It is convenient to take the examples of Mendel's law of heredity and Engel's laws of income and expenditure.

¹ F. S. Chapin, *Field Work and Social Research*, pp. 6-7.

But the inductive method is not the whole of modern science. Indeed, it represents merely the procedure which assists us in solving one of the three tasks of science. According to Peirce,¹ science has three tasks: first, the discovery of laws of natural phenomena, accomplished by the use of the inductive method; second, the discovery of causes, accomplished by hypothetic inference; and third, the prediction of effects, accomplished by the use of deduction.

Mendel's hypothesis of the segregation of unit characters and more recently Morgan's factorial hypothesis are convenient examples of an effort to perform the second task of science, that is to say, to discover causes by means of hypothetic inference.

In the case of Engel's law, the second task of science has not been performed. While it is true that Engel's "laws of income" have an inductive basis they are really as yet mere empirical rules and not scientific laws, because no one has satisfactorily performed the task of discovering the causal factors by means of hypothetic inference. The verbal statement, and even the mathematical verification of Engel's principle by Ogburn, have not advanced these so-called laws beyond the descriptive stage, since no hypothesis has yet been formulated to explain how such casual factors as (1) climatic influence upon clothing or housing, (2) psychological influence of leisure-class standard of living, (3) traditional elements, affect the variation in percentage spent for clothing and rent. Consequently, the third task of science, that of predicting effects by use of deduction, cannot be performed on the basis of Engel's law. On the other hand, experimental biologists may predict with some accuracy on a basis of Mendel's principle of heredity.

A student should be taught to guard against certain logical fallacies in the use of the inductive method. Even careful writers are prone to confuse a working hypothesis with a scientific law. *A priori* knowledge is often confused with *a posteriori*. It is helpful in this connection to differentiate the chief levels of generalizations. At the lowest level is the working hypothesis, a mere assumption, supposition, or conjecture. The accumulation of relevant evidence

¹ "A Theory of Probable Inference," *Studies in Logic* (Johns Hopkins University, 1883).

and the criticism of such a hypothesis may raise it to the second plane, that of theory, but it should not be forgotten that a much discussed set of associated hypotheses, known as a theory, still lies in the realm of speculation. A theory and its component hypotheses may be tested by the canons of logic and submitted to syllogistic analysis, but it is highly dangerous to make a deduction from a theory. The third and the highest plane of generalizations is that of a scientific law established by induction from facts. It is entirely permissible to make a deduction from such a generalization.

Examples of confused thinking in the analysis of social problems will be found in the fallacy of mistaking association for causation.

Karl Pearson has challenged the conclusion that the fall in the phthisis death-rate since 1847 was caused by sanatoria treatment, dispensary work, and modern medicine. He analyzed the decline of the general death-rate in Great Britain from 1835-1910 and compared the periods of decline in this rate with the decline in the death-rate for phthisis corrected for age. He discovered by this analysis that the phthisis death-rate began to fall long before the general death-rate fell and concluded that this was an indication of natural rather than of artificial decay of phthisis.¹

Reports of the housing committee of the city of Liverpool for the years 1912-14, claim that the fall of the phthisis death-rate from 4 per 1,000 to 1.90 per 1,000 was caused by improved housing alone. Schneider² questions the validity of this conclusion since it seems to be an illustration of the confusion of accidental association with causal association.

Pearson³ suggests this test:

When investigating the relation of two characters which you find associated, test whether they still remain related after you have given all other characters likely to be influential constant values. Before you have done this you certainly must not treat the relation as a *causative* one.

The full theory of this method is what in modern statistics we term the treatment by partial correlation.

¹ "Tuberculosis, Heredity and Environment," *Eugenic Lecture Series*, Vol. VIII.

² "Shortcomings of Socio-Sanitary Investigations," *American Journal of Public Health*, Vol. VII, No. 1.

³ *Eugenics and Public Health*, p. 24.

SPECIAL DANGERS OF EACH STEP OF THE INDUCTIVE METHOD

Hypotheses are often suggested by analogies and although analogies are proverbially dangerous, the analogical method may be robbed of its hazards by submitting every hypothesis derived in this fashion to the acid test of facts. Hornell Hart suggests that theoretical, or pure sociology, besides providing valuable background for the student of social problems, occasionally suggests hypotheses to be investigated, but does not offer definite solutions for specific problems.

It is important to emphasize to the student the tentative character of a *working hypothesis*. He should be taught to appreciate the fact that an hypothesis is a purely provisional formulation. It is all too easy to slip a clog in our mental machinery and pass from a hypothetical statement to accepting it as a fact.

Faris in the first part of his article, "Are Instincts Data or Hypotheses,"¹ has succeeded in bringing this fallacy into bold relief. Social psychologists have adopted the hypothesis that there are native or inherited, as well as acquired forms of behavior. The former are described by the term instinct. Many students then easily pass from the point where they consider self-assertion, curiosity, acquisitiveness, pugnacity, and so on, terms which really describe provisional hypotheses in the discussion of behavior, to the position of accepting the abstractions themselves as data of observation. When this form of loose thinking is followed, our whole analysis is confused. In other words, social science is sorely in need, at the present moment, of a criticism of its basic assumptions, and of its major premises. Relatively too much attention has been given to criticizing the logic of inference and interpretation, and too little to a critique of major premises.

Not only does the first stage of the inductive method, namely that of framing a working hypothesis, have its peculiar dangers, but the second stage of *observation* is also fraught with dangers. In the field of social relations it is particularly necessary to record the observations of occurrences in objective and quantitative terms, in order to avoid bias and prejudice.² In astronomy the telescope,

¹ *American Journal of Sociology*, XXVII, No. 2, 184-96.

² Chapin, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15, 149-56, 176-85.

the spectroscope, and the camera extend the observational power of the senses. The light-gathering power of the telescope uncovers stars too faint for the human eye to observe unaided. The spectroscope extends the observational power of the senses by assisting in the measurement of the speed of light. In the social field we have no such refined instruments of observation, but with systematic planning the use of schedules goes a long way toward standardizing the observations of students of modern conditions. Various efforts have been made to substitute for qualitative terms, in recording an observer's impressions of a social fact, more adequate, objective, and quantitative terms. Commons¹ has devised a dwelling-house score card for the study of housing conditions; the Whittier State School² has devised a score card for the study of home conditions. What we need just now is more experimentation in this field. Above all, it is important to impress upon the student the dangers that flow from original observations of social relations which have been inaccurately recorded.

Entirely aside from the objective character of observation of social facts there are errors of a cumulative as contrasted with a compensating sort. The United States Department of Agriculture in its collection of material for crop reports carefully discounts these errors.³

Finally, the social scientist who has a feeling of revolt against easy generalization is, in his new enthusiasm for fact-gathering, likely to make mere accumulation of facts an end in itself. Mere accumulation of facts is futile and sterile so long as the scholar fails to raise his eyes to the vision of possible inductive generalization from the facts.

Classification, the third stage of the inductive method, also has its peculiar dangers. It is very easy to force upon the data a system of classification foreign to it. In approaching classification there are the alternatives of either deciding a priori the nature of the classes, or of examining material to discover whether the items

¹ "Standardizing the Home," *Journal of Home Economics*, February 1910.

² "A Guide to the Grading of Neighborhoods," Bulletin No. 8 (July 1919); "A Guide to the Grading of Homes," Bulletin No. 7 (3d ed. 1920).

³ H. Secrist, *Readings and Problems in Statistical Methods*, pp. 331-34.

fall into distinct groups with several common traits. The usual categories of classification are those of time, place, size, or magnitude and order. It is to be noted, however, that categories of kind and type blend and overlap and are not exclusive in an absolute sense.

Material is often classified as homogeneous and heterogeneous. I find that these terms are frequently used as if the categories they represented were absolute ones. As a matter of fact, the terms are usually relative ones, since for one purpose material which is heterogeneous may be homogeneous when viewed from another angle. I have found it convenient to use the following distinction. When the qualitative difference in a group of things cannot be measured, or expressed in terms of a common quantitative unit of significance for the problem at hand, the group may be considered heterogeneous.

When the student has been drilled in the critical use of the first three steps of the inductive method, it is time to examine critically the fourth step, that of *interpretation and generalization*. I have already called attention to the danger that inheres in the confusion between a working hypothesis and an inductive law. It is equally important to make a clear distinction between empirical rules and scientific laws.¹

When one event is usually followed by another, and we know of no connection between the two yet predict the second when we observe the first, we are thinking empirically. Scientific thought starts off with observations, unbiased observations of facts; it proceeds from this point to an orderly grouping of the facts of observation; it classifies them into sequences and series. The fulfilment of scientific thinking is achieved when the facts so classified are discovered to conform to some principle or law. In this way, thinking becomes dynamic; you go from the concrete (observation of facts) to the abstract (the principles). Scientific men never make the accumulation of observations an end in itself, but always a means to an end—a general intellectual conclusion.

Too much attention to this culminating step of the inductive method has, however, its own peculiar danger, and overemphasis of the logical rules of drawing inferences results in a tendency to refinements of distinction that are merely verbal. This leads to

¹ F. S. Chapin, "Technique or Method," *Survey*, XLII, No. 3, 105-7; and John Dewey, *How We Think*.

an intellectual *cul de sac* of sterility. This is almost inevitable unless inductive procedure is at the bottom. The frequent and sometimes futile discussions of social forces are a case in point.

As soon as the student has obtained a clear conception of the meaning and procedure of the inductive method, it is important to give him the point of view that the skeleton of inductive method is the backbone of scientific procedure in three such methods of social research as the historical method, field work, and the statistical method.

THE HISTORICAL METHOD AS A FORM OF THE INDUCTIVE METHOD

Students do not readily see without explanation and illustration the important fact that the historical method of the critical historian is really an adaptation of the inductive method of modern science to the study of a particular form of data. Morgan in his classic work *Ancient Society*¹ has classified the stages of social evolution into seven categories.

In proposing this system of classifying the stages of man's prehistoric and historic evolution, Morgan has grouped historic facts under the headings of *a priori* evolutionary stages. He has imposed upon historic facts a classification not inductively derived. In contrast to Morgan's system of classification it is interesting to observe that contemporary anthropologists have proceeded in a truly inductive way to arrive at a system of classifying the stages of social evolution. Quantities of prehistoric and historic stone and metal implements have been studied and definite inductive *a posteriori* classes have been made.²

It is not necessary in this paper to review in detail the technique of historical criticism since this technique is adequately described in many available works.³ It is, however, important to impress upon the student the need of adequate and critical examination of library sources before field work or statistical interpretation is resorted to. In this connection the student should be taught to

¹ Pp. 9-13.

² F. S. Chapin, *Social Evolution*, pp. 76-82; H. F. Osborn, *Men of the Old Stone Age* (1915); J. M. Tyler, *The New Stone Age in Europe*.

³ C. V. Langlois, and C. Seignobos (G. G. Berry translation), *Introduction to the Study of History* (1912); J. M. Vincent, *Historical Research* (1910); F. S. Chapin, *Field Work and Social Research*, chap. ii.

distinguish the mere witness of an event, who observes without method and reports his observation in unprecise language, from the author or writer who is a real scientific observer, proceeds by fixed rules, and records his observations in the language of rigorous precision.

The training of students in the use of historical method of documentary criticism involves instruction in the making of critical bibliographies, in the use of reviews and abstracts, and in the habit of skepticism toward the printed statement.

FIELD WORK AS A FORM OF THE INDUCTIVE METHOD OF SCIENCE

The student usually desires to rush into field work. He should be taught that scientific procedure must be slow going and thorough and that the first step in the study of a social problem is a careful and critical survey of the literature of the subject. After he has exhausted the documentary material it is time to begin a study in the field of direct observation.

Teachers of social science have for a number of years utilized the method of the social survey to train students to the principles and practice of directly observing social problems.

The social survey has been subjected to much criticism because its procedure has not infrequently been unscientific, yet I believe it is entirely possible to introduce into the field-work procedure of the social survey rigorous scientific methods. The real weakness of the social survey is due to its divergent objectives. It is not easy to reconcile such conflicting purposes inherent in the survey, due to its different objectives, as (1) to get at the truth about social conditions of the community, (2) to educate the community in social self-consciousness. These two divergent objectives create a dilemma since the truth needs trained and experienced experts to get the facts and yet the community cannot be educated in self-consciousness apart from widespread individual participation in gathering the information upon which self-knowledge rests. In strict logic the two objectives seem mutually exclusive. Yet some organization of survey machinery must be worked out to save the values of each. My colleague, Professor Elmer, has attempted a solution of this dilemma by giving to local committees and citizens the task of gathering general information and by assigning to his

trained staff or advanced students the collection of more difficult information.

At this point I would refer the reader to an account of a method of instructing students in methods of social research which I once used at Smith College.¹

To summarize the more important points to observe in conducting a course in the field-work technique of research for college students: (1) students should be trained in evaluating the evidence of direct observation; (2) they should be trained in the use of objective and quantitative terms in recording observations; (3) it should be made clear that inferences drawn from field-work data depend for their validity upon the representative character of the samples chosen.

THE STATISTICAL METHOD AS A FORM OF THE INDUCTIVE METHOD

I heartily agree with Hart when he says: "In general I am strongly of the opinion that statistics has been presented too much from an abstract mathematical point of view and too little by approaching technique in the light of problems to be solved." If this statement may be accepted as a fair description of the situation it becomes evident why students do not develop a scientific attitude toward social problems from the average course in statistics. Abstract mathematical statistics supplies the social scientist with a wonderfully refined and effective tool, but this tool is concerned almost wholly with the classification and the interpretation of numerical facts and takes for granted that the preliminary stages of hypothesis, observation, and collection of data had been performed with scientific precision. As a matter of fact this assumption is in many cases not true. Students can hardly appreciate the significance and the value of mathematical statistics without a preliminary rigorous training in the formulation of a working hypothesis and the observation of social facts. It is because many teachers of statistics fail to make the student see the logical and necessary sequence of the interdependent steps of procedure in the inductive method that the student feels suspended in mid-air after having taken a course in statistics in which the emphasis has been upon abstract mathematical methods.

¹ F. S. Chapin, "The Socialized Class-Room, an Experiment in Group Self-Education," *Journal of Applied Sociology*, VI, No. 3, 1-13.

CONFERENCE ON COMMUNITY PROBLEMS

THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION

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ABSTRACT

The Philosophy of Community Organization.—Community organization is a somewhat vague term that may be applied to the whole broad field of community life, or to the consciously directed efforts to improve standards of living. Limits are set to the latter effort by the dominant social ideals prevailing at any one time. Within the field of philanthropy the Charity Organization movement, and, more recently, community councils have attempted to be more inclusive types of community organization. Such organization is frustrated by the element of conflict in community life, a factor which some definitions of community fail to take account of. Dynamic social changes in modern life in both cities and country accentuate the conflict element. Conflicting interests in the community are represented by forms of partial community organization, loyalty to which may eclipse loyalty to the community as a whole. In addition to the partial forms, certain pathological types of organization exist that are destructive of any general community ideals. Even the modern family and the state may so function as to prevent the development of a general sense of community. However, modern social psychology teaches that human nature is adaptable; and the conflict elements may be somewhat modified and subordinated to general interests through experiments in inclusive types of community organization. Examples of these are the more progressive community financial federations, the consumers' co-operative movement, organization in the interest of health, and in the field of recreation and of leisure time. Consciously directed community organization of this general and inclusive sort, then, aims to elevate the plane of rivalry in the community, and to prevent devastating strife through the development of a spirit of disciplined co-operation. It is an ideal that cannot be fully realized, but it is worth all the theoretical and practical effort that we can devote to it.

Recently the catalogues of our colleges and of schools of social work have been seen to include in their curricula courses under the title of "Community Organization." To some of us it has been a matter of considerable interest to know what precisely is the content of these courses, as the title is somewhat vague. On the one hand, it may legitimately apply to the whole broad field of community life, including the structure, functions, and interrelationships of organized groups and institutions; on the other hand, the term community organization is used in a much narrower sense to refer to the efforts of social workers to organize constructive forces on behalf of improved standards of living. This paper will discuss chiefly the narrower meaning of the term, though its broader sense will not be lost sight of. It is clear that limits are set to any attempt to reshape conditions within the community by the dominant social ideals which prevail at any one time and determine the broad outline of community organization. Each type of society, military, ecclesiastical or industrial, establishes its own

range of possibilities for community organization. It cannot be denied that modern industrialism produces conflicts and alignments that often preclude community organization on a broad and general scale in the interests of all.

Nevertheless, since the coming of the industrial era what is called community organization has been attempted in a variety of ways. On behalf of poor-relief, health, recreation, the prevention of delinquency, and allied interests, a vast amount of effort by special groups has been expended, as the particular problems have arisen. The organizations within these respective fields have endeavored to meet community-wide needs, yet the initiative has been confined to small groups, unrepresentative of the community as a whole. A step in advance was taken when the specialized groups sought to co-ordinate their efforts through some more general type of organization. The Charity Organization Society, beginning in England and transferred to American soil about forty years ago, was an example of this endeavor for more effective team work. But the movement that goes by this name has long since lost its co-ordinating function, and become a separate and specialized organization concerned with private poor-relief and family welfare, inasmuch as the agencies operating in this field were so inefficient as not to be worth co-ordinating. Today councils of social agencies are attempting anew the task of bringing together all the organizations in the community that are doing social work, conceiving this term in a very liberal sense. A further step has been taken during and since the war to secure co-operation in finance as well as in work, through the organization of community funds, financial federations, and so on. These organizations through their "drives" have taken on quasi-compulsory features somewhat akin to taxation. The compulsion is not legal, of course; yet for a variety of reasons the individual citizen may feel constrained to contribute. The story is told of a workman in one city who refused to donate anything to the community fund on the ground that he did not believe in charity. He took occasion to amplify his views, saying that neither did he believe in the church, nor in God. It is possible that the expression of his views on these questions was somewhat suppressed at home, so eager was he to give vent to his disbeliefs. At any rate, the foreman discharged him, the alleged reason being that he did not want a man around who did not believe in God; but it would take a great deal of argument to convince the man that his discharge was not due to his failure to contribute to the community fund. It goes without saying that the community fund idea has done vastly more than any previous effort to bring the average man face to face with his larger social responsibilities. We shall return to it more in detail later in this discussion.

Approaching the problem of community organization with this brief historical statement of developments within the field of social work, we may now ask, What is the purpose of consciously directed efforts of the sort we have referred to? Concretely it has been to meet particular needs as they have arisen, and then to prevent, so far as desirable and possible, the occasions for such needs. In a larger way, however, it may be observed that such social effort

would not have been worth the while, unless it had aimed to create a synthesis of interests on behalf of a richer and more efficient community life. It seeks to make *communities* out of mere aggregations of people, or, as Professor Cooley has put it, to create a moral unity as a basis for social ideals. Intelligent people cannot go about seeking to remedy the ills of society without sooner or later asking whether their efforts do or do not contribute to the fulfilment of these larger purposes. As such inquiries are made, stubborn obstacles emerge which, if not overcome, are bound to frustrate the ultimate purposes of the community builders. To some of these obstacles we shall now give attention.

A consideration of primary importance is that a community is a center of conflict as well as of comity. Some definitions of community fail to bring out this fact. For example, it does not appear in the definition given in Webster's *Dictionary*, wherein we read that "a community is a group of people having common organization or interests"; nor does the conflict element appear clearly in the definition given by Professor McIver in his book, *Community*, where he states that "A community is a *social unity* whose members recognize as common a sufficiency of interests to allow of the interactivities of a common life." These seem to be statements of what a community ought to be, and is, to be sure, in part; but in natural communities the common interest seems often to be overshadowed by a diversity of clashing interests of which the sociologist must take account.

In modern life a number of dynamic social changes accentuate the factor of conflict. Such things as rapid urbanization, migrations, due to unemployment or to fluctuating demands for labor, the shifting of neighborhood populations, tend to destroy the solidarity of primary groups of neighborhood and family which are the bases of the larger spirit of community. Associated with these changes in cities is the increasing prevalence of multiple dwellings which gravely menace the solidarity of family and neighborhood life. Under these influences our communities do become aggregations of people in flux. Complementary phenomena affect rural life, which is ordinarily regarded as more stable. Here what Ross calls folk-depletion produces lethargy and decadence. Moreover, in agricultural districts the rapid increase of tenant farming, especially during the last decade, through class division makes for a decline in community sentiment. Furthermore, in small towns and villages sharp conflicts arise between rural and commercial interests.

As a counter-influence it should be observed, however, that so far as cities are concerned, the very welter of urban and industrial life may create a cosmopolitan spirit which can be utilized by properly adjusted community organization through the social center and other provisions for leisure time. Nevertheless, it is true that the socializing influence of mere contact is slow to develop, and the earlier aspect of things is confusion.

The particular conflicts that obstruct the development of a largerspirit of community have to do with race, creed, class, occupation, politics, "town and gown," rural and urban mind, and other divergent interests. Many of

these conflicts are old and traditional; some would regard them as instinctive, to use a much mooted term. But modern conditions aggravate many of them, and give all a new setting. Some run deeper than others and are apparently less modifiable. For example, racial antagonisms are more fundamental than religious, which lose their force with the decline in the strength of the church. In the industrial sections of the country the class divisions occasioned by modern capitalism cut across racial divisions, and, except in times of international warfare, tend to supersede the latter in importance. Without subscribing to the doctrine that economic organization is the most important of all forms of community organization, one may admit that it tends to dominate in a commercial age which gives such great prestige to the acquisition of wealth. Therefore, any attempt to organize the community on the basis of general interests which does not in some degree lessen the gulf between the economic classes will fail of its purpose.

It follows that the various conflicting interests in the community seek expression in what may be called forms of pseudo- or partial community organization, loyalty to which can and does eclipse loyalty to the community as a whole. For example, a chamber of commerce ordinarily functions in the interest of a class, the business class, though there are conspicuous examples of such organizations that have taken a notably broader viewpoint. Similarly, labor unions of the orthodox type are the custodians of the interests of only the skilled laborers in the community. Churches are proverbially clannish, though in their struggle for existence they are laying hold of opportunities to serve general concerns. More recently we have seen the effort to establish *community churches* on a sociological instead of a theological basis. But even here there is danger of their being attractive only to the "queer" or the extremists in the community. Political parties are divisive to the degree that their patronage is lucrative and the issues they raise are considered vital. In the local community the more methods of science are employed in determining policies the less need is there for party divisions of the old-fashioned sort. Business men's clubs and fraternal organizations show a tremendous increase. The capacity for "joining" seems prodigious, especially when economic as well as social advantages of "belonging" are appreciated. Local professional and business men simply have to get into everything that is going, even at the expense of time and money, some of which could well be spent for more general community purposes. Private philanthropic organizations are wont to play a lone game, appearing sometimes as vested interests which deserve to be shunted off in the interest of higher standards. Organizations of the foreign-born often function so as to isolate their members from the rest of the community instead of being agencies for better integration.

A further word might be said at this point regarding the relation of domestic and political institutions to community organization. Under primitive conditions, when kinship constituted the social bond, the family was often co-extensive with the community. In modern life the state has come to sup-

plant the family as the most inclusive social bond. With this change the individual family becomes somewhat isolated, and what we cherished as privacy is often undisguised selfishness that blinds the members to the interests of the community at large. With regard to government we know that it is supposedly representative of general interests, though its frequent possession by special interests belies the theory of the matter. The most extreme example of this is the "company town," which at its best is but a benevolent autocracy; and at its worst—well, it is not the most promising field for community organization!

In the foregoing enumeration of particular forms of organization it is not intended to imply that they are unnecessary, but simply that in the absence of some larger degree of co-ordination, and more general purpose, they are liable to accentuate the economic and psychological conflicts which hinder the realization of common interests. In addition to those mentioned, however, there exist certain types of organization which are not only unnecessary, but are positively harmful. They may even be called pathological.

Among such types that have present-day significance two occur to me though others doubtless exist. The one is the Ku Klux Klan. Born of ignorance and inflaming ancient hatreds, with secret purposes and lawless intent, this organization is terrorizing communities of the land, making rational and wholesome ordering of community life impossible. One is forced to the unhappy conviction, in contemplating this organization, that America of today is a fertile soil for the growth of Old World antagonisms, and that the "land of opportunity" has become the home of prejudice and fear. The other organization which I mention may seem more ludicrous than portentous, yet it does indicate trends of opinion among those of whom some should know better. I refer to that alliance between some of the narrower orthodox churches which takes the name of the Fundamentalists. This movement away from science and progressive thought, reviving old notions of the supernatural, cannot help but detract from the ideal of the community as the center of man's aspiration and endeavor. It is strong in the smaller communities that lie outside the pale of the influences that come from science and modern social thought. With respect to both these organizations one can only say that they throw down a challenge to the sociologist and community worker. In the long run our main defense lies in a more penetrating and efficient system of social education.

Turning now to a consideration of constructive efforts toward real community-wide organization we are met at the outset with a note of promise which comes from modern social psychology. It is that human nature is fundamentally social and adaptable. The native dispositions that make for conflict, namely, fear, greed, self-assertiveness, pugnacity, and the rest are modifiable and not fixed. The problem of community organization is to increase the number of socializing contacts. Effort toward this end should be more possible when institutions and social situations are in flux, as they are today, than in a caste society where social relationships are static and fixed. The qualities that men display are normally those required by given social

situations. Pioneer individualism is not adequate for the city wilderness of today, nor even for efficient living in the country; hence, if proper leadership is supplied, we should expect to see develop in both urban and rural districts a more disciplined spirit of co-operation.

Without being too optimistic I think that we can see signs of the development of such a spirit. In this connection I shall mention briefly four contemporary movements which hold the promise, at least, of affording a larger measure of community-wide organization than we have experienced hitherto.

The first of these is in the field of public health. *Health* needs make a universal appeal, and it is comparatively easy to secure community-wide co-operation in furtherance of a health program. Infant and child welfare, the prevention of tuberculosis, social hygiene, the safety movement, and many other health interests have been made the subject of community-wide, co-operative effort. *Recreation and leisure-time activities* have also become the object of general endeavor: social centers, settlements, community theaters and pageants have made notable contributions toward the development of a larger degree of understanding and co-operation between the social classes. In the economic field the *co-operative movement* especially in Europe, and to a less extent in the United States, has been the means of organizing people for the general good. This is especially true of consumers' co-operation. To be sure, it has chiefly interested the working classes; but their interests, as consumers, are similar to those of other groups. At any rate, the exponents of the movement claim with much justification that it offers a natural and peaceable way out of many of our economic ills. Finally, in still another field *community councils* and *community chests* show tendencies toward organization on an inclusive basis. The best types of these organizations have representation from the various economic, racial, and religious groups in the community. They are doing much to put across the needs of the community as a whole for health, leisure, education, and economic standards. At all hazards this movement should be kept from becoming a monopolistic form of upper-class philanthropy.

The foregoing illustrations of community organization in various fields may sound rather unconvincing to one who contemplates only the greed, prejudice, and sharp antagonisms that are to be found in most communities. Admittedly, we cannot claim too much for these movements at present. But they do indicate a beginning, a striving after community values that have been well-nigh destroyed by a century and a half of individualism. Fifty years of social work have not been in vain if as a result an increasing number of people have begun to see the community and the value of effort on its behalf.

In conclusion, I would say that community organization, in the sense in which we have discussed it, is a social process which aims to direct and readjust the social forces of the community so as to allay, and to overcome, as far as possible, the antagonisms which arise out of traditional, institutionalized situations, to the end that a more disciplined and co-operative form of commu-

nity life may be attained. This process is more of an art than a science; and it must proceed by the process of trial and error in which the ideal of the thoroughly socialized community is constantly to be kept in view. The ideal is probably not attainable, but, if it were, it would cease to interest us. So far as I know it has been only modern sociology that has enabled us to see individual failures in crime, poverty, and disease as phases of community organization, or of the lack of it. It is neither desirable nor possible to abolish the differences which separate the members of the community, giving rise to rival groups. But it is both possible and necessary to elevate the plane of rivalry and to prevent the development of demoralizing strife. This is the great task to which we must bend our theoretical and practical efforts. In the words of Josiah Royce we should "judge every social device, every proposed reform, every national and local enterprise by one test: Does this help toward the coming of the universal community?"

CONFERENCE ON RURAL SOCIOLOGY

THE PROFESSIONAL TRAINING OF RURAL LEADERS

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ABSTRACT

The Professional Training of Rural Leaders.—Leadership is one of the prime needs of the small town and open country. In the past this has been largely an accidental matter. Present-day needs demand that those who are to serve rural people professionally must be specifically trained for the task of directing progress activities. The University of Missouri has made a beginning at such training. This is based both on courses of instruction and on field work carried on in various types of laboratories.

It is generally recognized that substantial, permanent rural progress will come about most rapidly in those communities where local people have been discovered and trained to assume local leadership responsibilities. So generally does this apply that it may be stated as a maxim, viz.: The community will go no farther nor any faster than its own local leaders can take it.

In the majority of instances where marked rural progress has been achieved, there has been present a training agent or agency which has been the inspirer of action. We may formulate a corollary, then, to the maxim just mentioned, viz.: Local leaders will go no farther nor faster than they are informed and inspired. In some instances this inspiring force has been the teacher, minister, doctor, banker, farmer, or grange lecturer who has resided in the community, but who has seen the possibilities of community progress. In others it has been the county agricultural or home demonstration agent, county superintendent of public welfare, county Y.M.C.A. or Y.W.C.A. secretary, Red Cross secretary, public health officer, or Sunday-school worker whose contact with the communities has been of sufficient frequency to enable him to perform the task of directing local leadership in a first-hand manner.

Dante said "Give the people light and they will find the way." Our consideration at this time has to do, then, with the training of the light-givers, i.e., those who will in turn discover, develop, and train others in the art and science of the direction of rural society. In accordance with the request of those in charge of our program, our present consideration is confined to the system of "Professional Training of Rural Leaders" in one institution, namely the University of Missouri. Owing to the limit of time for this paper there will be opportunity for very little more than a mere statement of the plan to the exclusion of the principles involved. For the purposes of this discussion, we may consider the

term rural leader as referring to anyone who is professionally employed in a work of a rural public-service nature.

The training plan at Missouri had its inception in the conviction that as a state university it should seek, as far as possible, to train the leadership of a public-service nature which is going to be employed within the state. Being for the most part a rural state, this naturally centered about the training of those who are to fill rural responsibilities. This came, however, some time after the establishment of the Missouri School of Social Economy in St. Louis which is a part of the University, and is primarily for the training of urban social workers. (Reference is made later to the relationship between this school and the rural training on the university campus.)

The university gave recognition to the training idea by placing a professor in charge of training for rural social service and by the employment of a field-work supervisor who gives his entire time to students in their field-work relations. This was followed by the development of a long-term training program both in the curricula and in extra-curricular activities. This plan which is known as the curriculum in rural social service is as follows:

	Credit hours		Credit hours
Social pathology.....	3	Application of principles of rural eco-	
Criminology.....	3	nomics.....	2
Child welfare.....	3	Preventive medicine.....	2
Rural sociology.....	3	Educational psychology.....	3
Rural community organization.....	2	Psychological tests.....	3
Methods of social work.....	2	Abnormal and defective children.....	1
History of social work.....	2	American state government.....	3
Field work.....	10	Genetics and evolution.....	2
		Elective.....	16

A course in Leadership is now being added.

This course of sixty credit hours which occupies the Junior and Senior years is designed primarily for the training of social workers in the customary and restricted use of the term, i.e., those who have family case-work as a part of their task such as: county superintendents of public welfare, Red Cross and charity organization secretaries, probation and school attendance officers. Students who desire further training in family work or to specialize in urban work are advised to go to the school of social economy (referred to above) for either their Senior year or for a year of graduate work. In like manner this school refers to the university those students who expect to work in the smaller cities, towns, and in the open country. An exchange of lecturers is maintained in order that the broadest appreciation possible may be obtained by the student.

Through the use of electives and possible substitutions this course is being adapted to the training of students for such work as that of secretary of chamber of commerce, Boy Scout and Camp Fire executive, secretary of county Y.W.C.A., county extension agents, and rural ministers, the latter

being in conjunction with the Missouri Interdenominational Bible College located adjacent to the University campus.

A definite course, suggestive in nature, is being worked out for each separate line of work as a guide to the student in planning his work. These course plans are now based on what we believe the needs of the various vocations to be. We recognize clearly that this method of determining a curriculum has a full possibility of error. The best that can be said for it is that it is better than nothing at all. It is doubtful whether we know by any adequate standard of measurement what the training of a rural social worker or a county agricultural agent should be.

The activity or job analysis as a means of determining curriculum content has been successfully applied in relation to certain other activities. Here the curriculum has been determined by the use to which the information gained will be put. Activities comprising a vocation or profession are analyzed to discover not only what the individuals now engaged are doing, but also what they might do if their task were logically extended. The subject-material necessary to assist in the performance of these activities is then collected and organized into a training plan in which "the structure of a subject varies with its function and its content with its use." Thus the sociology or economics needed is obtained in large part by an examination of the social and economic problems with which the individual has to deal both in his vocational and in his extra-vocational relationships.

At present the extra-vocational content of most training courses is determined negatively—a few hours are set aside in the course of study for the so-called cultural subjects and the selection of courses to fill them is largely left to chance and is sometimes crowded out entirely. Activity analysis provides a positive approach through a study of the extra-vocational life of the would-be leader from which is definitely determined what will be of most use in furthering those interests and needs which are not directly connected with the vocation. This method of determining curriculum content tends to remove the matter from the realm of speculation and chance and to place it on a firmer educational basis of utility fact.

We believe the principle of activity analysis to be applicable to the building of curricula in rural leadership training. In fact such an analysis is now being made of one vocation at the University of Missouri. We propose to extend it as rapidly as is possible to each of the vocations included in our training plan and to build our curricula on the basis of our findings. It is appreciated that this will not be an easy task. It will require a large amount of patient activity observation and study, followed by the most careful analysis possible of the evidence.

The problem or project method of teaching with some field activity observation is used at Missouri wherever possible in both the introductory and in the advanced courses. In the applied courses such as community organization, family case-work, extension work, scouting, and leadership the case method similar to that used in the teaching of law or medicine is followed. The student

is required to familiarize himself with the case which, owing to the course, may be a community, a family, an extension project, a record of the conduct of a scout troop, or the activities of a leader. This is later taken up in class for further analysis and for discussion, comparison, and suggestion.

It has been found difficult to secure an adequate number of community case records sufficiently annotated and detailed to have real teaching value. We are using five from which we appear to be getting excellent results.

In a number of professional fields it has been recognized that no amount of theoretical training can take the place of the personal contact of the student with the work to be done. There are those who believe the rural social sciences will not arrive until the teaching of them has been put on a laboratory basis as definite in requirements and as truly scientific as is chemistry or physics.

How is this going to be done? Do we dare trust students to do whatever they can find to do in a country community with which we expect to have future relations? The answer must be No! most emphatically.

The mere observation of rural activities on the part of students or participation in a few events such as a survey cannot be thought of as meeting the requirements any more than similar activities in a machine shop can be thought of as sufficing for laboratory work in a course in mechanics.

Long before the machine shop is used as a laboratory the funds have to be secured, plans drawn, the contract let, and finally the building erected and the laboratory equipment installed. No students are about during this time nor later, except under the close supervision of a mechanical engineer.

The necessities of our plan seemed to demand two types of laboratories: (1) general community organization laboratories; (2) specialized laboratories in particular fields of activity.

The general laboratories consist of communities in rather close proximity to the campus in which the people are engaged in either a particular project or are working toward the development of a practical, comprehensive, long-term program for the entire community.

Our experience has been that where a rural community has been developed into a social laboratory with the same patience and skill that marked the mechanical laboratory referred to above, to the point where local people have evolved a real going concern, let it be ever so small, and where they have been led to see their community as a part of the university training system on a real partnership basis and where both the community and the students work under the close continuous oversight of a competent supervisor, and both work at the same tasks, the entire undertaking proceeds with a degree of stability that is highly satisfactory to all concerned.

Each student, according to his interest or ability, is assigned to a locality in which some community organization project is under way. He first studies the case record of the community and familiarizes himself with the next steps to be taken. He then visits the community with the field-work supervisor and begins his work, eight hours of work per week being required for two hours of credit. In addition to the project work done, he makes a detailed, social-

forces study of the community with special emphasis on organized activities leadership, social cleavages, etc. This is the sort of a study every worker should make upon beginning work in a new field. It is done for his own information, is confidential, and does not have the participation of local people. The supervisor confers frequently with local leaders and meets all students once each week in the field-work seminar where all work being done is carefully considered.

In addition to the social-forces study which each student makes of his own community, the entire class together makes a general pathfinder survey of one community. This is done at the request of the community and with its active participation, with both students and local people comprising the various survey committees. The results of the survey, together with recommendations, are taken back to the community and presented at a public meeting. The recommendations have thus far formed the basis of a community program of work. Field work of this general sort is now being done in six communities. It should be understood that the field-work supervisor is working with these and other communities continuously in order that a balanced program be maintained. Extreme care is being exercised in order not to vitiate the community for the sake of the needs of the student.

The specialized laboratories pertain to the work of some particular organization into the service of which the student expects to enter. Here the student is responsible jointly to the field-work supervisor and the agency with which he is working. Frequent conferences with agency representatives as well as close supervision of the student is rigidly maintained. These laboratories now provide training in the work of the: (1) county extension agents—both in agriculture and home economics; (2) Chamber of Commerce secretary; (3) county Y.W.C.A. secretary; (4) charity organization society secretary; (5) county superintendent of public welfare; (6) Boy Scout commissioner; (7) Camp Fire executive; (8) probation officer; (9) school attendance officer; (10) rural ministry (responsibility here resting with the Missouri Bible College).

It should not be inferred that complete professional training is now being afforded in all of the activities mentioned. The United States Chamber of Commerce, the Y.W.C.A., the Boy Scouts, and Camp Fire organizations maintain their own specialized schools to which the student may go to complete his training. In the remainder, however, the student goes from his university course directly into his work.

Particular consideration is given in the plan to the principles and methods involved in the making of various kinds of rural studies or surveys, both as to the gathering of data and its compilation, as well as to various means of presenting the facts in order to secure community action.

A large portion of one course is now being given over to the subject of leadership. This will be offered as a separate course during the coming year and will be required of all students pursuing the rural social work curriculum.

The department of sociology pursues one major social study with which students are kept familiar. It consists this year in a study of the primary population groups of one county in co-operation with the office of rural life

studies of the United States Department of Agriculture. In addition to the formal training offered, there are frequent vocational or life-work conferences in which various vocations are considered. A representative of a particular line of work is usually present and discusses the professional opportunities in his field.

It is fully appreciated that the plan as stated is not complete, either in breadth of scope or in intensity of development. It is still in the making. Certain fundamental principles in professional training have been recognized and some definite long-term goals set. There have been a number of local conditions and circumstances, however, which have had to be taken into account and which have necessitated somewhat of a readjustment from time to time. Experience will, no doubt, result in others.

The plan being pursued is neither the simplest nor the easiest possible. It is the result of an effort to apply fundamental principles to a field in which the need is great and in which pay dirt now lies only in the deeper diggings.

RURAL SOCIOLOGY AS A COLLEGE DISCIPLINE

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ABSTRACT

Rural Sociology as a College Discipline.—Rural sociology (1) provides the knowledge of social environment required for adequate life adjustments; (2) makes for mental development; and (3) utilizes the laboratory method of study of the students' own experiences and observations. The simplicity of rural life in its small number of organized interests and its complexity in the number of interests seeking expression through a smaller number of organizations offer an ample field for study. The teacher of rural social science has the opportunity for engaging in pioneer research and for developing in his students scientific attitudes and methods.

The value of any college study must be determined in terms of objectives. This is no less true of the social sciences, including rural sociology, than it is true of other courses of study.

Whatever other objectives those trained in principles of education might mention, it may be assumed that so far as the social sciences are concerned there are at least three aims to be attained, any one of which is of sufficient justification for their study. The first is that of leading the student to such a knowledge of his social environment as will enable him to exercise good judgment in the various social situations in which he may find himself throughout life. The student of medicine endeavors to gain such a knowledge of human anatomy and of materia medica that he may bring the two together on occasion with beneficial, instead of disastrous, results. The student of engineering wishes to know the principles of mechanics, strength of materials, and methods of con-

struction so that what he fashions in the material world will stand the test of use. The farmer wants to know about soils, live stock, crops, climate, and farm organization so that he in his sphere can act wisely. Since every normal, rational being in addition to the requirements of knowledge of some type of activity whereby he may earn a living has constant obligations of fitting into all sorts of social groups with a minimum of friction and a maximum of advantage to himself and the group it is necessary that in some way he learn the principles of group life.

As with other types of knowledge, information with reference to social conduct is learned in large part by life in the home and by the admonitions of parents and others in case of violations of ethical principles. The difficulty that has faced social scientists in time past has been the naïve assumption that, unlike other activities, the elemental training received as an incident to the activities and associations of youth was sufficient as a guide to all life's activities. This was probably true in primitive life. But modern life presents complexities in social relationships the equal of any of the modern problems of mechanics. And many of the serious problems of modern world-adjustment rise from the failure to develop and popularize the social sciences along with other disciplines.

While the social sciences have a knowledge content of importance to all people, they have a special value to those who are to be professionally concerned with the maintenance or improvement of human relationships. A knowledge of the characteristics of leaders, the phenomena of the group mind, the methods of securing abiding social change, the forces that move human beings to act, the objectives in human progress, is just as important to the social engineer as is a knowledge of mechanics to the mechanical engineer. The problems of the social engineer are far more complex than are those of other types of professional workers and the paths of social progress are strewn with the wrecks of both leaders and plans resulting from a lack of understanding of the fundamental simple principles underlying social control and direction.

The second objective has to do with the development of the mind. It is assumed that study of botany brings to the student power of analysis of the make-up of plants, of their construction and life-history. The study of languages brings an appreciation of the use and meaning of words and powers of concentration and continuity of mental effort. So in sociology it is expected that the discipline will result in added ability on the part of the student to see the factors in community organization; to note the tendencies and the forces operating at any given time; and to understand the strength and weakness of community life. If the study of the social sciences does not give the student this power; if at the end of his course he cannot feel stronger in his appreciation of the factors of group life, and does not have more confidence in his ability to control those factors, he has not attained from his studies one of the most important objectives for which they were intended.

It is an accepted principle of education that growth in knowledge proceeds from the known to the unknown. Information does not become a vital part

of one's mental capital until it has been related in some vital way to one's past experiences or information. If this is true, then we have an additional very important reason for the study of rural sociology. In small colleges and in many of the state universities a large proportion of the students come from the villages or the open country. They come to the institution of higher learning with a background of personal experience and an acquired body of information about mathematics, language, history, natural science and to some extent of the forms of government. An analysis of the curriculum of almost any secondary school will lead to the conclusion that so far as the analysis of the child's own experiences or social relationships is concerned it is a closed field. Much of the information he has acquired and will acquire in college is or will be forgotten; and much of it will be carried in memory and become a part of his life only when in after years his experience may make that knowledge a valuable factor. The disciplinary value, such as it is, will of course be of permanent use to him. But the utilization and analysis of his own experience and knowledge previously acquired through personal relationships remains untouched. The teacher of rural sociology has the opportunity of beginning with the experience of the child and of building on this, through study of those experiences and the analysis of them. He has resources for laboratory work practically unexploited and yet the most fundamental because so in harmony with the principle that true education proceeds from the known to the unknown.

The ordinary college student imagines that he knows all about life in the country or the village because he has grown up there. He is inclined to pass over in his elections studies of such common material as life in a village or in the open country. Yet the truth is that he is much like a fish in water that does not recognize the substance in which he has his being until he gets out of it. It is the business of the rural sociologist to help the student to a realization of the complexities of the life in which he has been living; the surface movements found only locally and their causes and effects; the deeper currents and tendencies that affect all rural as well as urban life; and to send him back into his former environment, if he has the courage to go back or is under the necessity of doing so, with a larger appreciation of the strength and weakness of rural life. He should go with a knowledge of what can be achieved and how to go about it to make rural life what it ought to be.

Because of this previous mental content of most college students rural sociology offers an exceptional college discipline. Some teachers of social science appear to believe that most can be learned about sociological principles by the study of primitive life, or by the life of past societies as revealed by the pages of history. In both cases the subject-matter is necessarily second hand and incomplete. The rural sociologist has a subject-matter already at hand and sufficiently uniform in the minds of his students to afford an excellent basis for study. Moreover, it is believed that by the analysis of this subject-matter the student can be brought to a sound understanding of most of the important principles of sociology. Volumes have been written about sociology and the

practice is to require the student to wade through thousands of pages of the discussions of this field written by learned doctors. But there has been too little appreciation of the fact that by exercises in the analysis of the material already in the mind of the student, a better grasp of these principles may be attained and at the same time the student may secure the development of his powers of observation of his social environment. Reading of sociological literature is important. But it should not be permitted to take the place of the laboratory method of study of the student's own personal experiences and observations.

The rural sociologist, in common with other teachers of social sciences, has the advantage of the natural scientist in having a discipline calling for the highest type of mental ability. Most people like to deal with the material, the concrete. They find the study of plant or animal forms, or the reactions in chemistry or physics, easy to observe because they are observable to the ordinary physical senses. The student of sociology has to create for himself in his memory the social situations he proposes to study, and to analyze the intangible phenomena he has observed. Sociology in this respect has the educational value of philosophy or psychology. Sociology demands the highest type of mental ability and tends to develop it.

For students who come to college with an urban mental content the study of rural sociology has the same justification as has any other social science. It brings them into contact with another phase of life and is thus broadening in its influence. Moreover, since urban life is influenced to so great a degree directly by rural ideals persisting in the minds of those emigrating from the country, and by the rural influence in national life, it is well for him to know something of the conditions that result in rural organization and psychology.

Rural sociology may be considered as a more suitable subject-matter for beginners in sociology because of its greater simplicity. But while there is greater simplicity so far as the number of organized interests is concerned, there is a greater complexity in the number of interests that seek expression through a smaller number of organizations. Specialized agencies for care of dependents, recreational and social interests have not developed. The reactions of country people are as complex as those of people living in the cities but they express themselves in different ways. In any case the phenomena of rural life offer an ample field for study.

One more phase of the subject needs attention. The constant effort of mankind has been to add to the understanding of the environment for purposes of utilization and control. This is true in the social sciences as well as in the natural sciences. Rural life today presents a field almost untouched so far as the possibility of discovery of new truth is concerned. The teacher who has the ability to set new problems for research for himself and his students can hope to discover gems of truth that will enrich sociological knowledge and also make a permanent contribution to human welfare. He can at the same time create in his students a love for pioneering in the search for truth. Thus he has

the opportunity not only of inspiring in his students the love of search for unknown truth but at the same time of making a contribution to human knowledge.

The present need is for the expansion of teaching rural sociology in our colleges. Like most new disciplines it must overcome the inertia of custom and the antagonisms of other disciplines already accepted. But it is surely winning its way into general recognition as a valuable discipline and the reasons for its being recognized as a useful study give assurance of its ultimate success.

ORGANIZING FARMERS FOR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ACTION

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ABSTRACT

Organizing Farmers for Economic and Political Action.—Not only are farmers almost universally organizing for economic action, but there is a growing tendency for them to organize also for political action. A farmer class consciousness is rapidly developing. Farmers have learned the art of borrowing business technology and techniques. This agrarian movement is similar to the labor movement as a phenomenon in social psychology. It challenges certain of the major practices in our economic world, and certain of the dominant traditions in our world's social life.

Farmers have usually organized for three chief purposes—fraternal, economic, and political. They organize with four chief types of organization—community, fraternal, economic, and political. With the exception of the Grange, no American farmers' organization of any consequence is functioning very actively today as a fraternal organization. There is nothing by way of a fraternal motive which is sufficiently definite, consistent, and universal to furnish the basis for a distinctive farmers' organization. There is nothing which is sufficiently definite and universal to be called a farmers' community organization movement. So even if this paper were not restricted by its title to farmers' economic and political organizations, the time limit set upon it would suggest that major consideration be given to these two phases of the Agrarian Movement in order that we may strike somewhere near the heart of the organization bent that is now so indicative of rural thinking.

That farmers are almost universally organizing for economic action is without question. That there is an abiding and a growing tendency for them to organize for political action also seems evident. We have state farm bureau federations in forty-four states. Practically every one of them is in some way organized for definite economic activities. In a majority of the states they also influence legislation either directly or indirectly. We are rapidly approaching the day when a majority of the American farmers will be members of one or more co-operative societies, organized very specifically for economic activity.

In the American Farm Bureau Federation and in some state farm bureau federations two major types of economic organizations, the farm bureaus and the co-operative commodity marketing organizations, head up in one gigantic movement. From this one giant organization also emanates the farmers' most definite political influence.

If we were to consider community organization memberships, fraternal organization memberships, farm bureau memberships, and the memberships of a few well-known minor farmers' organizations, we would probably find that we have today a greater grand total of farmers' organization memberships than we have actual farmers. Unless we grasp this fact we are not in a position to appreciate what is transpiring in fundamental rural reorganization. And yet it is not so much reorganization as it is the culmination of a series of events which have waxed to maximum expression at certain periods of our national life and waned to minimum expression at other periods.

There have been three stages in the Agrarian Movement in the United States. Rather there have been three periods in our national history in which there have been definite attempts at organized political and economic activity in behalf of farmers or by the farmers themselves.

The first era began before 1830 and culminated in a series of statements issued by farmer and labor conventions in the forties and fifties. The most definite index to this era can be found in the 1844 platform of the National Reformers' Party.

The second era was the well-known agrarian period from 1870 to 1896. In this second era arose the Grange, the Agricultural Wheel, and the Farmers Alliance, with their allies and forerunners, the Knights of Freedom and the Knights of Labor. This movement culminated in the Populist Movement of the early nineties, and practically subsided with the final defeat of the Populist Party.

The third era is that of the American Farm Bureau Federation, the Non-Partisan League, the co-operative commodity marketing organizations, and the Agricultural Bloc.

No one of these movements has completely disappeared before another has begun to take its place. The agitation of the period of the forties and fifties was interrupted by the Civil War, but nevertheless carried over in the homestead and other settlement laws.

The second era was carried over to the third by the interim organizations of the Society of Equity, the Farmers' Union, the Gleaners, and other minor organizations.

No one of these movements has ever gone completely out of existence. The land policies of the National Reformers' Party have received some attention through all these years and are probably destined to present themselves for most serious considerations before the end of another decade. The Grange still lives. The Populist Movement left its indelible mark on American thinking. Indeed, it might not be wrong to say that its ideals have gradually been incorporating themselves into the world's political ideals.

A movement—for movement it is—which appears and reappears and in fact never ceases to be present, and which continually attempts to gain its ends by use of the same machinery, must have some real causes and must have a pretty definite “hunch” that it can get action sooner or later by continually experimenting along the line of its “hunch.”

Shortly stated, the cause is that farmers are not participating equally with other classes in the economic and social dividends. The “hunch” is that they never will until they are in position to exercise some control over the machinery which distributes dividends, viz., the market, and until they get political action favorable to their needs and problems. The farmers work continually under hardships. At times, such as that following the Civil War, during the panic of 1873, and following the Great War, they worked under particularly hard conditions. It is at times like these that they have organized for specific economic and political action. There have been at times more or less isolated sections in which farmers have worked under peculiar hardships. It has been in these sections and at these times that the Wheel, the Alliance, the Union, and the Non-Partisan movements have arisen.

Each time an agrarian movement has arisen its magnitude has been greater, its area of operation has been wider and its attainments have been greater than those of any previous movement. This is because it has had the experience of previous movements to guide it and because it is made up of an ever more intelligent agrarian population. It is probably no wild guess to say that the experience has now been wide enough and varied enough and the intelligence of the farming class is now high enough, that this or some immediately succeeding set of agrarian organizations will be a permanent part of our economic and political machinery.

Two generations ago farmers did not belong to organizations, except major social institutions and traditional parties. One generation ago only a few of the more radical belonged to the Wheel, the Alliance, and similar organizations. Today a majority of the farmers belong to one or more farmers' organizations. These organizations are fraternal, social, economic, and political. They are local, county, state, and national. They are unofficial and official. They are supported by subscriptions, fees, and taxation. But they are all a part of an agrarian movement—a movement that has arisen inevitably out of the following natural and fundamental facts: (1) The fact that farmers are performing a definite, essential, and abiding part of society's labor. (2) The fact that the development of industrial technologies—especially transportation technologies—has converted farming into a commercial enterprise and thrown farmers into a price and market régime. (3) The fact that the enlightenment of the farmer has reached such a status that he knows what is happening in other sections of the population and therefore knows that he is not a part of prosperous and polite society. (4) The fact that he has observed that other sections of population, particularly those that have more or less common economic interests, have gained the ends they sought most quickly by means of organized economic and political action.

These are facts that are natural products of social evolution in all Western civilization. They are fundamental facts. Upon them the present agrarian movement rests. Out of them it evolves.

The principles and major practices which the movement seems thus far to have developed are as follows: (1) It is made up of farmers. (2) They are organized for action, not mere talk or protest. (3) They are developing or acquiring the technologies with which to work. (4) They are cognizant of a need which is perpetual and promises to become permanent unless they themselves remedy it. (5) They are systematically attempting to discover the facts and analyze out the factors in their problems. (6) They are trying no new economic or political machinery. Rather they are borrowing those pieces of machinery which have been well tested in these two major lines of social activity and have proved their efficiency in getting results for their manipulators.

Why should it be considered so unorthodox for farmers to control their buying and selling as well as their producing machinery? Big business has long since demonstrated the economic efficiency of such concentration and co-ordination. Why should it be so unethical to form an agricultural congressional bloc? This scheme of legislative action has been tried, tested, and proved by other major economic classes. Furthermore, politicians have for generations been telling the farmers of the nation that they should stand unitedly here, there, and yonder on this and that issue. Why is a farmer's non-partisan organization so socialistic when enlightened men everywhere are asking for a re-alignment of political issues and political parties?

Whether there ought to be an agrarian revolution and whether it will last, many will doubt. Whether it should take such definite economic and political direction many more will doubt. We hear on every hand statements that the Farm Bureau is headed straight to destruction on political rocks, because of its connection with the agricultural bloc and because of its top-heavy marketing programs; that the Non-Partisan League has had its hey-day; that Commodity Marketing is due a severe fall because of its magnitude and its monopolistic tendencies. Some farm leaders and many others are therefore advising farmers against organizing for too direct economic action and against all organizing for political action. Just what they would have them organize for is not clear. The fact remains that farmers are organizing on every hand and that almost universally they are organizing for these two types of action. Even where they organize for pure economic activity they shortly find that they must fight politically for the establishment or for the continuance of their economic machinery. Such is the case with the tobacco growers of the southeast. Such was and is the case with the grain farmers of North Dakota and Canada. Wherever they organize for political action they immediately discover that the major political issues have always to do with the major economic issues.

It is impossible for the modern farmer to withdraw from the market and price régime, for he lives in a world most dominantly organized on these bases. It is undesirable that he withdraw from the political arena, unless he withdraw also his ballot. For him to withdraw his knowledge of, and interest in, major

political issues and still exercise his ballot would be to defeat the democracy of which he is a part and in which he is supposed to participate intelligently.

It is true that farmers have used night riding to carry their economic ends. They have attempted to sing swan songs for many legitimate business enterprises. They have been moved to both sadness and madness in attempts to get them into organized action. The bloody shirt has been waved and the eagle made to scream in an attempt to get Reuben's name on the dotted line. Of course they and their leaders have tried the idea of a third party and failed because third parties won't go in American life just yet, and because party allegiance is too indirect and intangible to guarantee continuous loyalty of farmers. They have sought to alter major economic practices and organizations by legislation and mere protest. They have sought to raise prices by urging cheap money and by legislating dollar wheat and ten-cent cotton. Notwithstanding all these things, and in fact partly because of them, they have reached a stage of thought and action that makes the writer believe that their present movement will bear permanent results for themselves and will deeply influence our whole national economic and political life.

There is rapidly developing a farmer class consciousness in America today. The proofs of this fact are many and fairly widely known. The definite appeals that are made to farmers to get them enlisted for or against tariffs, bonuses, subsidies, and the like are universal. Legislation concerning the control of the meat-packing business, truth in fabric, co-operative marketing, and rural credits are reflexes of the farmer's mind. There are right now nine rural credit bills before either the United States House or Senate. Week before last eight bills and resolutions passed either the Senate or the House in behalf of the farmer. The sixty-sixth Congress was almost a farmer Congress so far as measures passed were concerned. The work of the War Finance Corporation, the demand for a "dirt-farmer" on the Federal Reserve Board, the ever growing volume of rural education, road, and similar types of legislation are not solely charity work on the part of non-rural people. These are all things that require legislative action. They are indices to a rising consciousness among farmers themselves of rural needs. They are national activities. There are countless many more of state-wide scope.

Probably the most subtle demonstration of this class consciousness is manifested in local communities. An illustration is found among the cotton and tobacco co-operators of the South. Men who sat like "bumps on a log," imperious to the impassioned appeals of the organizers two years ago, are voluntarily meeting by-weekly now to talk over their common economic problems. They are traveling scores of miles in automobile loads to attend the court trials of signers who have violated their contracts. They are feeling each other. They are sensing their common cause in a way that seems unbelievable to those who worked with them a few months ago.

Not least among the proofs of this rising class consciousness among farmers is to be found in the election returns of two months ago.

Farmers have learned the art of borrowing industrial and business technologies and techniques. An illustration of the method of borrowing which the farmers have adopted is seen in the hiring of expert technologists as demonstration agents, marketing experts, legal advisers, and legislative representatives.

The agrarian movement is a parallel to the labor movement and the industrial revolution. The growing class consciousness and multiplied group economic, non-partisan, political activities and bureaucratic organization would seem to be enough to indicate the similarity of the farmer movement to the labor movement. The rapid and drastic transformation which is taking place in farm operations, particularly in the conduct of farm business, suggests a similarity to the industrial revolution. The difference is that it was the advent of power machinery and the mobilization of capital which ushered in the industrial revolution, while it is the application of merchandizing to farm commodities and the mobilization of farm credit which is ushering in the agrarian movement.

If these generalizations are correct, then it naturally follows that the farmer is becoming a conscious and purposeful part of the economic and political organization of the world. He is looking upon himself differently. Others will come to look upon him differently. Our whole set of rural mores will change. He will force us to see that political activity and political issues are but reflections or sanctions of dominant economic classes and economic issues. He not only will change the face of rural business and rural life but he will change our whole set of ideas and attitudes about farm folk. He will push the techniques of our present economic and political activities out into the light of clear day by insisting upon using them, and by so doing either challenge the right of such methods to exist or prove their usability for all classes.

On the basis of these observations, generalizations, guesses, or whatever they are, it would seem that we might logically conclude the following:

1. There is developing rapidly a farmer class consciousness in America today. The present economic and political activity of the farmer is but the spirit and purpose of a farmer movement seeking machinery with which to work.

2. Farmers have learned the value of borrowing and have discovered that it is possible for them to make use of technologies and techniques which other classes have been using effectively for generations.

3. The agrarian movement or agrarian revolution is similar to the labor movement as a phenomenon in social psychology and similar to the industrial revolution as a business or industrial phenomenon.

4. This movement or revolution will challenge some of the major practices in our economic world and some of the dominant traditions and mores in our world's social life. It will suggest an analysis of some well-established economic practices and force economic, social, and political adjustments which will constitute this a real era in national and even world-history. Such the spirit and the magnitude of the present agrarian movement suggests, and all because the farmers—the other half, if you please, of society—have determined upon direct and intelligent economic and political action.

CONFERENCE ON THE TRAINING OF SOCIAL WORKERS

THE TUFTS REPORT ON EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR SOCIAL WORK

J. L. GILLIN

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ABSTRACT

The Tufts Report on Education and Training for Social Work.—The report analyzes the field of social work into its four recognized types of work: (1) individual and family case work; (2) work with clubs and groups; (3) community organization work; and (4) research; differentiates certain borderland fields; and discusses the purpose and organization of professional schools, the location and provision for education and training, whether training for social work should be graduate or undergraduate, the present situation as to entrance requirements, the specific subjects which should be required for entrance as a foundation for professional courses, the problems of the curriculum, the problems of instruction, and fellowships and scholarships. The importance of background education in the sciences bearing upon social problems is rightly emphasized in the report. Universities and women's colleges can provide not only background courses for social work but, in most cases, advanced courses in research and fundamental social problems. Recruiting for social work, given only incidental attention in the report, if properly organized will secure an increased number of students of sufficient maturity and proper personal qualifications. Schools of social work in connection with universities can more carefully select from their own students those qualified to take training for social work than can the independent schools which are limited to applicants from other institutions.

That two studies on preparation for social work have been made within two years is not without significance. In June, 1921, Professor Steiner published his *Education for Social Work*, the result of his investigation for the American Red Cross. The study under discussion in this paper was made by Professor James H. Tufts, at the invitation of the Russell Sage Foundation. It was begun in the autumn of 1920 and was continued for over a year. Professor Tufts is still engaged in some work upon it to bring certain parts of it up to date.

Here we are dealing with only the second of these two studies. Professor Tufts says: "The study falls into two parts: Part I, an analysis of the field of social work; Part II, the education and training which is desirable for this field. The outstanding issue in the two parts is one, although it is differently formulated."

What are Tufts's answers to these main issues, and to the minor questions which he raises in the report?

In the effort to define the field of social work by considering the history of social work Mr. Tufts notes the growing number of kinds of the disadvantages

which have gained the thoughtful attention of social workers. He also shows that the advance in scientific knowledge has led to a demand for causes rather than an emphasis upon palliative measures. This tendency has enlarged the field of social work. Moreover, advance in both natural and social sciences has broadened the horizon of work to meet the evils found in society. And finally appreciation of the ideas of Plato, Aristotle, and Paul has displaced the notion that social ills are incurable, with the conception that since they are socially caused, they are socially remediable.

When the author of this report attacks the problem of the field of social work by a consideration of the present lines of activity, he finds that many of the functions of the social worker are supplementary to the work of already well-recognized professions—those of the doctor, lawyer, architect, engineer, etc. The “social worker is often demanded in these fields and often explores them simply because he finds that the other professions are neglecting them.”

Again, when he approaches the problem of the field from the angle of the relation of social work to the various social institutions and to the social process, he arrives at much the same conclusion, but inclines to the opinion that social work would recognize four types of work: (1) “work with maladjusted individuals and families” with its case-work and co-operation with other agencies in following the difficulty through to a solution; (2) work with boys’ and girls’ clubs, reading circles, Boy Scouts, play groups, or discussion groups; (3) work with a community or class too large to be met at any one time as a group with the purpose of getting the community to consider its problems and work at the solution; and (4) the analysis of conditions and causes, i.e., research.

With the field thus delimited as to the core, Mr. Tufts raises the question as to how far schools of social work should attempt to train for service in the border fields which concern the family (1) such as housing, eugenics, public health, and education; (2) those which concern activities and functions of government like reform leagues, city clubs, various special committees, mothers’ pensions, factory legislation, child labor laws, and governmental institutions for the care of diseased, dependent, and delinquent persons; and (3) those legal institutions for parole, probation, juvenile court, legal aid societies, and societies for discharged prisoners. He concludes that the schools of social work should train for the first-named border field. In the second he thinks physicians and lawyers for this field should receive their training in the professional schools for these classes, but the schools should have their courses give more of a social outlook than at present. He thinks such training can be secured better in a large university where students in law and medicine can take some work in the courses provided for social workers. For the third class he is of the opinion that in view of the recent great expansion of this field, “the schools ought to consider this as part of their task, especially those schools which are under the auspices of state universities, and therefore under especial obligations to provide for the proper conduct of government.” The border fields which relate to economic institutions may be divided into

those which concern agriculture, commerce, and industry. In the agricultural domain are county agents, home demonstration agents, and leaders of boys' and girls' clubs; in commerce secretaries of associations and chambers of commerce or of special committees under such bodies; in industry those in employment management, in recreation, leadership welfare work, and in labor arbitration. As to the agricultural work, the leaders should be trained in institutions in which a co-operative arrangement could be worked out between the college of agriculture and the school of social work in the same university. In the field of industry, Mr. Tufts inclines to the belief that the professional schools of engineering and business should give such training. In the field of "arbitration, the social interest is clear, but the field is as yet very small and the selection of persons to serve in this field must for some time to come be made with great reference to personal characteristics."

In the border field of health and hygiene the training of the public health nurse presents a difficult problem. Much of this work has been developed at the instance of social workers, but the nurse is trained to be supplementary to the physician. The physician is trained in one kind of a school and the public health nurse, the psychiatric, and the hospital social-service worker, in another. The author believes that if "the education of nurses is made more clearly an educational task and correlated with the education of physicians under a broad policy, the whole may be conceived from a combined scientific and social point of view."

In the case of the recreational worker and the promoter of artistic activities, such as the painter, architect, and writer of drama, Mr. Tufts believes "that in this group of border fields, the task of the educated and trained social worker is likely to be found in answering a question not definitely raised by the skilled artist or craftsman or commercial provider of recreation, namely, 'how can the community health, the community good fellowship, the development of the finer tastes in literature, in drama, in music, in color be met, in so far as neither private interest nor commercial interest is awake to these or concerned with them?' He will summon to his aid the architect, the musician, the artist, the writer of fiction."

The writer of the report notes that at present social work is manned for the most part by women and raises the question, Why?

The answer he finds partly in the salaries paid and the estimate in which social workers are held, and partly in public opinion as to the nature of social work. About one in ten of the social workers are men.

The problem is, "Shall preparation for social work be conceived primarily as education or as training? If we aim at both, what shall be the relative emphasis upon the two aspects? Shall the broad basis of education for social work be looked for in the college course, and should the work of the professional school for social work be that of training? The distinction here drawn by the writer of the report between *education* and *training* for social work is of the greatest significance. The training may suffice for the social worker who

serves in a subordinate position, but for the social worker who looks into causes, who serves as social engineer or statesman, and upon whom must fall the burden of working out plans for the adjustment of the social processes in the interest of the welfare of society there must be a longer and more fundamental education than for the mere routine worker. Again, is the same background of education required for the social technician in family welfare work as for the probation worker or the personnel manager? A year of training might be sufficient for those who are adapted by nature to do rather routine work, and who do not have any great initiative. But for those who are to make social work social engineering or social statesmanship, the broadest possible education in the biological, psychological, and social sciences, and also in social philosophy, combined with practical training in the actual problems of society at first hand is essential. Mr. Tufts suggests that so long as social work covers so large a range of activities as it does at present, it might be well for the schools of social work to indicate on their diplomas the kind and thoroughness of training which the holder has had.

With these issues clear the writer of the report proceeds to discuss the purpose and organization of professional schools, the location of provision for education and training, whether training for social work should be a graduate or undergraduate matter, the present situation as to entrance requirements, the specific subjects which should be required for entrance as a foundation for professional courses, the problems of the curriculum, the problems of instruction and fellowships and scholarships.

Professional schools have the twofold purpose of *educating* and *training* workers for social work, and the development of the professional field of social work by scholarly research and publication.

As to whether a school of social work should be independent or connected with a university, Mr. Tufts inclines to the opinion that although the social worker in the country should receive part of her training in the city, in order to understand the drawing power of the city, to see the operations devised to meet city problems and to be kindled by contact with a large body of fellow-workers, it is desirable that a large part of her training should be in an institution where country life actually exists.

Should training for social work be an undergraduate or graduate matter? Mr. Tufts says, ". . . in the present status of social work it is wise for colleges in which there is a reasonable demand for such work or in which the presence of a school of social work would evoke a reasonable number of candidates, to offer professional instruction to undergraduates in their final year, preceding it by suitable foundation courses." As for the separate school, his conclusion is that in the present situation it is best that those schools which desire only college graduates make sure that a large majority of their students are college graduates, the instruction be adapted to such students, and that those which feel that they are meeting the wishes of their constituents better by admitting those who do not hold a college degree continue to do so.

Schools of social work compare favorably as to entrance requirements with the professional schools of law, medicine, theology, and engineering, since the great majority require a "college education or its equivalent."

As to specific subjects as a foundation for professional courses Mr. Tufts finds that the independent schools and quasi-independent schools are rather uncertain in their requirements. Those which can most easily enforce these requirements he finds to be those connected with educational institutions which offer professional courses in the last undergraduate year. Stated in their logical order such requirements include biology, psychology, history, economics, political science, sociology, and philosophy.

The difficulties concerning curriculum relate themselves to such questions as proportionate emphasis upon practical training courses as compared with theoretical courses to give background and perspective, as whether the school is preparing students for work in a central field of social work or in a border field, length of the course, and whether the school should offer a single curriculum or varied curricula. He finds that the schools vary in all these matters. In the schools connected with universities the tendency seems to be to give certain courses which will provide not only a background, but also certain fundamental courses of a professional type, and then certain specialized courses for those who wish to prepare themselves for social research and social engineering. The best independent schools usually give one year in which there is no specializing, and a second year in which each student elects what in academic parlance is known as a major subject.

The problems of instruction relate to such matters as the case-study method of teaching and field work. The difficulty at present in the use of this method in schools of social work is the paucity of cases in usable form for teaching purposes, and often the inability of the teacher to use the cases in a way that will not waste the time of the student. Moreover, the case-method tends to develop technique. Side by side with it should be courses to help the student to see the causes of social problems and the larger methods of treatment. The problem of field work for the student relates to the difficulty of finding a field in which the student can get experience in dealing with social problems in view of the fact that social agencies are so busy looking after their clients that they have little time, and often no interest in directing the training of students. There is the further difficulty that in training for rural work, there are often no agencies through which the student can work. So unsatisfactory, however, is the situation that Mr. Tufts suggests that endowments should be created for the training of those who are to administer social service and for the discovery of the causes of difficulty and more effective ways of removing the causes.

As to fellowships and scholarships the writer of the report believes that fellowships should be available for *exceptional students only* in order to encourage such persons to enter the profession.

This brief review is quite inadequate to convey an idea of the fulness with which Professor Tufts has considered the various points and the fair and im-

partial way in which he has considered the arguments for and against each position. Perhaps some readers of the report, if it is published, will feel inclined to criticize it on the ground that it is not positive enough in its recommendations as to what shall be done to correct defects in present training methods. In many cases they may feel that it is difficult to ascertain just what the writer thought ought to be done about a given situation. However, I shall not do him an injustice if I report him as inclining to the opinion that the schools must not forget to provide for the training of those who by nature are equipped to be the social investigators and leaders in the larger social and economic adjustments which will prevent some of the social maladjustments now to blame for many of the problems with which social workers are concerned.

The reviewer finds himself in fundamental agreement with the positions taken in the report. There is a deplorable lack of appreciation by social workers and agencies of the importance of a background education in the sciences which have a bearing upon social problems. In many cases there is also no appreciation by teachers and officers of educational institutions of the importance of hard discipline in honest-to-goodness field work under competent direction. This gap must be bridged before training for social work will be on a sound basis. This report will do much to bridge that gap, as it has been bridged in medicine and law. The social worker and the professor must get together to their mutual advantage and to the benefit of the student. Only a few schools have sensed the importance of research and publication.

There is no question that the recent tendency in training for social work to be found in connection with universities and women's colleges is a movement in the direction of broader preparation. In that connection there may be found the solution of many of the problems which now vex the independent schools of social work. Those institutions can provide the background courses for social work, in most cases they can provide the advanced courses in research and special training for large grasp of the deeper problems confronting the social worker, and in many cases they can provide the practical field work as well as the independent school. Moreover, with such courses provided in the universities many more students will have their attention directed to social work than hitherto. Besides, students can be better advised and vocationally directed in their undergraduate courses than if there is no connection between the school for social work and the universities.

The report gives only incidental attention to recruiting for social work. Hitherto recruiting has been somewhat haphazard, the independent schools relying chiefly upon the social agencies to suggest suitable persons for training, and incidentally upon the colleges and universities to suggest the field of social work to their graduates. There has been a feeling that the graduates of our colleges and universities usually are too young to undertake training for social work immediately upon graduation. This conviction is not as well established now as it appeared to be some years ago. The American Association of Social Workers last year proposed a recruiting campaign in the colleges and universi-

ties of the country with the purpose of seeking out promising young people who might be directed to social work after proper training. As the result of visiting over fifty educational institutions in the United States last year for the Red Cross, I am convinced that there is here almost a virgin field for social work. In many institutions there are several students, undergraduates and graduates, of sufficient maturity and proper personal qualifications who would make good acquisitions for social work, were someone to present to them the opportunities in social work and advise them as to the kind of training they should seek. Maturity in years is not the only measure of promise in social work. Maturity in life-experience, in point of view and in ripened personality must be considered. If the students in the colleges and the universities can be sifted carefully, I am convinced a sufficient number can be found who by the time they have finished their training will have sufficient maturity to do well in social work.

In addition to the improvement of the faculty and courses now offered in the various institutions training for social work, there is needed more careful selection of the students. Selection should be made not only upon the basis of academic attainments but also upon the personal characteristics of the individual. Unfortunately there is no science which gives us very much light upon what characteristics make for success in social work. When training is done in a school and the applicant for entrance cannot be interviewed by one who knows what kind of personality is necessary in social work, the difficulty is not met by getting references from friends, clergymen, or business men. Assuming that those in charge of the courses in connection with universities know the kind of personality needed in social work it is probable that those who have been in the university and decide to take training for social work can be much more carefully selected than those who apply to an independent school of social work. Not only can the applicant's scholastic record be seen, but her instructors can be easily interviewed, and it will frequently happen that the director of the course may know her personally. Moreover, she can be tried out in the undergraduate courses requiring field work. The important matters in connection with such schools are (1) that they do only what they can do well and (2) that they envisage the larger problems of social research, publication, and social statesmanship.

DEDUCTIONS FROM A STUDY OF SOCIAL WORK POSITIONS

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ABSTRACT

Deductions from a Study of Social Work Positions.—One of the most definite indications of the lack of standards in the field of social work is the situation with reference to training. Constant reference is made to "training schools" and "trained workers," yet nowhere can there be found a key to the meaning of these phrases. To some people the word "trained" indicates the completion of an apprenticeship, to some it means "experienced," to some it implies the possession of a diploma from a training school. The words "apprenticeship" and "training school" themselves mean various things to different people. The personnel research conducted by the American Association of Social Workers during the past year has made it possible to set forth here tentatively something which will give the basis for a measuring scale from which can be derived common conceptions and common terms with which to describe the various stages in the training of a worker and the various types of training.

The following deductions are the result of a study of social work positions conducted by the Association of Social Workers during the past year. This research plan involved several methods, of which only the first has been carried to completion. This first method was a questionnaire study, accomplished by the sending out of about 11,000 questionnaires, and the return of about 1,375 from social workers of all varieties in all sections of the country.

For the purposes of this paper a special study was made of five questions which had a special bearing on the content of training: In what subjects did you specialize in college? In what field did you specialize in your professional training? What part of your education has been most important to the success of your work? Since entering social work what special subjects have you studied? If you had to do it over again, what training would you secure for this work? Only the first question and the last two lent themselves satisfactorily to statistical tabulation.

I wish to emphasize this point: that my conclusions do not result alone from these figures. They are influenced quite as much by what I have gathered directly from social workers, in interviews, conferences, committee meetings and other discussions. It has been a process of exposure to evidence from every possible source and these conclusions are the result of the infection. In order to be brief I shall merely summarize some of the items of chief interest in these tables. Then I wish to present my deductions in the form of an outline of training standards which I have prepared for discussion and action by the Committee on Training of the Association of Social Workers.

SUMMARY OF TABLES

Table I showed what social workers studied after entering social work and where, by the three main groups of workers: case work, group and settlement work, community organization. Table II showed the same in terms of

whether or not they had college training, and whether or not they had school of social work training. Tables III and IV showed for the same groups and divisions, what the social workers voted to secure in the way of training, *in addition to what they had*, if they were starting all over again. Table V was a summary by groups of those specializing in social sciences and related subjects in their college work.

If the factors of college education, social science training and training in a professional school of social work need vindication as factors in the social workers' equipment they would certainly get it from these figures. Tables III and IV showed 381 with two years or more of college work, and 99 more who voted for college training, a total of 480 out of a possible 583. One hundred and sixty-seven had training in a professional school and 200 more voted for it, a total of 367 out of a possible 583. The sum of those who had specialized in social sciences when in college plus those who voted to do so was as follows: Sociology, 207; Economics, 145; Psychology, 131; Social Science (not specified), 49.

In the whole group studied, the proportion of people with two years or more of college work was 65 per cent, and of those with professional school training 28 per cent.

The case workers showed the highest proportion who had had professional school training, 33 per cent. Within this group, however, the case workers with delinquents (probation, protection, delinquent girls) showed the poorest equipment, having the largest proportion of people without college education and without professional school training. In the settlement and group work section, there was an interesting division, the settlement showing the highest proportion of college people *without* training, while the club and recreational workers (Y.M.C.A., Y.W.C.A., and miscellaneous) were largely people *without* college education or professional school training.

TENDENCY TO STUDY

In general the number who studied some special subjects after engaging in social work was twice as large as those who did not study or rather did not answer this question. (It is possible that some people had studied but neglected to answer the question. Very few actually stated that they *had not* studied.) Interest seems to have been about equally divided between technical courses like case work and child welfare and what might be called pre-professional courses, sociology, labor problems, etc.

In considering where they did this studying we find that—contrary to natural expectation—the college people who had no professional school training turned to the college and to pre-professional courses, instead of to the training school, whereas the college people with school training showed up well in turning to the schools of social work for more training.

The large number who claimed to study special subjects by self-directed reading was probably due partly to the fact that some workers did not exactly

like to admit that they had done no studying and so quieted their consciences by listing books they had read. To rate some of those lists as organized study was probably rather generous. The number who claimed courses or directed reading by agencies in which they worked was so small as to raise a very definite question about how agencies conduct their apprenticeship training.

WHAT TRAINING THEY WOULD SECURE IF THEY HAD ANOTHER CHANCE

This section gives plenty of evidence of the divine discontent so desirable in people who take to their task in a professional way. There are likewise indications of some shrewd analysis and appraisal of the shortcomings of a good bit of training for social work. Very few people voted for omitting anything they had had, occasionally they would have preferred it a bit different, more often they would have had it be better in quality, but mostly their vote was to add something, anything from courses in sociology up to a degree of Doctor of Philosophy. There was no apparent tendency to *substitute* apprenticeship for school training. The surprising fact was the number who voted to add apprenticeship to school training. This has a definite bearing on the field work question.

I am aware that there is a tendency for this section of the figures to be over-optimistic. It is easy to vote on paper for an ideal course of training when you don't have to get out and dig for it. At the same time these figures match pretty well with those on what the workers actually did study.

OUTLINE OF PROPOSED STANDARDS

The study of these sets of figures, and even more, the study of the questionnaires, one by one, and finally the difficulties I encountered in editing them are at the same time excuse for and source of this outline of training school standards in which I propose to embody my deductions. The outline is divided into five sections: Organization and Relationship of the School; Pre-Professional School Requirements; Curriculum—with two subdivisions, Basic Professional Requirements and Vocational Requirements—Teaching Staff; and finally Field Work and its Supervision.

I. ORGANIZATION AND RELATIONSHIP

A constantly recurrent question in my study has been: When is a school not a school, that is, not a professional training school for social work? The questionnaires claimed training in a wild variety of disguises: college courses with volunteer case work, graduate work in sociology, undergraduate social work courses plus graduate work or an apprenticeship, all of these taken perhaps in departments of sociology, departments of social economics, or as majors in sociology in the arts course of a college.

RECOMMENDATION

I propose for the sake of common terms, that a school of social work be considered a professional school when it meets these requirements: (a) If

in a university or college, a status as a separate school on a par with the schools of medicine, dentistry or law, and that this be expressed by its official name, School of Social Work. This should involve the power to draw upon the resources of other schools or departments, to control its curriculum and its credit basis for classroom and field work, and to set its own requirements for admission to any course. (b) A director whose status is higher than that of a professor in charge of a regular academic department, e.g., directly responsible to the president. He should have been a professional social worker or if not should have an associate director who fills this requirement. He should have sufficient time outside of his teaching work to attend to administrative matters, and to supervise and correlate the departments of the school.

II. PRE-PROFESSIONAL SCHOOL REQUIREMENTS

The summary which appears earlier in this paper gave the evidence as to the stress which most social workers laid upon college education, whether or not they possessed it themselves.

RECOMMENDATION

I have therefore no hesitation about recommending a standard of at least three years college work prior to admission.

The evidence with reference to the social sciences is equally strong as far as the figures go. It is reinforced when you come to read the reasons for such study: "to broaden my viewpoint"; "to extend knowledge of social conditions"; "to acquire perspective"; "broader background."

RECOMMENDATION

That admission requirements include: (a) study of the social sciences (sociology, economics, political science, psychology), the sum of which is equal to the amount of work generally demanded as a major in any single one of them, or (b) a major in any social science.

That the student shall have had some opportunity for what might be called observation field work—the observation of a fairly wide variety of agencies and institutions to learn what they are attempting to do and what their general form of organization is like; or lacking this, that the student be provided with this type of field work at the start of his professional training.

III. CURRICULUM

The data provided by these returns throws light from a wide variety of angles upon the question of the content of the curriculum. It is suggestive, however, rather than conclusive, so that I would have preferred to carry out a more extended interview study before making any recommendations. However, there has resulted a clearing-up process in my own mind and I give here the gist of it for what it is worth.

In general the training equipment desired, or obtained, can be classified under four headings: (1) Background or pre-professional courses together

with observatory field work. (2) Specific knowledge courses. (3) Technical knowledge courses, together with clinical field work. (4) Technical skill training program, involving internship field work.

A. BASIC PROFESSIONAL REQUIREMENTS

Specific knowledge courses.—The first group of courses has been discussed under admission requirements. By specific knowledge courses, I mean those which bring from some outside field or science, like medicine, law, eugenics, architecture, and town planning, etc., those specific things which have a bearing on the sectors of human life which the social worker touches and which may be served up in tabloid form, so to speak. The student cannot delve deeply into comparative governments and theory of the state, but he needs to be able to recognize governmental machinery when his work gets tangled in its wheels; he will never need enough law to plead a case at the bar, but he wants to be informed enough to know when the law and its machinery is a guide for the feet of the honest, and when it is only the opportunity and the comfort of the wicked; an M.D. need not be one of his titles, but a knowledge of what diseases mean to his business is essential.

Look at this list of subjects studied by social workers, after entering social work, in order of their importance: Medical (social medicine, preventable diseases, hygiene, public health); Law (legislation, state laws, judicial and legal machinery); psychological and psychiatric (mental testing, psychology of feeble-mindedness, mental health, mental hygiene, social psychiatry, behavioristic psychology); Languages; Child problems (education of child, child health, child welfare, play, abnormal children, vocational guidance); delinquency (juvenile delinquency, criminology, prison reform, illegitimacy problems, the delinquent girl); Industrial Problems (labor, personnel management, labor laws, workmen's compensation and insurance); Social Work Routine (office administration, administration of social agencies, statistics, record-keeping); Home Problems (home economics, diet, nutrition, housing). I will spare you the enumeration of subjects mentioned by less than half a dozen people.

Recommendation: As you see these subjects roughly group themselves under six or seven headings. I would recommend that the five most general groups each be represented by a course in the first year of the training curriculum, i.e., medical, law and delinquency, psychological and psychiatric, industrial problems and social work administration.

Technical knowledge courses.—Perhaps the most definite conviction which has been growing in my mind while I have studied social work positions is that a social worker may not be regarded as impaled upon a pin or bottled in a vacuum, and distinctly labeled, Family Case-Worker, or Probation Officer, or Visiting Teacher, or anything else. At least this is not true if you wish to be accurate and have a regard for the niceties of the situation. By this I mean that you cannot hang on your labels and expect them to stay put, or mean anything for a reasonable length of time. I could produce case after case. There is

the family case-worker who has turned child-placing agent, or medical social worker, and turned up finally as head of the child welfare association. Or the house mother in a girl's reformatory, later protective officer for girls, who looks now as if she were pretty well established as club-worker in a settlement. Perhaps one will find an International Institute, Y.W.C.A. worker who has transferred her case-work skill from widows' pension cases to foreign-born girls, or a mental tester turning her hand to the guidance problems of the visiting teacher in the school. And when they have grown to the estate of executives, how they do skip around.

These are not rarities. They occur frequently enough to convince me that social work is either a collection of tasks so simple that an adult with reasonable intelligence can perform almost any of them, or that we have here a profession which is divided into fewer sections which have more of a common body of knowledge and skill than many people seem willing to grant. If this is as true as I have been led to believe by evidence I have seen, we will have to turn our faces away from the departmental idea that has gained considerable popularity. Instead of permitting or urging the student to make a choice—which will be controlled mostly by his ignorance of social work and the school's ignorance of him—we have to make a "social worker" out of him first, then help him to acquire real skill in the specialty which he is ready to choose intelligently.

Recommendation: For this process of making a "social worker" out of a student I would recommend the entire first year, with the necessary specific knowledge courses just discussed and added to them the technical knowledge courses. The latter would be courses that would give the student an understanding of all three social-work techniques which are more or less accepted without challenge, case-work, community organization, and social research. In each of the three he should have one-third of his first year field-work time as clinical field work, perhaps 150 hours. By clinical field work, I mean that which gives the student an opportunity to know how the technique is carried out under actual working conditions. He cannot be expected to have acquired any of the real skill himself.

B. VOCATIONAL REQUIREMENT

Vocational training course.—We come to the second year of the training-school program with the student not yet *trained*, but merely professionally prepared. He is prepared for a process which from now on must go on mostly within himself, the acquiring of those more or less automatic reactions to given situations which make up so much of technical skill. The most important things the school can do is to surround him with the opportunities to acquire this and to equip him with the means of checking himself up, evaluating his work, and improving his professional skill in the future.

Recommendation: The recommendation here is that there shall be a course on the special application of a given technique to the field which the student has chosen by an instructor who possesses the skill which the student seeks

to acquire. This implies the opportunity for personal attention to the individual student on the part of the instructor.

Under the circumstances the vital factor is an adequate period of field work, which for want of a better term I prefer to call internship field work.

IV. TEACHING STAFF

Recommendation: As to standards for the teaching staff I have no basis for them except deduction from the other standards here discussed. I should be inclined to recommend that a teacher of a professional knowledge course and of a vocational-training course should at least meet the eligibility requirements for senior membership in the American Association of Social Workers, and that the required four years of successful work with a social agency of recognized standing shall have been in the work which he seeks to teach.

V. FIELD WORK AND SUPERVISION

With regard to field work and supervision the questionnaires gave far more evidence of dissatisfaction than with anything else. Quite a number flatly turned their backs upon the schools and voted for apprenticeship. Many said they would take "more field work," "better field work," "good apprenticeship." More potent as argument, because more positive, are the answers to the question, "What has been most important to the success of your work?" Repeatedly the answer is "practical apprenticeship," "good practical work," "field work in the — (mentioning the name of some outstanding school or agency well known for well-organized apprenticeship)." Good supervision also came into its own with the mention of "good district supervisor," "wonderful superintendent," or the mention of names that stand for technical leadership in their fields. All of this justifies recommendation of most rigid standards.

Recommendation: Total field-work time, clinical plus internship, to be equal to the working time of an apprenticeship year, approximately 1,600 hours. This would permit for the first year three clinical periods of 135 to 150 hours each, and in the second year a total of six and one-half to seven and one-half months for internship field work.

Field work agencies to be accredited as satisfactory apprenticeship agencies by the national organization in their field, or approved as organizations of recognized standing on the membership eligibility requirements of the American Association of Social Workers.

Supervision in the agency to be by a full-time supervisor eligible to senior membership in the American Association of Social Workers.

Supervision from the viewpoint of the school to be by a regular member of the staff who can devote at least half time to this task; such person also to be eligible to senior membership in the American Association of Social Workers, with at least two of the necessary four years spent in supervising workers in an agency.

CONCLUSION

I am aware that by this time most of you are comparing these standards with the requirements for admission to the Association of Training Schools, or with anything anybody has ever tried to get away with, and are repeating the well-known phrase "fools rush in where hard-headed training school directors fear to tread." Permit me, therefore, to temper all this by explaining my real purpose. As I said at the outset, this is simply raw material from which I hope the Committee on Training of our Association will fabricate an authoritative set of standards—and note carefully: this set of standards is *not* a bar over which a school must jump to get into the field where the clover grows. It *is* a measuring-stick. It is not a means of letting anybody in or keeping anybody out. It is a rating scale, a 100 per cent mark. A school can measure itself by this scale and see itself as others see it. We can derive from it a common language to describe "training" schools and "trained" workers. At present writing we have no such thing. Instead of passing this mark and joining the fold of the elect, no school should ever be permitted to reach it, for it should be revised and pushed up. As I see it only such can be the method that makes for progress.

And now for the second of the two points which I desire to make. Such a set of standards cannot be determined by our Committee on Training or by anybody else, unless they have in their possession the data pertaining to the various factors mentioned in this outline. It is necessary, therefore, that some such fact collection be made, that a study of training schools be made so that from the evidence presented there can be produced a standard which has a real basis in fact.

The necessity for detailed facts is more obvious when one realizes that such a rating scale as is here suggested must not be rigid. It must not be applied so much in terms of form and organization as in terms of content. It must not discourage originality and experimentation, and it must give full credit in the final score to any factor of unusual strength.

Nothing that I have learned since I have been in contact with social work has made me more optimistic about the professional possibilities of social work than this study, nothing has been to me a clearer indication of growth, change and progress, nothing that I could even imagine would be a greater challenge to the training schools.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL ABSTRACTS

The extended abstract service inaugurated by the *American Journal of Sociology* seems to the Committee on Social Abstracts to represent a satisfactory move in the direction of realizing the plan originally suggested. The Committee, therefore, considers that it would be wise to test out this service for the present, and also communicate with Miss Wilson, Library of League of Nations at Geneva, to ascertain whether the abstracts of sociological articles written in other languages may not be made available for American scholars by co-operating with the Geneva Library. Meanwhile, the Committee has proceeded to work upon an important proposal made in the last report given by Professor Park.

This proposal was a plan to organize and systematize social research in the sociological field.

The Committee presents the following plan which has been accepted by the Executive Committee of the American Sociological Society.

An organization to conduct research in the methods of research:

- A. To establish a continuous survey of the results of social investigations, social surveys, etc., which have been completed or are in the process of being made by various research agencies or research groups. This would be accomplished by:
 1. *Collection* at some central place of the published reports of such studies.
 2. *Classification* and cataloguing of these studies in accordance with a scheme of classification, satisfactory to scholars in the sociological field.
 3. Analysis and comparison of these research reports to disclose the *methods used in making the original investigation*.
- B. Such an enterprise would require:
 1. The full time of a research secretary on a salary.
 2. Necessary office space, equipment, and repository for the archives so collected.
 3. Continuation of the Committee on Social Abstracts to act as a board of scholars with supervisory and advisory powers to determine the policy to be followed and executed by the paid secretary.
- C. It is roughly estimated that a grant of \$10,000 a year, for a term of years, will provide the resources required to try out this plan.

The most important modifications in this plan suggested by any member of the Executive Committee were those made by Dr. Lucile Eaves. Her suggestions were (1) that the project avoid unnecessary duplication of existing collections of the reports of research studies when it selected

a central place, for the collection and cataloguing of this material; (2) that the project include provision for abstracting and publishing promptly reports of the results of social research and supply careful inductive, comparative studies of methods of research in which differences in results arrived at by different methods are carefully weighed. It seems to the Committee that this suggested modification should be incorporated in the scheme recommended.

The plan of an organization to conduct research in the methods of research, as outlined above, was submitted by the Chairman of the Committee to the directors of the following national foundations with the request that they consider the advisability of making an appropriation to enable the American Sociological Society to put the plan in operation: the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Commonwealth Fund, and the Carnegie Corporation.

The Chairman of the Committee has undertaken negotiations with Mr. J. G. Pyle, Librarian of the James Jerome Hill Reference Library of St. Paul, Minnesota, with a view to ascertaining whether this reference Library would consider co-operating with the American Sociological Society, in the furtherance of the present research project. It seemed entirely possible that the Hill Reference Library might supply space for filing the books and research reports desired by the Committee in the furtherance of its project and that in this way considerable expense for filing space, cataloguing, etc., might be saved. If a co-operating arrangement could be made it would be possible in this way to avoid duplicating existing collections of research works.

In undertaking these negotiations your Chairman has not committed the Committee or the Society to any arrangement, but has simply made inquiries which he hopes will lead to a satisfactory conclusion.

The Committee, therefore, recommends that a possible co-operative arrangement with the Hill Reference Library for carrying out that part of its research project which requires the collection and cataloguing of research reports be made the subject of further consideration in the event that no more satisfactory arrangement can be made with a more centrally located library or agency, such as the Russell Sage Foundation of New York City, or the John Crerar Library of Chicago.

Respectfully submitted,

F. STUART CHAPIN, University of Minnesota, *Chairman*

SUSAN M. KINGSBURY, Bryn Mawr College

ROBERT E. PARK, University of Chicago

U. G. WEATHERLY, University of Indiana

A. B. WOLFE, University of Texas

FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE TEACHING OF SOCIAL SCIENCE IN THE SCHOOLS

The Committee submits as its report the "Report of the Joint Commission on the Presentation of Social Studies in the Schools":

I. COMPOSITION AND DUTIES OF THE JOINT COMMISSION

The Joint Commission on the Presentation of Social Studies in the Schools was constituted by the appointment of two members from each of the following societies: The American Historical Association, the American Economic Association, the American Sociological Society, the American Political Science Association, the National Council of Geography Teachers, and the Association of Collegiate Schools of Business. These appointees received varying instructions from the parent societies, but, speaking generally, the Joint Commission was charged with two duties: (1) that of continuing the study of the presentation of social studies in secondary schools, and (2) that of planning appropriate co-operation with other agencies working in the same field.

II. PROPOSED CO-OPERATION WITH THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE SOCIAL STUDIES

Taking up the second of these duties, the Joint Commission recommends the action set forth below in connection with the National Council for the Social Studies.

The National Council for the Social Studies is constituted as a clearing-house in this field. Its membership is approximately one thousand. Its official organ is the *Historical Outlook*. At the next meeting of the Council, changes will be proposed in its constitution which, if adopted, will define the field of the Council to be that of discovering, and giving currency to objective information needed by workers in the social studies.

Other changes in the constitution will be proposed which, if adopted, will place the control of the organization in the hands of a group of persons made up of (1) three or four officers elected at the annual meetings, (2) the editor of the *Historical Outlook*, and (3) one representative from each of the following organizations: The American Historical Association;

the American Economic Association; the American Political Science Association; the American Sociological Society; the National Council of Geography Teachers; the Department of Superintendence of the National Education Association; the Elementary, Secondary, and Normal School Sections of the National Education Association; the National Society of College Teachers of Education; the regional associations of teachers of history and civics for New England, the Middle States and Maryland, the Mississippi Valley, the Southern States, and the Pacific Coast.

In view of the fact that (1) this reorganization of the National Council will make it the organization which best represents the various educational agencies fundamentally interested in the presentation of the social studies in our schools, and that (2) the National Council for Social Studies is already doing effective work and gives promise of even more effective work in the future, the Joint Commission recommends that the American Historical Association, the American Economic Association, the American Political Science Association, the American Sociological Society, and the National Council of Geography Teachers each authorize the appointment of one member to the board of directors of the National Council for Social Studies provided that the foregoing constitutional provisions be, in substance, put into effect by that body.

III. FORMULATIONS OF (1) THE PURPOSE OF THE SOCIAL STUDIES IN THE SCHOOLS AND (2) THE DISTINCTIVE CONTRIBUTION OF EACH FIELD OF STUDY

In connection with its duty of continuing the study of the presentation of the social studies in secondary schools, the Joint Commission has sought to render a service by formulating statements of (1) the purpose of the social studies in the schools and (2) the distinctive contribution of each field of social study to that purpose. In formulating these statements the Joint Commission tried to secure a consensus of expert opinion. It made preliminary inquiries from 100 historians, 100 political scientists, 100 geographers, 100 sociologists, and 100 economists. It then sent out to committees of 100, for further suggestions and criticisms, a formulation of the distinctive contribution of each field. On the basis of the replies received, the representatives of each field worked out, in co-operation with the other members of the Joint Commission, the tentative formulations appearing on pages 220-24 of this report.

The Joint Commission recommends *that these tentative formulations be received by the parent societies*. It further recommends *that each society print and mail, not later than February 1, 1923, a copy of these tentative*

formulations (pages 220-24) to each of its members with a request for still further suggestions and criticisms. It further recommends that the Joint Commission contemplated in IV below be authorized to draw up and secure publicity for a final formulation of (1) the purpose of the social studies in our schools and (2) the distinctive contribution of each field of study to that purpose.

IV. THE FUTURE OF THE JOINT COMMISSION

The Joint Commission hopes that the parent societies will feel that this experiment in co-operation among the social sciences is sufficiently promising to justify its continuance. It, therefore, recommends *that each parent society appoint two representatives on a similar Joint Commission for the year of 1923. It further recommends that this Joint Commission for 1923 be authorized to carry out the third recommendation of III above and to include in the scope of its activities the study of the presentation of the social studies at elementary, secondary, and collegiate levels.* As illustrations of some of the matters which might be taken up under this authorization, the following may be mentioned: (1) a social study program for elementary and secondary schools; (2) social science courses for college freshmen; (3) teacher training; (4) neglected opportunities of the social sciences in collegiate work; (5) the history of the teaching of the social studies; and (6) current experiments in the presentation of the social studies.

Respectfully submitted,

A. M. SCHLESINGER	}	<i>Representing the American Historical Association</i> [*]
W. H. KIEKHOFFER		
L. C. MARSHALL	}	<i>Representing the American Economic Association</i>
R. G. GETTELL		
W. J. SHEPARD	}	<i>Representing the American Political Science Association</i>
R. L. FINNEY		
E. C. HAYES	}	<i>Representing the American Sociological Society</i>
R. D. CALKINS		
EDITH PARKER	}	<i>Representing the National Coun- cil of Geography Teachers</i>
L. C. MARSHALL		
C. O. RUGGLES	}	<i>Representing the Association of Collegiate Schools of Business</i>

^{*} The other representative of the American Historical Association, Mr. Henry Johnson, was able to attend only the second of the three meetings of the Commission and considers his part in the proceedings insufficient to warrant him in attaching his name to the report.

TENTATIVE FORMULATIONS OF (1) THE PURPOSE OF THE SOCIAL STUDIES IN THE SCHOOLS AND (2) THE DISTINCTIVE CONTRIBUTION OF EACH FIELD OF STUDY

The following tentative formulations are submitted as a basis for suggestions and criticisms.

THE PURPOSE OF THE SOCIAL STUDIES IN OUR SCHOOLS

The organization of the social studies in the schools should be determined by the purpose for which those studies are introduced. Their purpose is to enable our youth to realize what it means to live in society, to appreciate how people have lived and do live together, and to understand the conditions essential to living together well; to the end that our youth may develop such abilities, inclinations, and ideals as may qualify them to take an intelligent and effective part in an evolving society.

THE DISTINCTIVE CONTRIBUTION OF HISTORY TO THE SOCIAL STUDIES

The distinctive contribution of history to the social studies is to portray human events and activities as they actually occurred; its guiding principles are continuity and development. Therefore these events and activities are not regarded as isolated and unrelated or as of equal importance. Every condition or event is conceived to be related to something that went before and to something that comes after. Conditions and events are deemed important in so far as they serve to throw light upon some course of development. More briefly, then, the special and peculiar function of history is to trace development.

History places, and helps to explain, successive stages in the development of mankind. It constantly extends backward the memory of living men and gives them a sense of perspective to aid them in forming their judgments on contemporary affairs. In the light of history our most valued social possessions are seen to be deeply rooted in the past but the world is viewed as undergoing a continuous process of adjustment and change. Finally, history seeks to give students an intelligent notion of those human activities, decisions, and achievements which lie behind our present-day institutions and problems.

THE DISTINCTIVE CONTRIBUTION OF ECONOMICS TO THE SOCIAL STUDIES

The distinctive contribution of economics to the social studies is the understanding it gives of the processes by which men get a living. A very large part of human activity is devoted to the process of getting a living. One of the most significant things about our world is the fact that nature does not gratuitously supply all, or even many, of the commodities and services desired. In consequence, we "struggle" to get a living;

we learn to "economize" (in the broadest sense of that term) in the selection and utilization of effective means of gaining desired ends. These activities are *our economic activities*. They are carried on largely in group life and, even when most individual, are affected by group life. Economics, then, promotes a realization of what it means to live together and an understanding of the conditions essential to living together well, because it helps to explain the organization and functioning of an evolving society from the point of view of the social processes of making a living.

Economics sets forth, for example, certain aspects of our specialization, our interdependence, our associative effort, our technological struggle with nature, our pecuniary organization of the production and sharing of goods, our utilization of labor under the wage system, our market exchange, our international economic relations, our scheme of private property and competitive effort—all of which have become vital parts of our present social organization—and it shows how all of these function in enabling us to work and to live together. Concerning these economic processes certain generalizations or laws have been worked out and they are available as standards or guides for individuals and for groups.

Living together well in a democracy will be furthered if its people take an intelligent part in the guidance of the process. It is in this connection that it becomes peculiarly important that there should be a widespread knowledge of economic generalizations. Since a large part of our activities are economic activities, problems of competition, combinations of capital and of labor, distribution of income in relation to the common welfare, trade, transportation, and finance (to cite only a few) will always receive a large share of attention by every society which is concerned in restraining, regulating, and promoting economic activities that affect the social welfare. If democracy is to succeed, a large number of its members must learn to form intelligent judgments upon economic issues—to make those wise choices between alternative courses of action which are the real essence of "economy" broadly conceived. They can do this only provided they come to know the general plan or organization of our economic life, and to appreciate the existence and character of economic law in both domestic and international relations.

THE DISTINCTIVE CONTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL SCIENCE TO THE SOCIAL STUDIES

Political science is the study of the state, a term which includes all forms of political organization. It deals with the life of men as organized under government and law. As its distinctive contribution

to the social studies, it gives an understanding of social control by means of law and of the promotion of general welfare by means of governmental action.

Political science includes a study of the organization and the activities of states, and of the principles and ideals which underlie political organization and activities. It deals with the relations among men which are controlled by the state, with the relations of men to the state itself, and with those aspects of international life that come under political control. It considers the problems of adjusting political authority to individual liberty, and of determining the distribution of governing power among the agencies through which the state's will is formed, expressed, and executed.

Political science seeks to develop in individuals a sense of their rights and responsibilities as members of the state, and a realization of the significance of law. It substitutes accurate information and intelligent opinion for emotions and prejudices as a basis for forming judgments in politics and world-affairs.

THE DISTINCTIVE CONTRIBUTION OF SOCIOLOGY TO THE SOCIAL STUDIES

The distinctive contribution of sociology to the social studies is to show that, however much may be allowed for individual initiative and for natural environment, human life has been conditioned more by its social setting than by any other cause. Understanding of the social setting results from study of society as a composite unity made up of many interrelated groups and carrying on many interdependent activities all of which are conditioned by certain ever present types of causation. The multitudinous and repetitious manifestations of these types of causation are more or less subject to statistical treatment and make up those trends of social change a full statement of which would be social laws. Sociology studies the various forms of causal relations between the activities of individuals that are always occurring in homes, schools, neighborhoods, crowds, publics, and wherever human beings meet, and that give rise to public opinion, customs, and institutions.

Sociology also studies the problems of population as affecting all types of social activity, the effects of small and large numbers, of sparse and dense distribution, of differences in the quality of the individuals who compose the population, both their inborn traits as determined by racial and family heredity and the acquired traits which result from prevalent vices, diseases, occupation, and mode of life. This branch of

sociology includes certain aspects of the problems of immigration, eugenics, and public health.

It studies the causes, prevention, and treatment of poverty and crime.

It makes a comparative study of different societies including the most primitive, which reveals the social origins and the method of progress. This comparative study shows that nothing is too repugnant to us to have been customary somewhere and that we must be slow to think that anything is too ideal to be possible sometime, for customs and institutions are as variable as the states of mind and feeling which issue from social causation.

The study of sociology tends to dissolve the prejudices and bigotries which are the chief obstacles to social co-operation by showing that such prejudices are mostly formed at an age when rational judgment on fundamental problems is impossible, and that in the overwhelming majority of instances those who differ from each other most radically would hold similar opinions and sentiments if they had been molded by similar influences.

Sociology affords a clear view of the aims of education for it shows that distinctively human nature is second nature socially acquired and that if from birth one could be excluded from all social contacts he would remain a naked savage and a dumb brute. It illuminates the methods of education by its study of the effects of social contacts, and it supplies materials for moral instruction in the schools by its study of the relations between society and the individual and of the interdependence of groups. Such study presents in its full light the fact that all social life is team work. It tends to evoke the spirit of co-operation. It reveals grounds for ethical requirements and sources of ethical incentive.

THE DISTINCTIVE CONTRIBUTION OF GEOGRAPHY TO THE SOCIAL STUDIES

As its distinctive contribution to the social studies, geography gives an understanding of earth conditions and natural resources as the material basis of social development by showing the relationships which exist between natural environment and the distribution, characteristics, and activities of man.

This understanding of the relationships between man and his natural environment is acquired largely through comparative studies of specific groups of people living in specific regions. Such studies show how variations in different peoples reflect the influences of their respective environ-

ments; in many cases they also lead to the discovery of geographic principles. A knowledge of these principles, or generalizations, contributes, among other things, to an appreciation of the wisdom of utilizing earth resources efficiently, and in many cases points the way toward a more harmonious adjustment of man to his environment.

The realization that differences in peoples result in part from differences in natural environment also helps to promote a sympathetic understanding of peoples in that it affords a key to the explanation of characteristics and attitudes likely otherwise to be misunderstood.

The study of the peoples of varied regions in different parts of the world discloses, moreover, their interdependence and reveals the fact that the environment affecting each group of people has come, through means of transportation and communication, to embrace practically the entire earth. The idea of earth unity derived from the realization of such interdependence is another contribution of geography to the social studies, and is essential to the understanding of world-affairs.

ROSS L. FINNEY, University of Minnesota

EDWARD CARY HAYES, University of Illinois

REPORT OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES

The American Sociological Society was represented at the Annual Meeting of the American Council of Learned Societies held in New York on January 28, 1922, by the undersigned. Reports of the officers indicated that the publication of the *Annual Bulletin* of the Council would have to be delayed owing to the fact that official reports of the Annual Meeting of the Union Académique had not yet been received. Aside from the slight financial contributions which the Council had been able to make toward the support of international undertakings, the chief interest of the Council centered about a proposal to study the ways and means of beginning a dictionary of national biography. It was agreed that America had need of such a publication and that the Council was the logical agency to initiate the enterprise. A committee was appointed to investigate and report. An arrangement has been made with the National Research Council for collaboration in reporting Doctors' dissertations on subjects within the fields of learning covered by the constituent societies. A committee was appointed to confer with the National Research Council on the question of an international language. A committee was appointed to consider the proposal of establishing a business corporation for organizing along lines of modern business efficiency the distribution and sales of journals published by the constituent societies. This proposal was made by the representatives of a large New York publishing house. A representative from the Council was elected to serve as a director of the University Center of Research of Washington, D.C.

Respectfully submitted,

F. STUART CHAPIN

PROGRAM OF THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, DECEMBER 27-29, 1922

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 27

- 8:00 P.M. Joint meeting with the American Economic Association and the American Statistical Association. Elizabethan Room, Congress Hotel. PRESIDENT WALTER DILL SCOTT, Northwestern University, presiding. Presidential Addresses: "Company *versus* Trade Unions." HENRY R. SEAGER. "The Adventure of Population Growth." WILLIAM S. ROSSITER. "The Moral Dualism of Machiavelli." JAMES P. LICHTENBERGER.
- 10:00 P.M. Smoker tendered by the University of Chicago and Northwestern University to the members of the American Sociological Society and the allied associations. Elizabethan Room, Congress Hotel.

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 28

- 10:00-12:00 A.M. Division on Social Theory and Social Evolution. In charge of U. G. WEATHERLY, Indiana University. "Neuro-psychic Technique in Social Evolution." L. L. BERNARD, University of Minnesota. "Some Neglected Points in Comte's Contribution to Social Theory." WALTER B. BODENHAFFER, Washington University. Discussion by CHARLES H. COOLEY, University of Michigan; FRANKLIN JOHNSON, Grinnell College; HARRY E. BARNES, Clark University.
- 12:30 P.M. Luncheon Conferences
(a) Conference on Community Problems in joint session with the National Community Center Association. "The Philosophy of Community Organization," ARTHUR EVANS WOODS, University of Michigan. "Report on the Study and Preliminary Organization of a Neighborhood of 30,000 Negroes," by NORMAN HOLMES, Columbus Hill Neighborhood Association, of New York City. Discussion by BRUCE L. MELVIN, Ohio Wesleyan University.

- EDWARD M. BARROWS, former Director of Community Centers in New Bedford, Mass., and JUSTICE F. L. SIDDONS, Chairman, Community Organization Board.
- 12:30 P.M. (b) Conference on Rural Sociology. In charge of JOHN M. GILLETTE, University of North Dakota.
 "The Professional Training of Rural Leaders." E. L. MORGAN, University of Missouri.
 Discussion by DWIGHT SANDERSON, Cornell University.
 "Rural Sociology as a College Discipline." PAUL L. VOGT, Philadelphia.
 Discussion by W. J. CAMPBELL, International Y.M.C.A. College.
 "Organizing Farmers for Political and Economic Action." CARL C. TAYLOR, North Carolina Agricultural College.
 Discussion by LLEWELLYN MACGARR, Ithaca, N.Y.
- 3:00-5:00 P.M. Division on Biological Factors in Social Causation. In charge of FRANK H. HANKINS, Smith College.
 "Individual Differences and Their Significance for Social Theory." FRANK H. HANKINS.
 "Presentation of the Doctrine of Evolution in the Social Sciences." W. C. CURTIS, Department of Zoölogy, University of Missouri.
 "Twins and the Relative Potency of Heredity and Environment in Development." HORATIO H. NEWMAN, Department of Zoölogy, University of Chicago.
- 5:00 P.M. Meeting of the Executive Committee. South Parlor, Auditorium Hotel.
- 8:00 P.M. Foundations of Education in Sociology. In charge of DAVID SNEDDEN, Professor of Educational Sociology, Columbia University.
 "Sociology, a Basic Science to Education." DAVID SNEDDEN.
 "Some Practical Applications of Sociology to Education." C. C. CERTAIN, Director of Language Education, Detroit Public Schools.
 "Sociological Bases of Education for Culture." CHARLES C. PETERS, Professor of Educational Sociology, Ohio Wesleyan University.
 "School Controls as Training for the Larger Social Control." WALTER R. SMITH, Professor of Educational Sociology, University of Kansas.

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 29

- 9:00 A.M. Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Society.
- 10:00-12:00 A.M. Division on Organization of Social Research. In charge of LUCILE EAVES, Simmons College.

"Research Based Chiefly on Field Work: Methods Used in the Children's Bureau." EMMA O. LUNDBERG, United States Children's Bureau.

Discussion by JOHN O'GRADY, Catholic University; IRENE FARNUM CONRAD, Cincinnati.

"Getting at Significant Social Situations in Foreign Countries." EDWARD A. ROSS, University of Wisconsin.

"Methods of Conducting Research Courses for College Students." F. STUART CHAPIN, University of Minnesota.

Discussion by EDITH ABBOTT, University of Chicago; ROBERT E. CHADDOCK, Columbia University.

12:30 P.M.

Luncheon Conferences

(a) Conference on the Teaching of Social Science. In charge of EDWARD CARY HAYES, University of Illinois.

Discussion introduced by EDWARD CARY HAYES; CHARLES A. ELLWOOD, University of Missouri; RAYMOND G. GETTELL, Amherst College; ROSS L. FINNEY, University of Minnesota.

(b) Conference on the Training of Social Workers. In charge of J. E. CUTLER, Western Reserve University.

"The Tufts Report on Education and Training for Social Work," J. L. GILLIN, University of Wisconsin.

"Deductions from a Questionnaire Study of Social Work Positions," PAUL T. BEISSER, American Association of Social Workers.

Discussion opened by PORTER R. LEE, New York School of Social Work; EDITH ABBOTT, University of Chicago; GEORGE B. MANGOLD, Missouri School of Social Economy.

3:00-5:00 P.M.

Division on Psychic Factors in Social Causation. In charge of EMORY S. BOGARDUS, University of Southern California.

"Psychoanalysis and the Subjective in Relation to Sociology." W. F. OGBURN, Columbia University.

Discussion by HERBERT A. MILLER, Oberlin College.

"Sociological Aspects of Coercion." CLARENCE M. CASE, Iowa State University.

Discussion by W. B. BODENHAFFER, Washington University.

"Mental Patterns in Social Evolution." CHARLES A. ELLWOOD, University of Missouri.

Discussion by L. L. BERNARD, University of Minnesota.

4:30 P.M.

The American Sociological Society is invited to join with the American Economic Association in a Memorial Session for DR. SIMON N. PATTEN. Elizabethan Room, Congress Hotel.

7:00 P.M.

Annual Dinner. Speakers: U. G. WEATHERLY, EDWARD A. ROSS, ALBION W. SMALL, FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS.

MEETING OF SECTION ON RURAL SOCIOLOGY

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 27

- 2:00-5:00 P.M. "Sociological Significance of the Rural Surveys of the Inter-church World Movement," EDWARD DE S. BRUNNER, Director Town and County Survey, Committee on Social and Religious Surveys, New York City.
Discussion led by WALTER BURR, Kansas State Agricultural College.
"Surveying the Farmers' Standard of Life," E. L. KIRKPATRICK, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, United States Department of Agriculture, 30 minutes.
Discussion led by JOHN M. GILLETTE, University of North Dakota.
Round Table Discussion: "Laboratory and Field Work for Elementary Courses in Rural Sociology." How much is desirable? What exercises are practicable and beneficial? E. R. GROVES, Boston University; W. E. GARNETT, Texas Agricultural and Mechanical College; C. E. LIVELY, Ohio State University; GEORGE H. VON TUNGELN, Iowa State College.

MEETING OF SECTION ON SOCIAL RESEARCH

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 27

- 9:00-12:00 A.M. Joint meeting of the National Community Center Association with the sections on Social Research and on Rural Sociology. Conference on "Studies in Community Organization."
"The Distribution of Poverty and Philanthropy in a Large Urban Community." ERLE FISKE YOUNG, University of Chicago.
"A Study of Districting and Organizing Communities in a Large City." SEYMOUR BARNARD, Brooklyn People's Institute.
"A Study in Rural Community Organization." JOHN H. KOLB, University of Wisconsin.
Discussion by DWIGHT SANDERSON, Cornell University; WALTER BURR, Kansas State Agricultural College.
- 2:00-5:00 P.M. ROBERT E. PARK, University of Chicago, presiding. "The Family as an Environment for Child Development." From the Standpoint of Psychiatry: FRANKWOOD E. WILLIAMS, National Committee for Mental Hygiene; From the Standpoint of the Study of Delinquency: MARION KENWORTHY, Vocational Guidance Bureau, New York City; From the Standpoint of Social Psychology: ELLSWORTH FARIS, University of Chicago.

THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY FOR THE FISCAL YEAR DECEMBER 15, 1921, TO DECEMBER 14, 1922

Membership Statement

The total membership of the American Sociological Society for the year 1922 is 1,031. The number of members in 1921 was 923. This gain of 108 members more than offsets the loss of members last year, giving the Society the largest membership in its history.

Membership in 1921.....	923
Members resigning.....	71
Members dropped.....	81
Members deceased.....	2
Total lost.....	154
Members renewing	
ex officio.....	1
exchange.....	6
paid.....	761
New members.....	262
Total members for 1922.....	1,031

Recommendations for Membership

The large number of applications for membership in 1922 is the result of recommendations made by members of the Society. A high proportion of these recommendations came from the general body of members, but large lists of applicants and of recommended persons were sent in by the following: W. G. Beach, L. L. Bernard, E. S. Bogardus, F. W. Blackmar, Mollie R. Carroll, F. R. Clow, J. E. Cutler, J. Q. Dealey, C. A. Ellwood, E. E. Eubank, J. M. Gillette, Alvin Good, E. R. Graves, E. C. Hayes, T. L. Harris, I. W. Howerth, W. J. Kirby, J. P. Lichtenberger, Josiah Morse, H. W. Odum, W. F. Ogburn, P. A. Parsons, S. A. Queen, E. A. Ross, H. M. Snyder, U. G. Weatherly, Hutton Webster, E. B. Woods.

Invitations for the 1923 Meeting

Invitations for the 1923 meeting have been received from Brown University, from Detroit, indorsed by the University of Michigan, and from the University of Southern California.

Deaths during the year

The secretary regrets to report the deaths of George Hitchcock, Rochester, England, and Professor Simon Patten, University of Pennsylvania.

Respectfully submitted,

ERNEST W. BURGESS, *Secretary*

REPORT OF THE FINANCE COMMITTEE

December 27, 1922

Your Committee has, with the assistance of a public accountant, examined the books of the American Sociological Society for the fiscal year ending December 14, 1922. The postings of the ledger have been checked and were found to be properly charged to the respective accounts. The balance in the bank as submitted by the depository agrees with the statement as to "Cash in Bank on December 14, 1922." The bond of the Northwestern Electric Company was examined and found satisfactory. We submit for your consideration Balance Sheet (Schedule "A") and Statement of Cash Receipts and Disbursements (Schedule "B") prepared by the Secretary-Treasurer, which were examined and found to be correct.

SCHEDULE "A"

BALANCE SHEET AS AT DECEMBER 15, 1922

Assets

Cash in bank		\$246.14
Office furniture	\$118.65	
Less depreciation—up to and including 1922	41.52	77.13
<i>Proceedings</i> , on hand, 1,295 vols. @ \$0.50		647.50
Investments, Northwestern Electric Co.		
6 per cent Gold Bond		500.00
		<u>\$1,470.77</u>

Liabilities

Surplus as at December 15, 1921	\$1,751.75	
Additions:		
<i>Proceedings</i> , on hand	\$647.50	
Deductions:		
Depreciation—Office Furniture	\$ 41.52	
Net Loss—Schedule "B"	886.96	928.48
Net deductions		280.98

\$1,470.77

SCHEDULE "B"

STATEMENT OF CASH RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS FROM DECEMBER 15, 1921,
TO DECEMBER 15, 1922*Cash Receipts*

Dues from members, 1922	\$2,748.72	
Dues from members, 1923	692.00	
		<u>\$3,440.72</u>
Exchange with remittances		9.95
Postage with remittances		4.08
Interest on bond		45.00
Interest on certificate of deposit		17.91
Sale of <i>Proceedings</i>		298.17
		<u>\$3,815.81</u>

Cash Disbursements

<i>American Journal of Sociology</i>	\$2,070.33
<i>Proceedings</i> , Volume XVI	1,830.72
Clerical aid, salaries, etc.	363.98
Postage and express	281.11
Printing	173.91
Stationery	131.10
Secretary's expense at annual meeting	82.11
Exchange on dues received	27.35
Refunds on membership	28.00
Auditing	10.00
Insurance	1.56
Miscellaneous, including office expense	2.60
	<hr/>
	\$5,002.77
Excess of disbursements over receipts	\$1,186.96

Summary

Balance, cash in bank, December 15, 1921	\$1,133.10
Total receipts for the period ending December 15, 1922, as above . . .	3,815.81
	<hr/>
	\$4,948.91
Total disbursements for the period ending December 15, 1922, as above	\$5,002.77
Less credit from the University of Chicago Press	300.00
	<hr/>
	\$4,702.77
Balance, cash in bank, December 15, 1922	\$ 246.14

Attention is called to the fact that the Statement of Cash Receipts and Disbursements (Schedule "B") includes in its cash receipts "Dues from members, 1923." If receipts from this source (\$692.00) had not been included in this statement, the balance of "Cash in Bank" December 15, 1922 (\$246.14) would have been an actual deficit of \$445.88. It should be noted, however, that this deficit was not incurred during the fiscal year (1922) which this report covers. The deficit for this year is only \$98.98 and the remainder (\$346.90) was incurred in the fiscal years of 1920 and 1921.

Your Committee begs leave to present, herewith, a comparative table of incomes and expenditures for the last five years, 1918-1922 inclusive, prepared by the Secretary-Treasurer. This table shows that the financial activities of the Society during the past year have been the greatest in recent years and that the deficit for 1922 is the smallest since 1919.

ANALYSIS OF ACTUAL INCOME AND EXPENDITURES 1917-1922

Year	Receipts from Dues	Total Receipts	Expenditures	Deficit	Cash Balance
1917.....					\$380.65
1918.....	\$2,415.35	\$2,810.70	\$2,863.87	\$ 53.17	327.48
1919.....	2,598.30	2,962.79	3,196.74	233.95	93.53
1920.....	3,172.50	3,591.96	3,815.90	233.94	-130.41
1921.....	3,708.50	4,400.73	4,617.22	216.49	-346.90
1922.....	4,228.72	4,903.79	5,002.77	98.98	-445.88

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is suggested that a comparative table of membership by years, setting forth the number of new members, withdrawals, total gain or loss in membership, as well as sources from which members are drawn be prepared each year.

It is suggested that the Executive Committee appoint an Editing Committee to assist the Managing Editor in the preparation of the *Proceedings*. Your Committee is mindful of the ever increasing cost of printing the *Proceedings* and suggests that for the sake of necessary economy on this item the proposed Editing Committee, together with the Managing Editor, limit the length of papers, to be included in the *Proceedings*, to space consistent with the time allotted to the presentation of the respective papers at the annual meetings. While this may necessitate specifying the time at the disposal of a given speaker in the invitation extended to him, your Committee is informed by competent authority that this practice is not without precedent and is adhered to by some societies of excellent standing.

It is suggested that in conformity with good practice, the Secretary-Treasurer be bonded for an amount not to exceed \$2,500.

It is suggested that life-membership be raised to \$60 for 1924 and \$75 for 1925. Your Committee is prompted to make this recommendation by the fact that the cost of life-membership in the American Sociological Society was not increased at the time when the annual membership dues were increased to \$4.

Your Committee begs leave to present herewith the first Annual Budget of the American Sociological Society. This budget covers the fiscal year ending December 15, 1923. The need for balancing the budget made the economies contemplated in some of the foregoing recommendations necessary.

In conclusion your Committee wishes to express its appreciation of the time, thought and energy which your Secretary-Treasurer, Ernest W. Burgess, devotes to the Society. He is ever watchful of its best interests and we feel that the gratitude of the Society is due him.

Respectfully submitted,

Finance Committee:

THOMAS D. ELIOT

M. J. KARPF, *Chairman*

TENTATIVE BUDGET

of the

American Sociological Society for the Fiscal Year of 1923

(December 15, 1922 to December 14, 1923)

Receipts

	Actual Receipts for 1921	Actual Receipts for 1922	Estimated Receipts for 1923
Dues from members	\$3,708.50	\$4,228.72	\$4,100.00
Sale of publications	424.84	298.17	300.00
Press credit	200.00	300.00	300.00
Interest on bond	45.00	45.00	30.00
Interest on certificate of deposit	17.91	18.00
Exchange and postage with remittance	22.39	14.01	19.00
Total receipts	\$4,400.73	\$4,903.80	\$4,767.00

Expenditures

	Actual Expenditures 1921	Actual Expenditures 1922	Estimated Expenditures 1923
<i>American Journal of Sociology</i>	\$1,853.16	\$2,070.33	\$2,050.00
<i>Proceedings</i>	1,452.30	1,830.72	1,500.00
Clerical aid, salaries	497.41	303.98	400.00
Postage and express	253.86	281.11	280.00
Printing	297.99	173.91	250.00
Stationery	114.80	131.10	130.00
Secretary's expense	87.53	82.11	25.00
Society membership American Council	40.00	40.00
Auditing	25.00	10.00	10.00
Exchange on dues	37.36	27.35	30.00
Refunds on memberships	52.00	28.00	40.00
Insurance	1.45	1.56	2.00
Miscellaneous expense	9.60	2.60	10.00
Total expenditures	\$4,617.22	\$5,002.77	\$4,767.00

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MANAGING EDITOR FOR THE FISCAL
YEAR, DECEMBER 15, 1921, TO DECEMBER 15, 1922

On December 15, the number of different volumes of the *Papers and Proceedings* on hand was as follows:

Volume	Copies	Volume	Copies
I.....	84	IX.....	37
II.....	4	X.....	188
III.....	0	XI.....	0
IV.....	46	XII.....	105
V.....	50	XIII.....	2
VI.....	0	XIV.....	48
VII.....	53	XV.....	330
VIII.....	79	XVI.....	269

The total number of volumes, 1,295, is forty-nine more than were reported last year.

Respectfully submitted,
ERNEST W. BURGESS, *Managing Editor*

THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

MINUTES OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS DECEMBER 28, 1922

The meeting was called to order at 5:00 P.M. by President Lichtenberger in the South Parlor of the Banquet Hall, the Auditorium Hotel. There were present in addition to the President and the Secretary, Professors Blackmar, Bogardus, Cooley, Eaves, Ellwood, Hayes, Kingsbury, O'Grady, Ross, and Weatherly.

As the minutes of the last business meeting were published in the *Proceedings*, a motion was made and carried that their reading be dispensed with. The report of the Secretary was read and approved. The report of the Finance Committee, made by its chairman, Mr. M. J. Karpf, was approved. The recommendations providing for the appointment of an Editing Committee for the *Proceedings*, the preparation of a comparative table of changes in membership by years, the bonding of the treasurer, the increase in life-membership from \$50 to \$60 in 1924 and to \$75 in 1925, and a budget for the year 1923, were adopted. Moved and carried that the program committee inform persons invited to prepare papers of the limitation of their length for publication and that reports of discussion of papers be abridged or omitted in printing at the discretion of the Editing Committee.

The report of the managing editor of the *Proceedings* was made and approved. The report of the annual meeting of the American Council of Learned Societies, made by Professor F. Stuart Chapin, the representative of the Society, was accepted.

The motion was made and carried that the President and Secretary be authorized to decide upon the time and place of the next meeting in consultation with the other social-science associations.

A report for the Committee on Social Abstracts was then presented by its chairman, Professor Chapin.

After a statement by President Lichtenberger of the problem of coordinating the many present and prospective research activities of the Society, especially those involving co-operation with other organizations, a motion was carried that the President report at the business meeting a plan for the organization of a standing committee on co-operation in research.

ERNEST W. BURGESS, *Secretary*

MINUTES OF ACTION TAKEN BY THE SOCIETY
THURSDAY MORNING, DECEMBER 28, 1922

After a statement by President Lichtenberger of a proposal to organize a Social Science Council a motion by Albion W. Small that "The Society approve the consideration of the establishment of a Social Science Council for the consideration of study and research in the various social sciences and the more effective and complete organization and development of social research, and authorize the President to appoint a committee to meet with representatives of the other social-science associations" was passed.

ERNEST W. BURGESS, *Secretary*

MINUTES OF THE
ANNUAL BUSINESS MEETING, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
DECEMBER 29, 1922

The meeting was called to order by President Lichtenberger at 9:00 A.M. in the Banquet Hall, the Auditorium Hotel. The reading of the minutes of the last business meeting was dispensed with, since they were printed in the *Proceedings*.

The Committee on Nominations (Edward A. Ross, *chairman*, Charles H. Cooley, Lucile Eaves, Edward C. Hayes, Albion W. Small) recommended the following persons for election to the indicated offices for 1923: president, Ulysses G. Weatherly; first vice-president, Charles A. Ellwood; second vice-president, Robert E. Park; secretary-treasurer, Ernest W. Burgess; new members of the Executive Committee, John L. Gillin and David Snedden. Motion made and carried that the nominations be closed and these nominees elected. Professor Ross reported that the Committee on Nominations recommends the appointment early in the year of this committee, and the publication of its personnel in the *American Journal of Sociology* so that the committee may receive suggestions of persons for the various offices.

The Committee on Social Research reported through its chairman, John L. Gillin, that in addition to public sessions, two informal conferences on methods of investigations had been held during the meetings and that the program for the next meeting would be selected upon the basis of information requested from members of the Society in regard to research in progress. The report was accepted.

The report of the Committee on Social Abstracts, read by the chairman, F. Stuart Chapin, printed elsewhere in the *Proceedings*, was made and accepted.

The report of the Committee on Resolutions (E. S. Bogardus, *chairman*, J. M. Gillette, and H. W. Odum) expressed the appreciation and thanks of the Society to the Local Committee, composed of Professors Faris, Eliot, and Siedenburb, to the management of the Auditorium Hotel, to the University

of Chicago and Northwestern University for the Smoker tendered the visiting associations, and to the City Club and the Women's City Club for the extension of guest privileges.

The Amendment to the Constitution, submitted after favorable action by the Executive Committee, providing that the payment for life-membership in the Society be increased from \$50 to \$60 after January 1, 1924, and to \$75 after January 1, 1925, was unanimously passed.

The report of the Committee on the Teaching of Social Sciences made by Edward C. Hayes recommended that the Society authorize the appointment of one member of the board of directors of the National Council for Social Studies and of two members to the Joint Commission on the Presentation of Social Studies in the Schools; and to authorize the Joint Commission to draw up and secure publicity for a final formulation of (1) the purpose of the social studies in our schools and (2) the distinctive contribution of each field of study to that purpose. Moved and carried that the recommendation be adopted and that the President appoint the representatives of the Society.

The following motion made by U. G. Weatherly that "The chairmen of the Committee on Social Research, the Committee on Social Abstracts, and the Committee on the Teaching of Social Science shall, with the President, constitute a Committee on Co-ordination and Co-operation in Research, to whom shall be referred present and future projects for joint research enterprises, with power to assign such projects to the proper Committee," was adopted.

A motion by Thomas J. Riley "that the President be requested and authorized to appoint a committee to collaborate with a similar committee already appointed by the National Conference of Social Work to consider the value and adaptability of the records of social-work organizations and public welfare departments for scientific and teaching purposes and to make such consequent recommendations to the societies as may seem to the committees advisable" was referred to the Committee on Social Research with power to act in co-operation with the Committee from the National Conference of Social Work.

A motion made by Jerome Davis that "A Committee on International Relations of the American Sociological Society be hereby appointed by the President to study into the present methods used by our government in securing international information and also the way in which international news is gathered and given out to the American people by public and private agencies, and the possibilities of closer fraternal relations with sociological societies in Europe together with such other information or suggested changes as the committee thinks advisable; and to make its report at the next annual meeting of the Society," was passed.

About ninety members of the Society were present when the business meeting adjourned at 10:00 A.M.

ERNEST W. BURGESS, *Secretary*

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

MEMBERSHIP LIST FOR THE YEAR 1923

- ABBOTT, EDITH, Box 77, Faculty Exchange, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
- ABBOTT, GRACE, The Ontario, Washington, D.C.
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- ADDAMS, Jane, Hull House, 800 S. Halsted St., Chicago, Ill.
- ALBRIGHT, JOHN, Colfax, Ind.
- ALBRIGHT, LELLA R., Wellesley College, Wellesley, Mass.
- ALBRIGHT, JOHN, University
- ALSCHULER, DOROTHY, 420 N. Murray St., Madison, Wis.
- AMANN, DOROTHY, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Tex.
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- BOND, REV. CHARLES M., Ohio University, Athens, Ohio
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- BROGAN, A. P., University of Texas, Austin, Tex.
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- BROWN, ROY M., State Board of Charities and Public Welfare, Raleigh, N.C.
- BROWN, THOMAS I., Morgan College, Baltimore, Md.
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- BURDETTE, MRS. ROBERT J., Hotel Maryland, Pasadena, Cal.
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- BURGESS, E. W., University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
- BURKE, W. W., 975 E. 60th St., Chicago, Ill.
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- BURNET, PHILIP, Continental Life Insurance Company, Wilmington, Del.
- BURNHAM, E. LEWIS, Berwyn, Pa.
- BURNHAM, ERNEST, 1532 Grand Ave., Kalamazoo, Mich.
- BURR, WALTER, Kansas State Agricultural College, Manhattan, Kan.
- BURTON, ERNEST R., Economics Department, Brown University, Providence, R.I.
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